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ABSTRACT 
It is known that the presence of information related to, but not necessary 
for the completion of a speeded experimental task can affect 
performance. Previous studies involving such 'contextual' effects with 
information in verbal and nonverbal form have produced mixed results 
which have been attributed to differing underlying processing 
mechanisms. The present work examines the extent to which some 
possible mechanisms could, in common, account for within- and cross-
modality contextual effects. 'Priming' information relating to 
typographic case was presented over time intervals varying up to 
480 msec before, and up to 480 msec after, a target to which a speeded 
category-decision was indicated by a left- or right-hand key-press. 
Within-attribute' case-priming was effected using a letter string printed 
either in upper- or lower-case (e.g., `dghej', or 'YFLRB') paired with a 
similar target for case-decision. Within-attribute name-priming upon 
name-decision was similarly achieved using the case-denoting words 
`upper' and 'lower'. 'Cross-attribute' priming was possible through name 
information priming case-decisions (e.g., `upper-YFLRB'), or, case 
information priming name-decisions (e.g., 'YFLRB-upper'). The 
combined effects of case- and name-priming upon case-decision were 
also investigated using case-denoting words printed in either one or other 
of the two typographic cases (e.g., `upper-yflrb', or `UPPER-yflrb'). 
Relatively short decision latencies accompanied by relatively low error 
rates occurred when targets were preceded by congruent within-attribute 
primes. Incongruent priming led to slower responses with higher error 
rates. Similar effects were obtained with name-priming of case-decisions 
although, in comparison to within-attribute priming, these occurred after 
longer prime pre-exposures. Case-priming effects upon name-decisions 
were obtained for simultaneous as well as pre-exposed primes, however, 
congruent as well as incongruent case-priming led to relatively slow 
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decision latencies and higher error rates. Combined congruent case and 
name information speeded case-decisions in comparison to congruent 
case information alone. However the converse did not occur; increase in 
case-decision latency with incongruent case and name information 
combined was no greater than with incongruent case information alone. 
It has been argued that the results are consistent with models which 
propose that input is initially subject to encoding where 'activation' may 
spread automatically among interconnected verbal or nonverbal 
representations. In particular, this could partly account for speeded 
responses obtained with congruent primes. Relatively shorter decision 
latencies can also be attributed to subsequent decision processes and the 
generation of responses. The results also suggest that relatively longer 
latencies could arise from competing incompatible responses having to 
be suppressed. It has been further argued that relative speed of processing 
different stimulus attributes and the form of experimental task can be 
major determinants in the detection of contextual effects. 
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CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
One of the concerns within psychology today is the nature of the mental 
processes which underlie our perceptions and actions, and the nature of 
the mechanisms which might support these processes. What lies within, 
however, may also depend upon what lies without. In general our 
environment provides a context within which we operate. That context 
may be described in terms of what is presently around us or in terms of 
past events. One way that we may attempt to discover the nature of what 
lies within is to manipulate what lies without and then make inferences 
on the basis of any effects that may be detected. This approach, of 
course, is by no means new and most of the activities of psychologists 
may be interpretable in terms of the study of contextual effects. It can 
thus be argued that the study of contextual effects is potentially very 
broad and before a focus is attempted some of the approaches that have 
been adopted in the past to the description and investigation of context 
and its effects will be briefly examined. 
That the mind is an arena where past experiences may affect present and 
succeeding experiences is a notion that has been with us at least since the 
early Greek philosophers. For Aristotle the contents of the mind 
consisted essentially of images derived from previous sensations; mental 
organisation and functioning were considered to be largely determined 
by the order in which those images were presented. One way in which 
this was expressed was through a principle of 'association by contiguity'. 
This principle could, for example, be used to account for the way that 
one thought may arise from another and for the observation that items 
previously presented together were more likely to be recalled together. 
The associationist account of our mental experience also held an 
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influential position in post-Renaissance philosophy with such figures as 
Hobbes, Locke, Hartley and Brown providing modifications. For 
example, Brown (c. 1820) expanded upon the theories available at the 
time through considering the observation that while on one occasion a 
bell may remind one, say, of a church service on another occasion it may 
remind one of a farmyard. In order to explain the strength, life-span and 
occurrence of such associations the concepts of frequency, recency and 
vividness were applied. 
Although association had accounted for many common mental 
phenomena limitations in its explanatory potential were also evident. In 
the mid nineteenth century it was noted by Bain that although on some 
occasions experiences that had a degree of contiguity became associated 
there were also occasions when association was not apparent. It appeared 
that association was influenced by such factors as cause-effect, likeness 
and difference. However for such influences to occur it could be argued 
that some form of selectivity might operate prior to association. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, then, the explanation of present 
experiences in terms of past experiences had become complicated not 
only by virtue of a variety of factors concerning the history or form of 
their exposure but also because of the possibility of other mental 
activities that had yet to be explored. 
Although an associationist account of the mind remained dominant 
within Western philosophy almost until the beginning of the twentieth 
century any developments were bounded by a single method of study 
that had been adopted. This method can also be traced back to Aristotle 
who believed that while thoughts could be the material of science they 
enjoyed a 'subjective' existence which was quite distinct from an 
`objective' one. The mind was thus considered to be an entity which was 
only capable of being studied introspectively rather than through external 
observation. On this basis over the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries psychologists in the Wundtian tradition developed methods of 
training subjects to systematically report their own mental experience. A 
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major limitation of this introspective approach was opined by 
Galton (1883) who regarded the window on the mind afforded by the 
mental experience of which we were conscious to be but a small one in a 
vast array of automatic brain work. Galton, however, arrived at this 
conclusion through the use of introspective techniques; other 
experimental techniques which might have enabled him to explore new 
areas were not available. 
A method that was to supersede introspection emerged initially as a 
result of what was essentially a contextual or priming effect arising 
within the course of physiological work. In 1902 Pavlov, while studying 
the salivary responses of dogs to food, noticed that if a dog saw a feeding 
bowl or heard the sound of the footsteps of an attendant who would 
normally deliver food then an increase in salivation would result 
regardless of whether food was presented or not. The finding from 
further investigations that salivation was predictable and even 
controllable from a variety of contextual events that were associated with 
the presentation of food led to the development of a science that was 
based upon behaviours that were observable. One of the early developers 
and popularizers of such a behaviourist approach was Watson who also 
demonstrated that the prediction and control of behaviour that was 
obtainable with animals was also obtainable with humans. As opposed to 
the data from introspections which were not generally available the data 
from the experimental studies that characterised behaviourism had an 
appeal because they were regarded as objective and available to all 
observers. The implications of behaviourism for contemporary 
psychology were profound: the notion of thought as a complex form of 
behaviour began to take root and psychology became defined as a 
science of behaviour rather than as a science of consciousness. 
In spite of the radical change in method, then, the behaviourists were 
studying another facet of a contextual phenomenon which had occupied 
the associationists, namely, the effect of past events. Through 
behaviourism it was possible to find out what responses or memories 
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might become associated as a result of the control of the spatial and 
temporal contiguity of external events. In the same way that only the 
conscious products of mental processing were considered by the 
introspectionists only the observable behaviours were considered by 
behaviourists. 
A major question left unanswered both by introspectionists and 
behaviourists, however, concerns why contextual, or, associative effects 
might occur. If one is to attempt to consider the nature of the 
mechanisms that may underlie what we are conscious of or how we act 
then one has to look beyond the psychological work so far identified. An 
approach to psychology that was concerned with the description of 
underlying mechanisms emerged in Europe in the early part of this 
century as a result of attempts to study mental illness. The idea that 
mental activity could take place unconsciously was being developed by 
psychoanalysts who argued that much of human behaviour resulted from 
unconscious motives. The psychoanalytic theories which became 
established were concerned largely with how human feelings and 
emotion could be related to previous experience. 
At about the same time as psychoanalytic theory was emerging there was 
a group of people in Germany who were concerned with the analysis of 
the conditions that gave rise to particular perceptions. This 'Gestalt' 
movement was concerned with the way that sensations were organized 
and made into patterns which could be recognized and manipulated. To 
this end a series of 'laws of context' or perceptual organization were 
formulated which drew attention to the more microscopic elements of 
our experience. The 'law of proximity', for example, described the 
grouping of items in terms of their spatial or temporal nearness while the 
`law of good continuation' refers to the way we may predict ahead or 
simply to 'fill a gap' in an existing spatial or temporal array. 
Buhler (1908) emphasised the importance of a 'field' or activated 
knowledge base available to the perceiver; the relationship between field 
and prior events thus being a prominent one. In addition to looking at 
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how different aspects of our experience may be related, Gestalt 
psychology was concerned with the active nature of the mind; this 
contrasted with the reactive portrait that was being offered by the 
behaviourists. Kohler (1925), for example, in his study of chimpanzees 
used the term 'insight' to imply that the animals were capable of 
organizing their perceptions of the environment so that problem-solving 
behaviour of an active and purposeful nature was possible. Although 
Gestalt psychologists managed to formulate laws such as those of 
perceptual organization their overall theoretical approach was not clearly 
defined and a precise scientific method of investigation was not 
developed within this context. This, coupled with the effects of Nazism 
in Germany, has led largely to the decline of Gestalt psychology. 
The behaviourist and the psychoanalytic movement have continued to be 
influential, and further work relating to Gestalt principles has been 
carried out by those such as Gibson (1979). However more recently 
much of the activity of psychologists has been marked by the 
development of a so-called 'cognitive' approach. As with the earlier 
approaches the effects of context have a place within cognitive 
psychology. However before context in particular is focused upon the 
nature of cognitive psychology itself will first be introduced. 
Although 'cognition' may simply refer to knowledge a central tenet in 
cognitive psychology is that the mind is an active agent, and the aim has 
been to try to establish what kind of mechanisms underlie our thoughts, 
perceptions and behaviours. One of the pioneers in this field was Neisser 
who in the 'sixties was using vocabulary and concepts that were not 
unfamiliar to the world of computing; these, for example, included 
`information', 'processing', 'system', 'subroutine', 'input', and 'coding'. 
In particular it was also noted by Neisser (1976) that computers accept 
and classify input, manipulate symbols, recognise patterns, and store and 
retrieve items from a memory, and that these activities seemed to bear 
some resemblance to cognitive processes. Although it was not 
necessarily the belief that computers functioned internally in the same 
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way as the mind the importance of the reference to computers was that 
they provided a concrete manifestation of some putative mental 
processes. Such concrete manifestations provided a focus strong enough 
to withstand extended study applicable to the psychological domain. An 
information-processing metaphor, then, provides the basis for a general 
theoretical framework within which cognitive psychologists hope to 
account for the activities of the mind. 
In order to investigate internal mental mechanisms cognitive 
psychologists have adopted a scientific approach in the sense that the 
importance of testable theories and observable data is acknowledged. In 
this respect the mental events occurring within an individual while not 
being generally observable must be inferred indirectly from objective 
data. Since one form of objective data is observable behaviour cognitive 
psychology is at least in part a behavioural psychology in terms of its 
method although, of course, it remains distinct from behaviourism in 
terms of its content. In comparison to Gestalt psychology cognitive 
psychology addresses similar questions in terms of content but has the 
advantage of analytical tools, of which the notion of an information 
processing system is an example, and, experimental techniques which 
were not available to Gestalt psychologists. 
At this stage it should, however, be remembered that the mind is a 
witness to what we do as well as to what we experience mentally. On this 
basis it may be argued that any method based solely on behaviour or on 
introspection will be an impoverished one. If one is to further develop an 
eclectic approach then it may also be argued that a study of the brain is 
relevant. This argument may be evidenced by the fact that many 
psychological texts contain information on the physical and chemical 
structure of the brain together with techniques correlating perceptions 
and behaviours with electrical activity, physical impairment or the 
presence of certain chemicals. That both physiological and 
phenomenological approaches have a place within cognitive psychology 
has been argued by Posner (1978) who considers the information 
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processing metaphor as one which is capable of accommodating mental 
phenomena as the output of a specialized processing system while a 
consideration of the progress of information through different stages of a 
system is not out of keeping with physiological analyses. 
The cognitive approach remains an active one with many variations on 
the information-processing metaphor being offered in conjunction with a 
variety of investigative techniques and the implications for the effects of 
context are many. In the next section some processing mechanisms and 
concepts that have been developed by cognitive psychologists are 
outlined. In view of the theme that has already been introduced some 
pointers regarding contextual effects in relation to the mechanisms 
outlined are also included. However it should be noted that at this stage 
the intention is only to introduce some possible mental structures and the 
main issues relating to them. On this basis a comprehensive justification 
of the mechanisms both in conceptual and empirical terms is not 
attempted; the empirical detail that is included is intended mainly to 
illustrate rather than justify the issues concerned. A more focused and 
rigorous discussion follows in Chapter 3. 
MECHANISMS AND MODELS 
Early Processing and the Notion of Levels 
It is a fairly well-established neurophysiological notion that input to the 
perceptual system is processed at different levels. Within the visual 
sensory system dominant structural features exist such as the retina, the 
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and the visual cortex. The visual cortex 
itself is arranged anatomically in layers represented by the location of 
successive synapses and the well-known findings by Hubel and 
Wiesel (1962), for example, suggest a certain hierarchy: at the layer 
where incoming fibres from the LGN terminate there exist 'simple' cells 
which respond to such basic visual features as edges and lines in 
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particular parts of the visual field. At the next level there are 'complex' 
cells which respond maximally when more abstract conditions are met; 
position in the visual field for example becomes less important. 
`Hypercomplex' cells at the next level respond with further conditions 
relating to such factors as line length or direction of motion. From this it 
has been argued that visual input is processed initially in small steps; 
each step using information provided by previous steps. However it 
should also be noted that further physiological studies in this area (see, 
for example, a review by Van Essen, 1979) suggest that the topography 
is a complex one which is characterised by many interconnections among 
visual areas which are not arranged in a straightforward way. 
Hubel and Weisel's work is confined only to relatively basic neural 
mechanisms and it is tempting to extend the principle and postulate the 
existence of detectors of such complexity that they might respond only to 
a particular person or object. Konorski (1967) for example has developed 
this idea to include cells or 'gnostic units' which play a role in the 
recognition of relatively highly abstracted units of visual pattern. Hubel 
and Wiesel, however, used cell depolarization as an index and their work 
is essentially physiological. 
Within the psychological domain similar ideas about processing stages 
abound. For example Craik and Lockhart (1972) have adopted the levels 
of processing concept. When applied to language relatively low levels of 
processing are said to correspond to simple graphemic or phonic 
features, these are then combined so that letters and word-names form 
intermediate stages while associations, categorizations and other 
semantic features form the substance of the higher levels. This approach 
also has implications for memory as it is assumed that information that is 
processed to a higher level, or more 'deeply', is also encoded more 
extensively and forgotten less easily. The work by Craik & 
Tulving (1975) lends empirical support to this view. Interpreted in an 
extreme form this approach also suggests that information-processing is 
serial in nature. As a result of input being processed through a series of 
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stages our perceptions and our actions may be based on more abstract or 
semantic representations. 
If elementary features or primitives are assumed to exist, then within the 
visual domain Hubel and Wiesel's work may lead to the suggestion that 
lines and angles are among the basic units of our perceptual processes. 
Many attempts at an analysis of the nature of the processing of words 
assume the existence of an initial stage where the contours of parts of a 
word or letter are considered as elementary distinctive features. It is 
assumed in this distinctive features approach (e.g., Massaro and 
Schmuller, 1975) that letters can be resolved into a set of graphemic 
entities upon which the categorization of input is based. Elementary 
features have not only been described in terms of lines and angles; 
among other suggestions is the idea that spatial frequencies may serve as 
a basis (e.g., Kinchla, 1977). The above theories have not been the 
subject of extensive exploration and the same is generally true of the 
early processing of letters and words. Henderson (1982) has pointed out 
that this may be due to a widespread tacit assumption regarding 
distinctive features along with a further assumption that the goal of initial 
processing is to identify each of the letters comprising a word-form. In 
this latter case it is thought that little would be lost when attempting to 
understand the later stages in word processing which in some ways are 
easier to investigate. 
In general, then, the theoretical approaches that prevail either state 
explicitly or merely imply that incoming sensory data are processed first 
in terms of basic physical features from where they may be processed to 
varying degrees or levels of abstraction. In some ways it may appear 
logical to consider the course of processing as one beginning with input 
at a sensory receptor such as the eye. Here one may imagine sensory 
information providing the 'driving force' so that it is progressively built 
upon in a hierarchical fashion, gradually taking on some mental shape 
until a percept is arrived at. The terms 'bottom-up' or 'data-driven' have 
been commonly used with reference to this. A problem with this 
20 
approach, however, may be illustrated by those pictures where a 
camouflaged or disguised object is not readily perceived unless a clue is 
given as to its identity. Thereafter the difficulty is generally not 
experienced upon subsequent presentation of the same pictures. Such an 
effect suggests the possibility that information already available at higher 
levels actively influences the outcome of processing initiated at lower-
levels. The terms 'top-down' or 'conceptually driven' processing have 
thus been used; input is at least partly analysed in terms of what is 
expected, the expectations arising from existing stored high-level 
representations. The notion of top-down processing is of importance to 
the general idea, expressed by those such as Gregory (1980), that 
perceptions are hypotheses. With this in mind it may be regarded as 
essential that any mechanisms that are suggested allow for the provision 
of top-down processing. 
If it is assumed for the moment that the starting point of the visual 
process is the detection of features then a question which arises concerns 
how featural information may be used to allow the recognition of larger 
units of information including whole object shapes. A number of models 
have been developed which suggest in some detail the mechanisms that 
might be responsible for the processing of input from the earlier stages. 
A 'template' model which relies on detectors which are finely tuned to 
respond to the shapes of particular objects may be one possibility, 
however there is an obvious problem regarding the number of detectors 
necessary to deal with the many possible variations of both object and 
viewpoint. In view of the problems regarding the plausibility of template 
models the recent focus has been on models which have a number of 
intermediate stages and methods of abstraction. Some of these are now 
briefly discussed. However since the immediate emphasis is on the 
different types of model detailed justifications have been avoided; any 
empirical details serve only to illustrate the nature of a model. 
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Pandemonium 
An early model characterised by a series of processing stages that may 
underlie object recognition was the 'Pandemonium model' proposed by 
Selfridge (1959). The existence of detectors known as 'demons' was 
posited; they 'shout' when they detect a particular item. Demons are 
arranged hierarchically, the lowest-level 'image demons' record the 
arrival of an external signal. 'Feature demons' detect such basic features 
as certain types of line and angle while 'cognitive demons' are 
responsible for detecting more complex patterns; a letter for example. 
Demons listen to shouts from lower-levels and, according to how much 
information is relevant to their pattern of interest, they shout to the upper 
levels (hence `pandemonium'). Eventually a 'decision demon' listening 
to the cognitive demons decides which is shouting the loudest and selects 
the corresponding pattern as the one most likely to correspond best to the 
input. This kind of model has been used to illustrate the process of letter 
recognition; cognitive demons being responsible for individual letter 
patterns. In principle, since a letter can be likened to any other object this 
model should also be applicable to the recognition of whole words and 
other types of object. The effects of context may also be included by the 
addition of contextual demons, however this is essentially an add-on 
feature to a model where the progress of recognition is determined by the 
activity of lower-level demons. The effects that may give rise to lower-
level activity being influenced by such top-down factors as expectancy or 
perceptual set do not fall easily within its compass. Although the 
pandemonium model is an interesting metaphor it has not been 
rigorously developed in relation to empirical work. 
Marr's model of Object Recognition 
More recently, work carried out by Marr and his colleagues has received 
widespread attention. While Marr was initially concerned with the 
computations that may occur within neural structures this concern gave 
way to the overall functions that might be undertaken by such structures. 
22 
As a result of this he worked within the field of artificial intelligence and 
developed a model representing processes underlying object recognition. 
Man- 
 (1982) attempts to account in some detail for the processes linking 
a retinal image to the production of a semantic statement relating the 
image to specific knowledge of known objects. The retinal image or 
`grey-level array' is analysed in terms of transitions in intensity, the 
result being a 'primal sketch' which is effectively a representation of 
image contours. The next stage of analysis attempts to sort out which of 
the contours represent the object outline and which contours represent 
the form of the object (or background) in terms of the orientation of 
surfaces in space. Up to this point no specific knowledge of particular 
objects is necessary; the resulting 'two-and-a-half-dimensional sketch' 
representing figure and ground is achieved through fundamental 
assumptions concerning the properties of matter such as that objects are 
relatively immutable and exist in one place at any one time and, 
appealing to various general perceptual processes, utilising depth cues 
such as motion parallax, stereopsis, perspective and shadow. At this 
stage only one view of the external scene is represented and this view 
may not link directly with existing knowledge which may have been 
modelled from other views of the world. In order for this link to take 
place the existing 'viewer-centred' analysis has to be generalised so that 
an 'object-centred' description, or model, is formed. This is achieved 
through deriving from the two-and-a-half-dimensional sketch a set of, 
what Man calls, three-dimensional 'generalized cones'. The cones may 
be of varying size, with a major axis and may be linked. At this point the 
set of cones may be compared with a stored set of three-dimensional 
models representing the stored specific knowledge of the viewer. 
Comparison can take place at varying levels of detail implying a 
hierarchy in terms of description, for example a human being may 
register in terms of anything from 'upright object' to 'Aunt Mary'. 
Since the work of Man and his colleagues has been expressed principally 
as a computer model the extent to which it represents human mental 
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functioning is, of course, open to question. Additionally, while Marr's 
work may have contributed to an understanding of what a visual analysis 
may be trying to achieve the model is one that is essentially driven by 
input. If it were not for Man's untimely death it is possible that top-down 
mechanisms might have been incorporated more fully into the model; the 
paper by Man and Nishihara (1978), for example, is suggestive of this. 
Models Concerned Specifically with Word-Recognition 
The prominent position enjoyed by verbal language within western 
culture has had implications for mental models. This is evident in so far 
that many cognitive psychologists have concerned themselves 
specifically with the processing of language. The recognition of words 
has in turn received much attention and models relating to this abound. 
Since such models are numerous a comprehensive coverage will not be 
attempted. Instead a summary of the main mechanisms and types of 
word-recognition model is provided. A general issue relevant to the 
analysis of the process of word-recognition is concerned with the 
existence of mediating perceptual units. Such units may, for example, 
include whole words, parts of words or letters. Any mediating units may 
also vary in form as well as in size as is evidenced in the interest that has 
been paid to the notion of phonological mediation as an alternative to 
visual access. 
Letter Mediation 
If, as with objects, one were to develop a model of word-recognition in 
terms of perceptual units of varying complexity it might seem natural to 
envisage processing of individual letters as a mediating factor. This is of 
course an issue, even if letter units did act as mediators this does not 
necessarily mean that the identification of individual letters is an 
independent operation that always precedes the recognition of a word-
attribute such as name. One example that is often used to illustrate this 
24 
point is the occurrence of 'kV in 'THE' and 'CAT' (Selfridge, 1955). The 
fact that words composed of incomplete or half letters can still be read 
provides further support. Even if it is not argued that attributes such as 
word-names may be recognised independently of letter elements the 
effects of context still need to be understood. Letter identification, and 
also the recognition of many word-attributes, may depend upon 
interactions among various levels of processing, each level providing a 
context for the other. 
It is also a possibility that within the representing world letters may not 
necessarily exist as physical letter forms but instead in terms of abstract 
graphemes. This has been suggested by McClelland (1976) who found 
that subjects' performance at reporting the typographic case of correctly 
identified words presented at threshold was poor. However these results 
require careful interpretation. Although McClelland required a report on 
case this attribute was not relevant to the experimental task. It is thus 
possible that the physical form of a letter might have been represented 
but not have been recoverable in those terms. Coltheart (1981) has 
suggested a model where units responsible for recognising the letter-
form of an incoming stimulus output into an 'abstract letter identity unit' 
before a word-representation is activated. The existence of an abstract 
letter identity unit is supported by Evett and Humphreys (1981). Here it 
was found that when a word such as 'point' was briefly presented and 
followed by a mask consisting of randomly arranged letter fragments, so 
that subjects were not aware of its presence, then identification of the 
word 'POINT' similarly obscured, but to a lesser extent, was 
significantly more accurate than if it had been preceded by 'gravy' which 
is graphemically dissimilar. The word 'paint' and the nonword `pair' , 
which have letters in common with 'POINT', similarly led to improved 
identification. An important aspect of the results in support of the notion 
of abstract letter units rather than mere similarities in graphical form was 
that the degree of improvement in performance was not significantly 
different if the effects of letters which are similar regardless of case such 
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as `s' and `S' were compared with the effects of letters such as 'a' and 
`A' which have greater differences in visual form. 
Should abstract letter identity units exist a further question arises 
regarding the nature of the information that is required for a string of 
letters to be recognised as a particular word. Categorizing input in terms 
of abstract letter units may be insufficient for word-recognition without 
further information relating to positions of letters within a string. It is 
here, perhaps, that a major difficulty arises when trying to formulate a 
mechanism that will cater for all the possible letter positions occurring 
within words ranging in length from one to a dozen or more letters. A 
further issue relevant to the mediation of abstract letter units within 
word-recognition concerns the role of word-shape. The overall 'outline' 
or 'envelope' of a word has been considered to be an important factor in 
the identification of words; with reference to this the difficulty of reading 
upper-case text has been compared to reading lower-case text. On this 
basis it has been argued that a model incorporating abstract letter identity 
units would have problems since word-shape information would soon be 
lost. However the importance of a physical feature such as word-shape 
upon word-recognition may be questioned by the findings from some 
experiments where normal word-shape was disrupted by the use of letters 
printed in alternating cases. Here it was found that both word-recognition 
(Besner, 1980) and reading aloud (Cohen and Freeman, 1979) were not 
significantly affected in comparison to normally printed words. 
Phonological Mediation 
Models which consider phonological coding to be necessarily involved 
in the recognition of printed words have been suggested by those such as 
Gough (1972), and Spoehr and Smith (1973). Generally such models are 
based upon rules governing the conversion of graphemes to phonemes. 
Among the difficulties that arise with such models is their inability to 
deal with homophones and irregular pronunciations. Evidence of such 
difficulties has also been found empirically; for example Baron (1973) 
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found that phrases which were phonologically meaningful but visually 
meaningless (e.g., tie the not) were judged as meaningless just as quickly 
as strings of words which were both visually and phonologically 
meaningless (e.g., eat the walk). Models where phonological mediation 
is assumed to be both necessary and sufficient for word-recognition are 
generally not of current interest as it is now assumed that recognition and 
access to meaning can be carried out independently of phonological 
coding when words are presented visually. This of course does not deny 
that phonological recoding can have a role in the process of word-
recognition. 
Access to Lexical Entries 
Given that the essential nature of the role of such mediating elements as 
letters, word-shape and sound is not easy to determine another approach 
to visual word-recognition that has been explored is one where whole 
words are considered as perceptual units. Within this approach the 
concern is how a particular item of input accesses a unique lexical entry, 
that is, one of a collection of many word-representations inside the head. 
Recently Can and Pollatsek (1985) have attempted to categorise such 
models of word-recognition. Their groupings distinguish 'lexical 
instance models', where recognition depends directly upon a database of 
word examples, from 'parallel coding systems' models which are based 
upon the deployment of rules relating to various aspects of word 
structure. 
Parallel Coding Systems Models 
With Parallel coding systems models two mechanisms are basically at 
work; a lexicon which is directly visually addressable and rule-based 
phonological coding which may be deployed in the case of new or 
unfamiliar words. The progress of input through these different 
processing routes has led to the term 'horse race' being used. An issue 
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within this group of models concerns the role of phonological recoding 
when familiar words are encountered. Of particular interest is how such 
models can deal with the possibility of conflicting output from the 
different mechanisms which may arise with familiar words which have 
an irregular pronunciation (e.g., done, two). One suggestion that has been 
offered far as conflict avoidance is concerned is simply to assume that 
the phonological system only attempts to deal with input that is 
unfamiliar to the visual system and vice-versa. This, however, requires 
some form of precognition or, at least, some method of pre-checking. If 
pre-checking is adopted then it may be argued that the recognition 
problem is subject to an infinite regression. The problem of conflict may 
be accommodated by assuming that the visual system operates more 
rapidly and conflict only occurs infrequently where input is either 
unfamiliar or in the face of certain unusual situations such as with 
experimental tasks in a laboratory (Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson, & 
Besner, 1977). In the case of conflict output from the phonological 
system has time to have an effect on further processing. A further 
possibility with parallel coding systems models is to assume that both 
direct visual access and phonological encoding occur regardless, and, 
that conflicts are somehow dealt with. However within this domain 
procedures for dealing with conflicts do not appear to have been 
articulated in any precise detail. 
The discussion of parallel coding systems models has focused on conflict 
that may occur between visual access and phonological recoding. So far, 
however, little has been said about the mechanism of visual access itself. 
This will now be considered within the category of lexical instance 
models identified by Carr and Pollatsek (1985). 
Lexical Instance Models 
Rather than operating according to rules the main feature of lexical 
instance models is that direct visual access to a storage system 
representing 'instances' of individual words is necessary for word- 
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recognition. Rule-like behaviour, however, may result from the use of 
exemplars or instances. Although 'instances' may refer to specific 
occurrences of inputs (e.g., Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Whittlesea, 1983) 
and may be regarded as analogous to the templates discussed earlier, the 
term has a different meaning in the class of models identified by Carr 
and Pollatsek. In this latter context a 'lexical instance' may be equated 
with the notion of a 'prototype' as developed by Posner (1969). A 
prototype may be thought of as representing the mean of a number of 
variations; in this way the identity of 'lexical instances' is independent of 
variations in such properties as print size, ink colour or type face. 
Although the lexical instances comprising a mental database may refer to 
words the reference may also include letter clusters or subword units 
containing a meaning or 'morphemic' element. 
Lexical instance models have been subcategorised by Can and Pollatsek 
into `logogen models', 'lexical search models' and 'verification models'. 
Each has a similar storage base but each has a different mechanism by 
which the representational elements within that base are accessed. These 
are now briefly described. 
Logogen Models 
The idea of the logogen was developed by Morton (1969) and is based 
on the assumption that direct auditory or visual access can be made to a 
mental storage system where individual words are represented. A 
logogen exists for each known word or morphemic unit; essentially it is 
an evidence collector for auditory or graphemic features. Each logogen is 
in direct communication with a 'sensory surface' to which incoming 
auditory or visual stimulus attributes are fed; if the input sufficiently 
matches the conditions specified for a particular logogen then that 
logogen reaches threshold and 'fires'. Since each logogen only represents 
prototypical properties for any given word the matching process rather 
than being dichotomous is one where evidence is built up. The 
processing of input is effectively carried out in parallel; the sensory 
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surface is in contact with all logogens and a given input may result in 
`evidence' for the existence of more than one lexical instance being built 
up. However as the process continues it is assumed that instances that 
have more in common with the input approach their firing thresholds 
faster that those with fewer similarities. Each logogen has an adjustable 
threshold, this is affected by such contextual factors as word frequency 
and recency of usage. Once a logogen fires it outputs to a 'cognitive 
system' which in turn feeds back to the logogen system. One function of 
the cognitive system is that it may provide a semantic context, that is, the 
feedback lowers the threshold of logogens of associate words. When a 
logogen fires the corresponding word is made available for output from 
the system. Without input the evidence-level of a logogen decays over a 
short period of time to zero. 
Models which have similarities to that proposed by Morton have also 
been developed by Glushko (1979), and McClelland and 
Rumelhart (1981). In particular, McClelland and Rumelhart's work will 
used as a basis for further discussion. 
Lexical search models and verification models 
In contrast to logogen models which allow simultaneous or parallel 
access of input to all lexical entries, input with lexical search models is 
compared serially on an entry-by-entry basis. If a whole lexicon were to 
be searched in this way for each incoming stimulus the process would 
undoubtedly be very time consuming. Because of this, most search 
models that have been proposed incorporate some mechanism whereby 
the set of items to be searched is first reduced. The method of reduction 
for example might be by initial letter or sound, as is implied in 
Forster's (1976, 1979) search model. Input is first constructed in terms of 
a complete visual or auditory representation of a word (rather than 
individual features as with the logogen model). This representation is 
then compared with the contents of either an orthographic access file 
which contains visual representations of words or, with a phonological 
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access file. Access files duplicate some of the information contained in a 
master file which is essentially a lexicon. Each access file is divided into 
`bins' containing subsets of the total word population, each subset being 
delineated according to various auditory or visual qualities of words such 
as initial letter or sound and organized within each bin according to such 
factors as frequency of usage. 
A further difference between logogen models and lexical search models 
is that while logogen models are concerned mainly with word units, 
lexical search models are based on morphemic representation. Another 
distinguishing feature is that lexical search models use a checking 
process; once one of the words on offer from the lexicon has been 
matched then the sensory input is accessed directly by the activated 
lexical representation as a final check or verification. This contrasts with 
the logogen model which depends on the output across a range of 
detectors effectively in competition. The precise mechanisms which 
allow for the possibility of final checking has in some models been seen 
as a major defining factor and as a result an identifiable subgroup of 
`verification models' has been developed (e.g., Becker, 1976, 1979, 
1980; Paap, Newsome, McDonald & Schvaneveldt, 1982). 
Spreading-Activation 
Many of the above processing models are based upon the existence of a 
large number of units representing elements of known information. This 
is applicable both with regard to letters or words as well as objects in 
general as already illustrated by Marr's model. Encoding mechanisms 
based upon such processing units have been further developed in the 
context of 'spreading-activation' models. Here the processing units are 
often referred to as 'nodes'. The nodes are interconnected and capable of 
assuming a level of excitement or 'activation'. Activation is assumed to 
spread from one node to another. The level of activation at a given node 
is also subject to decay (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Grossberg, 1980), this 
prevents an overall indefinite build-up which might otherwise arise as 
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activation spreads. The notion of activation is consistent with a range of 
processes relating to stored representations of concepts and has been 
used to explain the rate at which processing information may proceed 
(Anderson, 1983), or, to explain the availability of information to 
decision processes (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1976). 
The concept of spreading-activation may be seen as central in relation to 
contextual effects. This has been widely acknowledged (e.g., 
Anderson, 1976; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1976; 
Posner & Snyder, 1975). For example the finite amount of time that 
activation is thought to persist has been used to explain the facilitation 
effect obtained when, after the presentation of a given input, a similar 
input subsequently presented within a short period of time is processed 
faster than dissimilar input. One notable study of this effect was carried 
out by Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) using word-pairs varying in 
semantic relatedness. 
Although the range of spreading-activation models may be potentially 
varied most have been concerned with the representation of information 
at a semantic level only. On this basis contextual effects have been 
described in relation to differing semantic structures. One example of the 
way that our knowledge may be structured in terms of concepts has been 
considered by Quillian (1968). His 'semantic network' was developed as 
a model underlying human performance. 
Semantic Networks 
A semantic network consists of a collection of 'nodes' or locations 
containing information representing individual concepts. Nodes may 
correspond to words in a natural language but this is not a requirement. 
The nodes may be related by virtue of some form of association among 
the concepts they represent. The relations within the network determine 
its overall structure. With regard to this Collins and Quillian (1969) have 
suggested a hierarchical arrangement where, for example, properties 
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specific to birds are stored with birds while those relating more generally 
to animals are stored with animals. In what is now a well-known 
experiment they found that a statement such as 'A canary eats food' took 
longer to be classified as true than the classification for 'A canary has 
feathers'. Collins and Quillian saw the essential difference between the 
two statements in terms of such phrases as 'eats food' being 
superordinate to such phrases as 'has feathers' in terms of a presumed 
hierarchy regarding animal properties. However although the 'eats food/ 
has feathers' contrast may suggest a hierarchy with regard to 'bird' and 
`canary' it is easy to foresee problems when using other descriptive 
attributes to resolve objects which may be considered to be at the same 
level. For example even if low-level descriptive terms may suffice in the 
differentiation between, say, a shark and a herring it as also tempting to 
consider the possibility that higher-level concepts such as 'is dangerous' 
may enter into the comparison, and in some instances this may be 
necessarily implicated. 
The above strictly hierarchical arrangement has been frequently 
questioned. For example Rips, Shoben and Smith (1973) found that 'A 
penguin is a bird' took longer to classify than 'A robin is a bird'. This 
suggests that mental organization exists in terms of prototypicality as 
well as, if not rather than, hierarchy. There is also the possibility that 
such findings are simply representative of the degree of association 
between words (Wilkins, 1971). A revised account of the semantic 
organisation proposed by Collins and Quillian (1969) has been suggested 
by Collins and Loftus (1975). Their model was organised in terms of 
semantic-relatedness rather than hierarchy. Semantic-relatedness is 
indicated by the links between concepts. Input that relates to a given 
concept results in the corresponding node being activated. Activation 
also spreads to other concepts that are linked and stronger links between 
associated concepts may result. Although the Collins and Loftus (1975) 
model overcomes some of the shortcomings of its precursors another 
approach to the organisation of concepts has also for some time been 
developed in various forms; this has been referred to as 'schema theory'. 
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Schema Theory 
In his 'Critique of Pure Reason', Kant (1787) used the word 'schema' in 
relation to the way we actively organize experience. Bartlett (1932) has 
also used the term with reference to a central cognitive structure that is 
involved in our perceptual processes. More recently schema theorists 
have attempted to provide precise elaborations on the basic idea, often 
for the purpose of the development of computerised representations of 
knowledge. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977), for example, postulate the 
existence of a set of interacting knowledge structures which they call 
`schemata'. Concepts are represented prototypically within this 
framework and a schema is thought of as a particular instance which is 
represented by a network of interrelations specific to it. As in the case of 
nodal structures, schemata can become activated so that contextual 
effects, or processing in terms of a particular attribute or category may 
result. One schema can embed within another and although this suggests 
a hierarchy, the nature of that hierarchy may be considered to be more 
general than that suggested, for example, by Collins and Quillian (1969) 
which is seen simply to be an order of inclusions. The generality results 
from the principle that one schema may make reference to a subset from 
a range of other schemata according to context and purpose. In this sense 
a schema may effectively consist of information relating to a variety of 
levels of abstraction. In spite of this, various workers have tended to 
concentrate within relatively narrow ranges. For example the 
representation of plots or stories has been studied by Charniak (1972), 
and Schank and Abelson (1975) while the representation of words has 
been examined by Anderson and Bower (1973), and Kintsch (1972) 
among others. 
It may be argued that the degree down to which the abstraction of 
various levels of schemata are assumed to range inevitably reaches a 
point where some schemata have no subschemata from which to refer. 
Norman, Rumelhart, and LNR (1975) refer to the lowest-level units as 
`primitives' which represent components of experience which can be 
subjected to no further analyses. Besides including elementary sensory 
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features these components may also include basic sensory-motor 
procedures and 'causal-connection' (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), 
The above models relating to spreading-activation have primarily been 
concerned with semantic structures rather than with the nature of 
processing leading to semantic representation. This latter concern is to 
some extent addressed by a group of recent models that have been 
referred to under the term 'parallel distributed processing' (PDP). 
Although these models are typically nodal and involve the spread of 
activation they may be contrasted with the earlier spreading-activation 
models. Rather than the emphasis being on semantic structure, the focus 
is broader so that processing at a variety of levels of representation may 
be considered. A further characteristic of PDP models is that they may 
contain inhibitory as well as facilitatory mechanisms; this differs from 
those earlier spreading-activation models where contextual effects have 
been described only in facilitatory terms. Since the ideas relevant to 
parallel distributed processing are pervasive with regard to encoding in 
general and also are becoming of widespread interest they will now be 
introduced in some detail. 
Parallel Distributed Processing 
Models grouped collectively as parallel distributed processing models 
(e.g., Rumelhart, McClelland & the PDP Research Group, 1986), while 
exhibiting different forms, are generally based on a set of processing 
units which are subject to varying states of activation. In some models 
such as McClelland and Rumelhart's (1985) distributed model of 
memory the units may represent abstract elements or feature-like entities 
and any concept or meaningful representation exists as a pattern of 
connectivity among the units. The `connectionistic' approach has also 
been developed by Seidenberg and McClelland (1989). Here word 
representation is characterised by the activation of a group of distributed 
features rather than by word nodes per se. In some connectionist or 
distributed feature models there may be a close analogy between the 
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units and neural elements or collections of neural elements (e.g., 
Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz & Jones, 1977; Grossberg, 1981). By way of 
contrast in another group of PDP models the units represent concepts as 
nodes in a network. The concepts may range from features and letters 
through to words and other larger meaningful entities. In both types of 
model the idea is that a large network of simple operations exists where 
each unit receives input from a number of other units from which it 
generates an output which is in turn fed back or communicated to a 
number of other units. Concurrent activity involving many simple 
processing elements underlies complex mental phenomena; there is no 
overall controlling or executive system. Such a situation may be 
perceived as essentially passive: to some extent this is acknowledged, for 
example solutions of problems may be settled into rather than calculated 
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). However it is also argued that goals, 
or intentions, may themselves be considered to be stored patterns of 
activation. (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland & Hinton, 1986). This 
issue concerning volition, however, appears to require further 
development. 
The concept of activation is central to all PDP models and the levels of 
activation allowed for a unit vary from one model to another; levels may 
be both discrete and continuous, they may vary both positively and 
negatively and may also include a zero-level. The level of activation may 
also be subject to 'addition' rules so that the state of activity for each unit 
over the system may be determined. Most important to the nature of the 
system is the pattern of connectivity among the units. This pattern 
determines what each unit represents and additionally determines what 
can be stored within the system as well as how it will respond to input. 
Whether or not the system behaves in a hierarchical, top-down or 
bottom-up fashion is also a function of the pattern of connectivity. In 
general, then, PDP models may assume a number of forms. Two 
examples which are both relevant to the processing of words as well as 
being representative of the class of models where the units represent 
concepts in other forms are now given. 
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The Interactive Activation Model 
The 'Interactive Activation Model' was developed by McClelland and 
Rumelhart (1981) in order to explain a range of empirical observations 
on word perception and also to relate in detail to the results of computer 
simulations. Figure 1.1 provides a simplified overall description. The 
VISUAL INPUT 
FIGURE 1.1 A simplified overall representation of McClelland and 
Rumelhart's (1981) interactive activation model of word-recognition. 
Excitatory connections are represented by lines ending with arrows and 
inhibitory connections by lines ending with circles. 
model consists of 'detectors' or 'nodes' grouped into levels. Each level is 
responsible for the recognition of such entities as elementary visual 
features of letters, letters and words. There are nodes representing each 
item that is known to the system. At one level, for example, a node may 
exist for a particular letter of the alphabet in a particular position within a 
word while at another level a node may exist for a particular word. The 
existence of word nodes may allow this model to be classified as a 
logogen model. Each node is connected to a limited number of other 
nodes or 'neighbours' which may be within the same level and also in 
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adjacent levels. The connections can carry excitatory or inhibitory 
signals. Excitatory signals increase the level of activation of recipient 
nodes while inhibitory signals decrease the level. A tonic level for a node 
in a quiescent state lies between the fully inhibited state and the fully 
excited state. A given node remains active only momentarily as 
activation is subject to a decaying process. Excitatory and inhibitory 
signals are transmitted to neighbouring nodes. The resultant activation of 
any one node is determined by the combined input from its neighbours. 
Connections within the same level are inhibitory as here the nodes are 
effectively competing so that a resultant single interpretation of any input 
to that unit is produced. Connections to adjacent units can either activate 
or inhibit nodes within those units. Input is initially processed at feature-
level and excitatory and inhibitory connections may then be made to the 
letter recognition unit. Similarly excitatory and inhibitory links are made 
between the letter recognition unit and the word-recognition unit. 
However as far as these latter two units are concerned inhibitory and 
excitatory connections can be made in either direction, that is, 
information at word-level will in turn influence processing at letter-level. 
In this way processing is both top-down and bottom-up; this is 
significant in relation to the term 'interactive' being applicable to the 
model. Some details of the process of the recognition of a word may be 
understood through the example given in Figure 1.2. Here the letter 'H' 
occurring within the context of the word `HAT' raises the level of 
activation of nodes representing letters which are consistent at a featural 
level and inhibits those that are inconsistent. Nodes representing words 
beginning with `H' are then activated and in turn activation is fed back to 
consistent letter nodes. Words not beginning with `H' are inconsistent 
and activation is inhibited. Similarly the remaining letters and word are 
recognised rapidly through both positive and negative feedback. 
Processing is continuous in the sense that no one stage of processing 
needs to be completed before another one can begin. 
The Interactive Activation model has been used to account for the 
recognition of words in human memory. Another feature of human 
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FIGURE 1.2 An example 	 showing how 	 excitatory 	 and 	 inhibitory 
connections may be 	 involved 	 in 	 the 	 course 	 of word-recognition 	 in 
McClelland and Rumelhart's (1981) interactive 
	 activation 	 model. 
Excitatory connections are represented by lines ending with arrows and 
inhibitory connections by lines ending with circles. (Adapted from 
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1981.) 
memory is that it is possible to recall a word on the basis of one or more 
of the variety of its attributes. A number of PDP models have been 
developed to account for this phenomenon and one developed by 
McClelland (1981) may be used to illustrate the main underlying 
principles. 
McClelland's Model 
McClelland's (1981) model consists of a network where 'instance units', 
each representing a particular object in memory, are linked to elements 
within groupings of units representing the properties of objects. The links 
allow the units to interact. Interactions may be mutually excitatory such 
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as in the case of an instance unit and its related properties. However 
mutually inhibitory links also exist for example between property units 
whose values are incompatible and also between instance units so that 
there is not an overload of activated memories. This model has been 
illustrated by imagining two gangs; the 'Jets' and the 'Sharks'. The 
objects are individual members of the gangs who are each assigned a 
value for a given property along the lines shown in Table 1.1. Figure 1.3 
Table 1.1 A sample of the individuals belonging to two gangs together 
with their hypothetical characteristics. (Adapted from McClelland, 1981.) 
Name Gang Age Education Marital Status Occupation 
Art Jets 40's J.H. Sing. Pusher 
Lance Jets 20's J.H. Mar. Burglar 
Ralph Jets 30's J.H. Sing. Pusher 
Sam Jets 20's COL. Sing. Bookie 
Rick Sharks 30's H.S. Div. Burglar 
shows how information relating to the sample of individuals specified in 
Table 1.1 is represented as a network. Each of the individuals is 
represented by an instance unit (centre) which is linked to its respective 
property units. The links consisting of mutually excitatory connections 
(shown by double-headed arrows) allow the activation of one unit to lead 
to a pattern of activation across the other units. If, for example, the name 
unit "Art" is activated then a pattern of activation corresponding to Art's 
properties is produced. This pattern of activation effectively amounts to a 
representation for Art. It is worth considering a further example; the 
activation of the property units "40's" and "pusher". "40's" activates the 
instance unit for the individual "Art" while "pusher" activates two 
instance units; those for the individuals "Ralph" and "Art". Of the two 
"Art" is activated more strongly and in turn the name unit "Art" most 
strongly activated. By extending this reasoning it is possible to consider 
the outcome of activation resulting from an input which to an extent 
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FIGURE 1.3 A network containing instance units and property units. 
Mutually excitatory connections (shown by double-headed arrows) occur 
between some units in different groups while all units within the same 
group are mutually inhibitory. (Adapted from McClelland, 1981.) 
matches a particular object but contains some misleading properties. 
Rather than the misleading properties necessarily leading to a total 
failure in recall the instance unit or nodes best matching the input will be 
activated most strongly, although probably by a smaller margin in 
comparison to a situation where there are no misleading cues. The 
important point to be drawn from this is that no special mechanisms are 
required to deal with erroneous cues or even incomplete cues during the 
process of recall. 
A further consequence of this network arrangement is that stored 
representations of an object that are initially incomplete can be enhanced 
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in the sense that information can be interpolated as a result of subsequent 
partial activation of objects with similar properties. Such interpolations 
may, of course, be erroneous but would nevertheless occur automatically. 
An example of this effect in the case of the Jets and the Sharks would 
occur if the instance unit for 'Ralph' were to become activated but it was 
not known to the memory system that he was a pusher. Should, however, 
other individuals with Ralph's qualities tend to be pushers as opposed to 
burglars or bookies then, as the respective units became partially 
activated, the value 'pusher' for the property unit relating to Ralph would 
also become activated to a higher degree than the other possible values. 
The same type of process can also produce a pattern of activation 
representing properties that are general to a group rather than specific to 
an individual. For example activating the property unit 'Jets' will result 
in partial activation of all examples of Jets and a collective partial 
activation of property unit values will ensue. Such values as "20's", 
"Sing." and "J.H." may, for example, dominate while the level of 
activation for any one name unit is likely to remain low since most of the 
individuals in the gang will probably have different names. The model as 
described above depends upon instance units each storing a set of 
connection strengths relating to each object. The possibility has been also 
considered (McClelland et al., ibid) that the nature of stored connection 
strengths can be further generalised so that instance units are not a 
requirement. The information relating to the stored connections for any 
object may well be distributed over the connections for a large number of 
processing units rather than being confined to a single instance unit. 
One thing that characterises PDP models is that patterns of activation are 
produced according to the particular process in hand. Patterns of 
activation are not stored as such but are created or recreated. In such a 
system the processing mechanisms do not require reference to a long 
term memory store so that memories have to be found and put into a 
working memory store in order to be implemented, instead the 
processing mechanisms and property units are as one and memory is 
effectively part of processing. A further consequence of this model is that 
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a store of general rules which underlie the processing of particular 
instances does not as such exist, the system simply behaves as if it knows 
the rules. Learning thus does not depend on the formulation of rules but 
instead upon an accumulation of connection strengths. 
McClelland's model is of interest in relation to the semantic structures 
associated with spreading-activation models. A question which arises in 
the present research concerns the nature of a semantic representation. 
This may be considered through taking an example of an everyday object 
such as a cup. In hierarchical information-processing models the 
semantic representation of 'cup' may be seen as a 'distillate' representing 
in abstract terms the notion of 'cup'; perhaps in terms of its possible 
functions and its possible manifestations as a concrete object. There 
would be a marked distinction between the abstract nature of this general 
representation and the representation that may be formed in the case of a 
particular instance of a cup; here a lower-level representation of various 
features, perhaps representing the topography of the object, may hold. In 
the context of a model such as McClelland's (1981) the semantic 
representation of 'cup' is fundamentally different; access to any one of a 
variety of properties pertaining to 'cup' simply serves to elicit other 
related properties; no formal 'distillation' of 'cupness' is stored as a 
separate unit. In PDP terms, then, a semantic representation is not an 
invariant or definable entity. If semantic representations are not readily 
definable as entities then in turn the nature of a semantic structure such 
as that proposed by Collins and Quillian may also be difficult to 
determine. Furthermore this logic may in turn have implications 
regarding the hierarchical nature of information-processing. 
The modular Nature of Mental Processing 
Some of the models that have already been discussed imply the existence 
of groupings of mechanisms or 'modules' dedicated to particular types of 
task. The various 'layers' of demons in the Pandemonium model may be 
construed as one example where processing modules are arranged 
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hierarchically while the notion of a 'mental lexicon' or a set of stored 
word-representations may be thought of as a module in an overall 
comprehension system. Since both input and the products of mental 
processing may assume a variety of forms it is conceivable that there 
may also be a variety of processing modules together with ways in which 
they may be arranged. 
Before the existence and possible arrangements of modules is discussed 
it may help to identify a general issue concerning such subdivisions of 
processing. Although originally written in a clinical context 
Geschwind (1968) has neatly outlined this issue: `...there have been 
schools of thought which have stressed the importance of thinking of the 
patient as a whole, seeing his responses as those of an integrated unitary 
structure, even in the face of damage. ....many confusions about the 
patient in our own minds as well as those of others resulted from a failure 
to do the exact opposite ....to regard the patient as made of connected 
parts rather than as an indissoluble whole' (p. 637). The idea of 
modularity has also been expressed through evolutionary studies. For 
example Jerison (1973) puts forward a view that audio-linguistic and 
visual-spatial processing have independent evolutionary histories. 
Psychological texts, especially those concerned with language 
comprehension, are extensively populated with models based on 
modularity. Also Posner (1969), for example, uses the term 'isolable 
processing system' with reference to internal codes of a stimulus that can 
be independently manipulated. Dividing the world into different parts 
may be argued to be limiting if the parts continue to be treated in 
isolation and permanent boundaries are built-up. However if the parts are 
to have a role in the investigative process then this process may be 
enhanced if interactions between what might be considered to be separate 
domains are also investigated. The recent study concerning the 
interaction of colour perception and word-recognition carried out by 
Prinzmetal (1990) is, perhaps, illustrative of this. 
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Support for some forms of modularity has been drawn from the study of 
people suffering from selective agnosias such as prosopagnosia (the 
inability to recognise faces). Hecean (1981) has noted that although 
prosopagnosiacs may be unable to recognise familiar faces they can 
usually recognise words. Ellis & Young (1988) have similarly found that 
the recognition of objects may not only be disrupted independently of 
words but also independently of faces. As these clinical conditions are 
typically linked with localised brain injuries it has been assumed that 
face, object and word-recognition systems even if not entirely different 
in operation may at least be separable into distinct relatively independent 
systems. However some caution is appropriate; face recognition is a 
complex task, this may be indicated by some of the reported difficulties 
in inter-racial face discrimination (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). On this 
basis most people are capable of displaying the symptoms of 
prosopagnosia. If a face is regarded as a complex object and, 
furthermore, recognition of particular faces requires making fine 
discriminations among complex objects which in some ways exhibit 
similarities then it could be argued that the notion of prosopagnosia has 
arisen from special circumstances regarding the difficulty of the task 
rather than the content of the task object and therefore does not exist as a 
pure condition. It is thus predictable that if prosopagnosiacs are given 
tasks involving numbers of similar but complex objects other than faces 
then their performance would also be inferior to that of normals. Since 
this prediction is supported by studies carried by those such as Damasio, 
Damasio, and Van Hoesen (1982) and Bornstein (1963) it has been 
argued that face recognition systems do not exist as such and that 
prosopagnosiacs merely have a general loss in ability to make fine 
discriminations among complex objects. 
Parallels may be drawn between the sophistication of most people's face 
recognition abilities and other forms of object recognition. In the same 
way that practice in discriminating between face types that we are 
frequently exposed to may lead to the formation of a sophisticated 
supporting face representational system it is also possible that extensive 
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practice involving other objects will lead to similarly sophisticated 
systems. An examination of certain trades or professions where varieties 
of a particular object type are constantly being dealt with may also 
support the idea of the ability to acquire an appropriately sophisticated 
system. Gibson (1969) for example has noted the accuracy and rapidity 
with which the sex of newborn chicks can be determined by some 
farmers in comparison to a layperson who can only do this with great 
difficulty. Although the term 'representational system' is used in 
reference to particular enhanced discriminatory abilities this should not 
imply that such systems exist as functionally and topographically distinct 
entities. The fact that they appear to be acquired through experience in a 
variety of content areas suggests that the existence of separate, content-
dependent 'boxes' within our mental architecture is unlikely. The 
underlying nature of such representational systems and the inherent 
mental processes may be the same; despite the apparent deficiencies 
relating to specific content areas exhibited through some clinical 
conditions it may be argued that there exists a general mechanism which 
is capable of supporting the processing of a variety of complex object 
types, and, that with practice the processing of certain groups of stimuli 
may be enhanced. 
Word and Picture Processing 
Although there are difficulties regarding the existence of mechanisms for 
the processing of certain object types the broader issue concerning 
localisation of function with respect to linguistic abilities and 
visuospatial abilities is one that is currently the focus of much debate. 
Such an issue may be relevant to any contextual effects that may arise 
from the concurrent processing of visuospatial and linguistic input and 
will therefore be further examined. For ease of reference the verbal and 
visuospatial categories of information are often, if not crudely, referred 
to in terms of words and pictures. One question, for example, which may 
present itself concerns whether verbal input is processed by the same 
mechanisms as nonverbal input. 
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A variety of empirical work suggests that words and pictures are 
processed differently. Such differences are implicitly supported by the 
extensive literatures that concern themselves exclusively with word-
recognition or exclusively with various forms of object or picture 
recognition. Studies concerning hemispheric lateralisation also claim to 
provide evidence of a topographical distribution of linguistic and 
visuospatial functions. One area of work which illustrates this is the use 
of tests which purport to measure a variety of abilities on brain damaged 
subjects. If a test such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
is used in cases of progressive widespread brain damage (such as 
Alzheimer's disease) then performance on all subtests representing a 
range of abilities deteriorates with time. If, however, performance on 
subtests is correlated with the position of localised brain lesions (e.g., 
McFie, 1975) then language impairment appears to be associated with 
lesions in the left hemisphere while visuospatial impairment is associated 
with lesions in the right. Another finding from this work which is of 
particular relevance to the performance of tasks based on object 
recognition is that while the level of performance on one set of skills 
(e.g., linguistic) may be greatly impaired, performance on the other 
remains largely unimpaired. 
Theories such as those of hemispheric lateralization, although not 
without their critics, may have been influential in the formation of 
models of word-recognition which appear to have evolved quite 
separately from those of object or picture recognition. This of course is 
not to preclude interactions between any such proposed linguistic and 
visuospatial systems. If words and pictures are processed differently it 
may be worth considering exactly what distinguishes words and pictures 
and how the processing of these different forms of information may 
coexist either on an independent or interactive basis. Analyses of any 
interdependencies that may exist among the processing of words and 
pictures has been approached through the nature of the way words and 
pictures may be represented mentally. 
47 
The nature of mental representations may in turn have consequences for 
the nature and organization of memory as well as for perception and 
performance. As far as the modularity of language processing and picture 
processing is concerned two main arguments relating to reresentational 
systems prevail. One is where different and independent representational 
systems exist according to form, and the other is where the semantic 
content of both words and pictures shares a common representational 
system. The two differing approaches have been expressed in terms of 
' single-encoding ' and 'dual-coding ' models 1. 
Single-Encoding 
One notion of long-term memory that has been developed by Norman, 
Rumelhart and the LNR Research Group (1975) is that of a common 
system in which both pictorial and linguistic information may be 
represented in the same form. Representations are considered to be 
propositional, that is, our knowledge of objects and concepts is 
considered to be represented as a collection of symbols (not necessarily 
verbal) whose form in relation to any physical manifestation of the 
outside world is quite arbitrary. Among the arguments put forward in 
favour of such a 'central semantic' model is that information about the 
world arrives in memory via a perceptual system. If perception is seen to 
be the constructive and interpretive process that much of the work 
carried out in the area would have us believe then stored information 
must also reflect this interpretive and constructive nature. Although we 
may have the ability to image objects from memory this does not 
necessarily mean that information is stored in that form. An image 
should not be equated with a video tape of a particular sensory 
experience even though it may appear to be complete and continuous; it 
1 For convenience it will be assumed here that the input resulting from 
picture stimuli may be treated in a similar way to input arising from other 
environmental objects, and so both types of input will be referred to as 
pictorial. However this is not to deny the special status that the processing of 
pictures may have in relation to the processing of objects (see, for example, 
Hagen, 1978). 
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is a mutable entity in the same way that our perceptions are mutable. 
When appropriate we may process things using images which are 
regenerated from a propositional store and the nature of those images 
(including any conceptual errors contained therein) will reflect the nature 
of the store. The possibility of propositional representation for pictures 
maps neatly with the representation of verbal information and this in turn 
opens up the possibility of the existence of a single storage system within 
which both verbal and pictorial material may be represented. The 
representations within such a singular encoding system have also been 
assumed to be semantic in nature. 
One study that has been used to provide empirical support for a central 
semantic processing system was carried out by Young, Hay and 
Ellis (1985) who examined the written accounts of 22 subjects who 
monitored their own problems in person recognition. The problems that 
frequently occurred included the complete failure to recognise a familiar 
person, mistaking an unknown person for a familiar one, inability to 
remember the name or normal context of meeting in the case of slight 
acquaintances who were met out of normal context and finally the 
inability to remember a person's name. What is interesting in the latter 
case is that in at least 90% of the occurrences information relating to 
such things as occupation or normal meeting context could be recalled 
but not the name. Young et al. accounted for these findings by 
postulating three separate processing systems; a 'face recognition 
system' containing a store of representations of familiar faces, a 
`semantic system' containing general information relating to an 
individual such as occupation or normal meeting context and finally a 
system containing a store of words that may be retrieved in a spoken 
form. When it comes to considering how the above systems might be 
arranged the findings on the absence of certain types of problem have 
been of help. For example the situation where both a face is recognised 
and the corresponding name remembered but other semantic information 
is not recalled seems never usually to occur. From this it may be deduced 
that there is no direct route from a face recognition system to a word 
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store; the semantic system appears to be a necessary link. Since decisions 
regarding the familiarity of names alone and faces alone can be made but 
apparently one cannot evoke the other without inclusion of semantic 
information then there is also a possibility of a two way traffic between 
these systems. Figure 1.4 presents a possible arrangement of the 
suggested systems based on the above assumptions. 
FIGURE 1.4 Mental processing mechanisms and their arrangement as 
implied by the introspective monitoring of problems encountered in person 
recognition recorded by Young et al., (1985). 
Although it has already been argued that the existence of a recognition 
system specifically for faces as opposed to the recognition of any 
visually presented objects is open to doubt the above model may 
nevertheless be taken to be one example of a category of models which 
may be generalised in terms of visuo-spatial and verbal processing. One 
example of a more general model within which the arrangement arising 
from the work of Young et al. (1985) may be subsumed is the 'sensory-
semantic model of picture and word-encoding' which has evolved from 
the work of Nelson and his co-workers (e.g., Nelson & Brooks, 1973; 
Nelson, Reed & Walling, 1976; Nelson, Reed, & McEvoy, 1977). 
The Sensory-Semantic Model of Picture and Word-Encoding 
The sensory-semantic model was evolving at a time when it was widely 
thought that mental processing ultimately favoured the semantic 





progressively lost (e.g., Baddeley, 1966, 1972). In this context it was 
surprising to find that sensory information could affect performance on 
paired-associate memory tasks. For example semantically distinct but 
formally similar words (e.g., ban, bat, ben, bin, bit) were less effective as 
recall cues for numbers paired with them than words of low formal 
similarity (Nelson, 1968). Conversely the arbitrary association of word 
pairs was more easily learned if the words has letters in common, such as 
`cactus-carrot' and 'instep-influx' (Nelson, Fosselman, & Peebles, 1971). 
Similar results were obtained with analogous experiments using stimuli 
where similarity in pictorial form and phonemic form was varied. (See 
Nelson, 1979, for a review.) Such experiments led Nelson et al. to the 
conclusion that pictures and verbal labels could be represented in an 
elaborated form both in terms of their formal, or sensory, features as well 
as in terms of their semantic features. 
The overall arrangement of the major components of the sensory-
semantic model is shown in Figure 1.5. These dominant components are 
systems within which features or codes relating to words or pictures are 
represented. The features may become activated and in this way the 
model has a microstructure similar to that of nodal models within which 
spreading-activation occurs. However the sensory features relating to 
words and pictures are grouped separately and in turn are considered to 
be qualitatively different from semantic features. The featural systems 
are regarded as independent; visual features representing the physical 
appearance of words and objects in terms of such primitives as lines, 
angles and brightness while semantic features represent the significance 
of input in terms of its denotative, connotative, associative and 
conceptual meanings. Phonemic features relate to the name-code of a 
word or object in terms of acoustic and articulatory attributes. An 
important characteristic of this model is that the semantic system is 
amodal and common to picture and word stimuli, that is, there is an 
equivalence insofar that the same semantic code may be activated from 




PICTORIAL STIMULUS VERBAL STIMULUS 
FIGURE 1.5 The sensory-semantic model of picture and word-encoding. 
(Adapted from Nelson et al., 1977.) 
With both word and picture input processing is assumed to begin in 
terms of primitive visual features and more detailed visual codes are built 
up continuously with time as information from various types of feature is 
accrued. Evidence is, as it were, gradually built up; the continuation of 
processing is not dependent upon the completion of processing of earlier 
features. Similarly the processing of phonemic and meaning features is 
continuous and may be initiated by partial activation from a subset of the 
input. Although there are similarities in the initial processing of words 
and pictures there remains an essential difference with regard to their 
access to phonemic, or name-code, information: whereas this access in 
the case of words is relatively direct and does not require semantic 
mediation the same is not true with pictures; in order for a picture to be 
labelled verbally it has first to be identified at a semantic level. 
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The sensory-semantic model provides a basis from which contextual 
effects arising from both pictures and words can be interpreted. While 
containing a microstructure relating to the nodal models discussed earlier 
it also provides a macrostructure relevant not only to encoding per se but 
also relating to how such factors as the nature of the task or instructions 
allowed a selective control over encoding operations. As a result this 
model will be subject to further examination in relation to a range of 
empirical work. Before this is undertaken, however, the arguments 
relating to dual-coding approaches to picture and word processing will be 
introduced. 
Dual-Coding 
In contrast to the arguments for a common semantic system are those in 
favour of different semantic systems for picture and word input. The 
latter view has been represented by Paivio (1971) in the form of a dual-
coding theory. The main assumption is that there are two different types 
of symbolic system underlying perception, memory, language and 
thought. A nonverbal (or imagery) system is concerned with the 
interpretation of scenes and the generation of images while a verbal (or 
linguistic) system is responsible for interpreting language and generating 
speech. It is also assumed that the two systems can be independent in the 
sense that either one or both systems can be active without interfering 
with each other. Among other things this assumption is derived from the 
comparison of interference effects on perceptual and memory tasks 
carried out within the same modality and between different modalities 
(e.g., Brooks, 1967; Byrne, 1974; Segal, 1971). The assumption that the 
systems are interconnected follows from such evident abilities as naming 
nonverbal input and generating visual images from a verbal description. 
Although each symbolic system is assumed to be distinctly different the 
means of analysis of incoming information follows a similar form. This 
is evident from the adaptation of Paivio and B egg's (1981) model shown 










I  Ilk 
U) 
Dog 
5 	 'Imagen' 
cc 
41) 



























'Logogen' Referential relation 
Sensory analysis 
53 
NONVERBAL OUTPUT 	 VERBAL OUTPUT 
SYSTEMS 	 SYSTEMS 
Z\ 	 Z\ 
NONVERBAL 	 VERBAL 
STIMULI 	 STIMULI 
FIGURE 1.6 An adaptation of the dual-coding model of meaning. 
Examples are given of logogens and imagens that are known to the 
system. (After Paivio and Begg, 1981.) 
is assumed that stimulus features are available to mechanisms which 
accrue information relating to known visual or verbal entities. (These 
have been referred to as imagens and logogens respectively. The nature 
of imagens may be considered to be analogous to the nature of the 
logogens as already described.) Upon receiving sufficient information 
these mechanisms become activated and enable access to further 
information. Access to further information may via a 'referential' link to 
the other symbolic system where, for example, words may be imaged or 
pictures named. In addition to inter-system links associative relations 
may be made within each system and may involve more 'collective' or 

















A further general point regarding the dual-coding model is that for each 
system perception and memory form a continuum. This implies that there 
is a degree of isomorphism between the representation of information in 
long term storage and the representation of incoming information. In 
other words information is represented in long term memory in a form 
which in the case of nonverbal input may be thought of in terms of such 
dimensions as colour, size and shape, while for verbal input the 
representations reflect the arbitrary characteristics of linguistic entities. 
Put crudely information in memory may be considered to be stored in the 
form of a visual code as well as a verbal code. The representation of 
visual code has been described as 'analogical' in nature. This contrasts 
with the propositional representation of pictorial information 
characteristic of single-encoding models. Rather than being a literal 
representation the term 'analogue' refers to a structural similarity 
between parts of an object and corresponding parts of its representing 
image. An analogue system may thus allow mental transformations to 
correspond to physical transformations; for example the intermediate 
views relating to the rotation of an object through a prescribed angle are 
also related to mental representations. 
In support of dual-coding theory Paivio (1975) cites a range of work 
which includes experiments on size comparisons. For example 
Moyer (1973) has found that the time it takes to indicate a word name 
representing the larger member of a pair of animals varies in inverse 
proportion to the remembered size difference between the animals. For 
example 'horse-goat' would require more time than 'horse-mouse'. Such 
results are said to suggest that relative sizes are represented in an 
analogue form upon which comparisons are based. A similar experiment 
(Paivio, 1975) extends the comparison task to include objects represented 
by pictures. In addition to both picture pairs and word pairs showing the 
previous inverse function relating decision time and size difference it 
was also found that the decision time for pictures was significantly faster 
than for words for each of the relative size differences. Paivio assumed 
that analogue representations of object size are contained in the pictorial 
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system and are accessed more directly by picture input than by word 
input and therefore decision times for pictures will be less. On similar 
grounds Paivio also argued that the faster decision time for pictures is 
inconsistent with verbal coding and propositional theories because if size 
information is stored propositionally it would be more directly accessed 
by words and in that case-decision times for words should be shorter. 
The strength of this latter argument however may rely on the assumption 
that word-names are recognised as quickly as picture shapes and on a 
further assumption that if size information is propositional in nature it is 
more directly accessible from a word-name than from a picture shape. 
This latter assumption may be questioned on the grounds that an object 
name is only one of a large number of attributes that may relate to an 
object's propositional code, therefore size information may only be 
indirectly obtainable from a propositional system. 
Analogue Versus Propositional Representations 
Many of the arguments relating to single-coding and dual- coding models 
concern the nature of represented pictorial information. In particular 
propositional representations have been contrasted with analogue 
representations. Pylyshyn (1973), for example, has argued strongly for a 
propositional store that underlies all processing. In particular he asserts 
that information cannot be stored as images which are latently 
photographic in nature because there would be no means of organized 
access to the inevitable vast quantity. Recalled images are therefore 
conceptual in nature, being constructed from abstract propositional 
information. Any image elements within theories on mental processes 
must therefore be regarded as epiphenomenal. Pylyshyn also points out 
the danger of equating an image with a 'picture in the head'; a picture is 
the final product of mental processing and not an object to be processed. 
In spite of the logic of the above propositionalist arguments there is, 
perhaps, still a need to account for the illusion of pictorial form; that is in 
order for images to be recreated and for the phenomenon of the picture, 
recourse to stored pictorial and image elements might nevertheless be 
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necessary. Questions may arise here regarding the nature such elements 
and the limits of their complexity and their accessibility by means of 
propositional statements. 
A difficulty in trying to resolve the analogue-propositional debate has 
been indicated by Anderson's (1978) mimicry theorem where it is argued 
that in principle one type of system can in most cases be designed 
according to mathematical or logical principles so that it accords with the 
effects arising from another type of system and thus a definitive proof or 
demonstration in favour of one particular system type over another is not 
to be expected. This may be illustrated in the case of the mental 
transformations that may result from the rotation of an object. Here it can 
be argued that an equivalent of the continuous process that may result 
from an analogue system can be obtained through discrete 
representations if a series of small increments are made to the relevant 
propositional variables. Although such a claim may appear disheartening 
to both theorists and experimentalists the 'narrative' may be resurrected 
on the grounds of what is plausible in the light of information available 
from a variety of paradigms or sources. These may range from 
neurophysiological investigations into mental hardware to behavioural 
studies and include such general notions as a principle of parsimony. It is 
within a context guided by pragmatism, then, that one may continue in an 
attempt to assess the virtues of each theory. 
Mental Mechanisms: Some Main Themes 
A variety of mental mechanisms and models relating to the analysis of 
verbal and nonverbal input have been briefly described. Although any 
given model may be subject to adjustments in an attempt to 
accommodate effects predictable from another competing model some 
major distinguishing features relating to an array of models which may 
be considered 'viable' have nevertheless emerged. The models discussed 
may be viewed both in terms of their 'microstructure' and 
`macrostructure'. The notion of a microstructure may apply to the 
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existence of such general mechanisms as processing units or nodes and 
the connections and flow of activity between them. In this way 
spreading-activation mechanisms have been contrasted with the 
microstructure of some parallel distributed processing models. While the 
possibility of facilitatory processing effects in the case of spreading-
activation models the additional possibility of inhibitory effects exists 
with PDP models. The macrostructure of a model may be expressed in 
terms of such larger-scale arrangements as a processing hierarchy, or, the 
existence of 'modules' dedicated to processing of information in 
differing forms. A notable example is the possibility of a semantic 
system; all encoding models appear to have one. However it has been 
suggested that the nature of semantic representation may vary, especially 
where pictorial information is concerned. The possibility of 
representations being analogical or propositional has implications for 
models which have been described as single- or dual-coding with 
reference to verbal and nonverbal information. 
The processing mechanisms and structures that have been introduced in 
this chapter continue to be among the objects of investigation in 
cognitive psychology. As indicated earlier in this chapter a 
comprehensive discussion of these models in relation to empirical work 
has so far been deliberately avoided. This was to allow the themes that 
have been identified to emerge rather than be submerged. Inevitably, 
however, further scrutiny and refinement is necessary and so some ways 
in which the investigation of the above issues may be focused is the 
subject of the next section. 
INVESTIGATING MENTAL MECHANISMS 
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that mental processing is subject 
to the effects of context. Furthermore it was also observed that contextual 
effects are both pervasive and varied and the possibility of contextual 
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effects occurring in relation to some of the mechanisms and models 
introduced has already been indicated. The control and measurement of 
contextual effects, then, may be used as an investigative device in the 
course of examining mental structures. This approach is, of course, not 
new. Within the models that have been outlined the processing of verbal 
content has figured prominently and so the use of printed text as an 
investigative medium may be appropriate. However the processing of 
pictorial or nonverbal content is also of interest and contextual effects 
relating to this may also be of interest. The commonalities and the 
differences between the processing of verbal and nonverbal information 
may also be investigated empirically through the use of text alone. In one 
sense a printed word is like any other object or picture, that is, without 
paying particular attention to its semantic aspects there remains a word-
like form. The attributes that relate to this form may include colour, size, 
type style and case for example. In addition to such physical properties 
words also have a degree of orthographic regularity, a name and a 
semantic content. Although the processing of words is highly automatic 
and usually concerned with the extraction of meaning it inevitably occurs 
in a context where information relating to a variety of word attributes is 
continuously available. The converse also applies; a situation can be 
imagined where processing aimed at a nonverbal textual attribute occurs 
within a verbal context. The possibility that contextual influences may 
result from interactions arising from both within and between the 
processing of different word attributes may be considered on account of 
the variety of context effects that have already been established. Such 
interactions have typically been detected using 'priming' techniques. 
Although examples of priming have already been introduced in a 
historical setting further examination of what is meant by a prime may be 
useful in relation to present-day experimental work. 
Priming 
A prime is in most general terms a source of information, the availability 
of which may be related to an activity or activities where the results of 
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some form of mental processing are of interest. Typically the activity is 
an experimental task and prime information may be presented in any 
sensory modality, with varying degrees of temporal and spatial 
contiguity to the events or objects connected with the task. Priming 
information may be either essential or non-essential to task performance, 
although the term 'cuing' (essential) has been used as distinct from 
`priming' (non-essential) (Sudevan & Taylor, 1987). Experimentally, 
context becomes a manipulable entity through the control of prime 
information. Although in many experiments contextual information may 
be presented as a 'prime' stimulus that is separate from a 'target' 
stimulus upon which a task is performed, priming information may also 
be conveyed through a non task-relevant attribute of the target; for 
example with a word-naming task the priming attribute could be the 
colour of the ink in which the word is printed. 
If the processing of a target stimulus is affected by the presence of prime 
information then priming is said to have occurred. Priming effects are 
detectable in a variety of forms; these may be physiological as well as 
behavioural or introspective in nature. On those occasions which involve 
observable performance on an experimental task response time, error 
rates, threshold of detection and response biasing are frequently used 
measures. In those studies where variation in response time is of interest 
the terms 'facilitation' and 'inhibition' are frequently used with reference 
to the speeding-up or slowing-down of responses. 
Words such as 'congruent', 'incongruent', 'associate', `nonassociate' and 
`neutral' are commonly used to express the relationship that may exist 
between elements or attributes of the prime and target. Although these 
terms may be self-explanatory there are frequent occasions when further 
specification may be desirable. For example tables citing the frequency 
for word associates (e.g., Kucera & Francis, 1967) make no distinction 
between fundamentally different types of associates such as synonyms, 
antonyms and functional associates. Difficulties can arise when 
interpreting some studies based upon such norms where the above 
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distinctions have not been made. Associates are potentially arbitrary in 
nature, although there may be a measure of general agreement as to what 
is an associate for a given item there may be less general agreement as to 
what is not an associate. Apart from associations which are formed 
idiosyncratically there are many occasions when it is difficult to find a 
nonassociate perhaps because, it may be argued, that our mental 
apparatus is disposed to discovering associations. It is interesting that 
published tables of nonassociates are not as freely available as their 
associate counterparts. Rather than attempt a full discussion on the 
problems regarding nonassociates it is perhaps best at this point merely 
to draw attention to this cautionary note that difficulties may occur and 
an attempt will be made to resolve them within the context of the 
empirical work that is discussed. 
Perhaps a more problematic situation arises when an attempt is made to 
provide a 'neutral' priming condition or even to use stimuli which may 
be classed as neutral 'ready signals'. The inclusion of a neutral priming 
condition within an experiment may be a necessity in order, for example, 
to establish whether both facilitation and inhibition are taking place, 
rather than, say, just varying degrees of facilitation. Since there is a 
potentially wide range of information attributes available from any one 
stimulus the notion of a truly neutral prime is, of course, questionable. 
Although it may be reasonable in some experimental circumstances to 
dub, say, a series of priming 'X's as a neutral condition this still has to be 
done with caution. For example many experiments typically look at the 
differential effects of associated and unassociated word-primes in 
relation to a so called neutral condition using 'X's (e.g., Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971). In such cases it may be argued that the 'X's 
automatically prime the particular quality of non-wordness. This may 
have important implications for the type of processing that is under 
scrutiny. 
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Mental Models and Priming Effects 
It was said earlier on that a close link exists between the questions that 
are asked about mental functioning and the methods employed in its 
investigation. In this respect the work of cognitive psychologists is no 
exception and the concern with mechanisms underlying mental 
phenomena together with the techniques involved in detection and 
measurement have inevitably brought their own set of questions. Some 
of these questions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 where some 
experimental findings relating to the processing of verbal and nonverbal 
attributes of word stimuli are examined. However the questions that are 
discussed emerged from a number of research ideas that were initially 
explored in relation to the present study. These will now be outlined. 
CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH IDEAS 
In this chapter we shall look at a central theme which has pervaded the 
thinking behind this study; namely how a learner's behaviour may be 
automatically influenced by such environmental stimuli as words and 
pictures. At a time when much contemporary educational psychology is 
characterised by models of the learning process which are exclusively 
`cognitive' and emphasise readily specifiable and measurable features of 
learning it seemed to be of interest to investigate some of the possible 
effects that may arise automatically from the presence of stimuli which 
may be outside phenomenal awareness. 
One means of pursuing this area of interest was through the already 
established technique of 'pattern-masked' priming. In a typical 
experimental set-up access to conscious awareness of a briefly presented 
word or picture could be prevented if it was immediately followed by 
`visual noise' in the form of a pattern-mask consisting of jumbled lines 
or letters. Many studies have used this technique in order to examine any 
selective influences on some overt task that might arise due to the 
presence of a word of picture of which the subject was unaware. 
Within such a methodological context it was appropriate to ask a number 
of questions concerning those factors upon which the influence of a 
prime might be dependent. Such factors might include those relating to 
the prime such as its physical form or any semantic information that may 
be carried as well as those relating to the subject such as cognitive style, 
mood or mental state. Other questions arose concerning whether the 
influence of a prime was invariant or dependent upon individual strategy 
and also whether representations of events which do not reach 
62 
63 
phenomenal awareness are stored for an extended period of time and also 
whether these events can act as recall cues. 
In terms of underlying mental processes a number of theoretical ideas 
were of interest. One example was Posner and Snyder's (1975) two 
components view of attention: a fast automatic inhibitionless spreading-
activation process and a slow limited-capacity conscious-attention 
mechanism. Not only was this of interest in relation to Neely's (1977) 
results, which are discussed in Chapter 3, but also there was a link with 
the work of Marcel (1980) which suggested that sub-threshold primes 
have an activating effect relating to more than one interpretation of their 
content regardless of context, while supra-threshold primes have context 
dependent effects which are limited to one interpretation at a time. 
Within this context it was also of interest to speculate as to whether loci 
specifically responsible for the processing of such stimulus attributes as 
the semantic or graphemic existed, at least functionally if not spatially. 
With this in mind the time-course of any priming effects of different 
forms of information might have been of interest. 
A number of experimental techniques were pursued concurrently in an 
attempt to replicate some of the more established findings with a view to 
extending the experimentation more specifically in relation to theoretical 
ideas such as those outlined above. Probably most time was spent in 
trying to obtain reliable and significant semantic-priming effects with 
sub-threshold words. A number of studies (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Fowler et 
al., 1981; Balota, 1983) have reported the effects of such primes on 
lexical-decision reaction time, but the results have been inconsistent. In 
the course of the present study a similar set of procedures was followed 
and similarly erratic results were obtained; if anything the results were 
less significant statistically than the weakest effects that were reported in 
the above-cited studies. Typically a sub-threshold pattern-masked prime 
was presented tachistoscopically and followed about one second later 
with a lexical-decision task in which the subject had to decide whether a 
given string of letters formed a word or not. Variation of such parameters 
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as luminance, threshold setting of prime, duration of inter-stimulus 
intervals, density and quality of pattern-mask, size of stimuli, binocular 
vs. dichoptic presentation did not appear to affect the results. 
A further factor which was investigated was the type of semantic-
association between the prime and target: on one occasion antonyms 
appeared to produce a larger trend in lexical-decision latencies than 
synonyms, however this trend tended to be reversed in a subsequent test 
in which word-pairs were also categorised as category associates, 
functional associates and non-associates. On this latter occasion no 
noticeable pattern of priming effects was obtained. The experimental 
procedure was discussed with Marcel in his laboratory (who adopted the 
same priming paradigm and reported significant effects) but no important 
differences between the set-up and procedure used in this study and his 
were apparent. In addition the raw data sheets from the present research 
(each containing about 130 stimulus pairs) were inspected in case any 
other patterns of effect were noticeable. Again no obvious patterns of 
effect in relation to the data or the circumstances of its collection were 
apparent. 
As such workers as Marcel (1983) and Fowler et al. (1981) appeared to 
have obtained large and significant semantic-priming effects with 
pattern-masked associates on lexical-decision tasks and since the 
experimental materials and procedures adopted in this study were put 
under scrutiny the apparent differences in outcome were puzzling. In an 
attempt to resolve these differences the failure in obtaining results similar 
to those of Marcel or Fowler was attributed either to chance on their 
behalf, or, to other non-identifiable factors in their experimentation. This 
view has been supported by recent papers. For example Merikle (1982) 
has suggested that the pattern-masking thresholds used by Marcel (1983) 
and Fowler et al. (1981) could not have been reliably estimated from the 
few trials run for that part of their experiments. This is strongly reiterated 
by Merikle and Reingold (1990) who make the additional point that the 
mere presence of stimulus alternatives in a recognition task such as that 
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used by Marcel may have led to a decision-bias. A further paper 
(Balota, 1983) has reported the use of a pattern- masking/lexical-decision 
paradigm where heed had been taken of Merikle's criticisms. In this 
study Balota had gone to greater lengths to establish a reliable pattern-
masking threshold. Not only was the threshold substantially below that 
obtained by Marcel (1983) and Fowler et al. (1981) but also the the 
lexical-decision facilitation for threshold primes was less, and weaker 
statistically. The results obtained in the course of the present research 
were similar to Balota's in those respects. 
The aim of the above tests that were carried out was to produce optimal 
conditions for sub-threshold priming effects so that a measuring 
instrument capable of responding to subtle experimental conditions could 
be developed. However in the light of results obtained the conclusion 
that was drawn was that at best such techniques as pattern-masked 
priming on a temporally contiguous task such as lexical-decision are 
useable as tools but only for gross effects where one independent 
variable is manipulated. If finer quantitative measurements are to be 
attempted these techniques are unlikely to provide a sufficiently fine 
resolution. 
In one way the lack of unequivocal results was of interest in the hope that 
some hitherto unconsidered aspect of the experiments might have 
surfaced so that ways of obtaining sub-threshold priming effects could be 
approached differently. In a more 'lateral' approach to this area a variety 
of tests were carried out on subjects in a hypnotic state (criteria: arm 
levitation, and analgesic symptoms). Simple reaction times were found to 
be longer under hypnosis than in a wakeful state regardless of 
encouragement to speed up. There was no reliable difference in the 
threshold of phenomenal awareness of pattern-masked words between 
subjects in hypnotic and wakeful states. Subjects who had been exposed 
to sub-threshold stimuli both in hypnotic and wakeful states were, under 
hypnosis, encouraged to recall the stimulus events as if they were in 
slow-motion. However the use of such an 'action-replay' or 'slowing- 
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down' technique in an attempt at masked prime detection was without 
success. A Stroop colour-naming task was also tried with subjects under 
hypnosis: in accordance with the usual findings colour-word names were 
found to interfere with speeded reporting of the colour in which the 
stimuli were printed, but, the level of interference could be reduced to a 
level below that found in the wakeful state by suggesting a strategy such 
as only attending to the first part of a letter or word. 
Various interpretations of the comparative findings for the hypnotic and 
wakeful states were entertained. A comprehensive coverage of these will 
not be attempted here; however, two ideas which featured will be briefly 
reported. Firstly a finding that interference on colour-naming in a no-
strategy condition was enhanced under hypnosis may suggest that 
subjects are generally more susceptible to contextual influences and on 
this basis sub-threshold priming effects, if obtainable, may be enhanced 
in this condition. The hypnotic state was also in some ways seen as a 
state of relaxation and the possibility was considered that relaxed states 
that may be induced by other means, such as by alcohol, might also give 
rise to enhanced sub-threshold priming effects. Secondly the finding that 
threshold detection of pattern-masked primes appeared to be similar in 
hypnotic and wakeful states, even upon repeated presentation, resonates 
with an argument forwarded by Marcel (1983). Briefly this challenges 
Morton's (1968, 1979) and Shallice's (1972) treatment of conscious 
awareness as criterially dependent on a threshold amount of activation 
accumulated in categorisation units of particular stages of perceptual 
processing. Instead of awareness being conceived as qualitatively 
dependent on the information in these systems, Marcel argued it to be 
qualitatively dependent on information in a representational system 
specific to consciousness. His results (ibid. Expt. 5) indicate that the 
repetition of a sub-threshold prime does not provide the accumulation of 
information necessary for phenomenal representation, although lexical-
decision facilitation increased with prime repetition until gradually 
`levelling-out'. This can be taken to indicate that perceptual activation is 
not the accumulation of that information which mediates priming. The 
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tentative findings with hypnotic subjects in the present research may also 
suggest that the requirements for phenomenal awareness are qualitatively 
different from those for non-conscious representations may also apply in 
an altered state of awareness, such as hypnosis. 
A slightly different experimental approach that utilised pattern-masked 
primes was also provisionally tried, this time the emphasis being on 
memory. The general question concerned whether or not we remember 
those things of which we are unaware. Underwood's (1976, Chapter 4) 
discussion on attention and memory cites a number of experiments 
which, for example, require recall of information presented while a 
distractor task is undertaken. The impression gained from this discussion 
was that in many of the studies mentioned the 'status' of the unattended 
information needed to be changed in order for it to be recallable. Put 
another way, information which is presented in a form which is 
phenomenally unavailable not only has to be 'memorized' in its 
phenomenally unavailable 'state' but additionally has to be rendered by 
the subject into an overtly phenomenally available form in order for it to 
be expressed as a recalled item. If this point is not heeded then any 
interpretation of the findings may be biased towards the conclusion that 
unattended inputs are irretrievable. With this in mind any recall test for 
information of which one is unaware can only be an indirect one. Rather 
than, for example, expecting recall of pattern-masked words after a 
period of time, a more suitable requirement might be to present a pattern-
masked word with a phenomenally available event (e.g., a word which is 
not masked) and then to see if re-presentation of the masked word aids 
recall of its phenomenally available episodic associate. 
In relation to the above ideas an experiment involving what was referred 
to as 'episodic cueing' was undertaken with interesting, even if rather 
ephemeral, results. The experiment was based on the idea that a pattern-
masked sub-threshold prime presented contiguously with a supra-
threshold target might act as an episodic recall cue for the target. (The 
word 'episodic' relates to Tulving's (1972) conceptual distinction of 
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episodic memory as opposed to semantic memory; episodic memory 
referring to the storage and retrieval of personally dated and specific 
experiences, compared to a more general knowledge of meanings 
implied by semantic memory.) A list of thirty prime and target pairs (not 
necessarily related) was presented, approximately three seconds elapsing 
between each pair. Subjects were then asked to recall as many of the 
target words as they could. Finally the sub-threshold primes were 
represented and after each prime the subject was encouraged to recall 
any more words from the memory set. Although in many cases no further 
words were obtained, or, those that were did not belong to the set there 
were occasions with two subjects where further words were correctly 
recalled and, furthermore, corresponded with the primes with which they 
were originally paired. Since some five to ten minutes elapsed between 
the original presentation and the time of correct cued recall this could be 
taken to indicate that some kind of representation of a sub-threshold 
event was stored for at least this period of time. 
Although the experiment as it stood was not well controlled it was at the 
time considered as a possible candidate for refinement and extension and 
so two major modifications were made. Firstly an attempt was made to 
increase sensitivity by substituting cued recall with a cued forced-choice 
test, that is, after presenting a series of sub-threshold/supra-threshold 
word pairs the supra-threshold words were represented in twos with a 
sub-threshold cue, one of the target words being paired with that cue 
originally and the other drawn from one of the other pairings. No 
episodic cueing effects were found. Secondly, instead of using relatively 
`neutral' words of high frequency of usage as stimuli, affect-laden and 
personally relevant sub-threshold cue words were used. Again no 
episodic cueing effects were found. Although some improvements or 
modifications might have been made with regard to the method of 
stimulus presentation (especially in the case of masking sub-threshold 
cues) the experiment was discontinued at that time. 
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In view of the difficulties with experiments involving pattern-masked 
primes there was then a shift of emphasis on to experimental paradigms 
where all the information contained within a given stimulus set was 
available to conscious scrutiny but where aspects of that information 
might not be consciously attended to. The main questions then became 
framed in terms of the extent to which information might be processed 
unintentionally and automatically and the extent to which that 
information might be retrievable, or, the extent to which that information 
might affect performance on a contiguous task, even though the 
unattended information may not be necessary for task completion. 
One experiment that was piloted looked at whether a need state such as 
hunger might be linked to selective memorisation of items associated 
with hunger. Groups of about fifteen college students were used. Without 
too noticeable a disruption to the overall pattern of classroom activities 
(e.g., because some timings are informal either an early or a late lunch 
break can easily be contrived) an attempt was made to manipulate the 
likely degree of hunger. A typed list of one hundred words was presented 
to each subject, ten of the words signified food items, a further thirty 
referred to items which could be construed as examples of a container 
(e.g., envelope, house) and the remainder, with no obvious connection to 
either of these categories, were intended as distractors. A further seven 
words, one of which was a food item, were written on a blackboard in the 
corner of the classroom. The experiment was presented as a study on 
selective memorisation. Initially the task was to read through the list of 
one hundred words in order to find every word which represented a 
container and to try and remember it for later. After two or three hours 
the subjects were asked to write down as many words as they could 
remember from the list regardless of whether they were container words. 
Additionally they were asked to note any words they might have seen on 
the blackboard. Assessment of food intake in the intervening period was 
by means of a subsequently presented questionnaire within which 
appropriate questions relating to food were embedded. 
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Briefly the results tended to show a positive link between recall of food 
items and an assessed degree of hunger at the time of presentation of the 
word list. The words listed on the blackboard were used in a rough and 
ready attempt to assess recall of information spatially removed from 
attentional focus. The food item on the blackboard was not in fact 
recalled by any of the subjects. Because such an experiment ran the risk 
of inter-group contamination and because of a lack of suitable groups of 
subjects further investigations of this nature were not pursued. 
Another experimental paradigm that was piloted attempted to manipulate 
word-prime processing so that different aspects of the primes would be 
attended to. It was thought that performance on a subsequent lexical-
decision task might be affected by the nature of prime processing. A 
modification of an experiment performed by Henik, Friedrich and 
Kellogg (1983) was carried out. Two letter strings, one above the other, 
were presented for about half a second. The lower string was always a 
word while the upper was either the same word or a non-word. There 
was then a dark interval of about two seconds during which subjects, 
depending on experimental condition, would either read aloud the lower 
word or make a same/difference judgement relating to the two strings. A 
single letter string was then presented for lexical-decision. This string 
would either be a non-word or word semantically related to the prime, or 
a word not normally semantically related. The idea was that reading the 
prime aloud would draw attention towards its semantic aspects whilst the 
same/difference judgement would draw attention away from the semantic 
and towards 'lower-level' graphemic qualities of the word. On the whole 
facilitation effects on lexical-decision were stronger after the naming 
task and some subjects also showed significant facilitation after the same 
difference task. A further idea was to run a similar experiment using 
picture primes to see whether semantic information 'leaked through' 
from a picture despite attention to 'lower-level' graphemic aspects of it. 
This experimental approach, however, gave way to an alternative 
approach that was concurrently being investigated. 
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It was considered possible that non-task-related attributes of a prime 
might automatically affect performance without requiring a subject to 
engage in some overt attention directing task such as that adopted by 
Henik, Friedrich and Kellogg (1983). In view of this a series of small-
scale pilot experiments were attempted using a variety of stimulus 
attributes such as colour, semantic category and typographic case. For 
example in one experiment the requirement was to use a right- or left-
hand key press to indicate whether target words were in 'upper' or 
`lower' case. These targets were primed either by semantic-associate or 
non-associate words. Since the primes were not predictive of the targets 
it was hypothesised that because on balance there would be no pay-off 
arising from conscious processing of the primes, again, any priming 
effects would be automatic. 
In general when target stimuli presented for category decision (e.g., 
upper- or lower-case) are preceded by either semantic-associates or non-
associates a number of predictions can be made. Firstly it might be 
argued that the semantic information is irrelevant to the category-
decision task and thus semantic-priming effects would not be expected. 
Secondly it might be argued that such a previously presented associate 
might speed up automatic but necessary higher-level processing of the 
target's semantic content so that mechanisms could be freed more 
quickly to deal with processing content relevant to the decision task. 
Alternatively, the existence of a contiguously presented pair of associates 
might draw attention to the existence of the 'entity' of association and 
thus compete with attention to the category-decision task. 
Case-categorisations were found to be faster when prime and target 
words were semantically associated, even though the associations were 
not related to the case-category. Similar association effects were obtained 
when subjects were required to categorise target words in terms of 
semantic-category (` animal', or 'not animal') or colour (` red' , or 'white'). 
The latter experiments indicated that a relationship between prime and 
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target on a stimulus attribute that was not task relevant nevertheless 
influenced performance. Although this finding was of interest it proved 
difficult to interpret in terms of the nature of any underlying 
mechanisms. This was also exacerbated by the possibility that with the 
paradigm adopted subjects might deploy different strategies concurrently 
(cf., Posner & Snyder, 1975). For example category-decision responses 
might have become contaminated with associate/nonassociate responses. 
With this in mind it was considered appropriate to look more closely at 
any automatic priming effects that might occur across stimulus attributes 
but where the information carried was related in spite of the differing 
attributes. This, of course, has similarities to the body of work initiated 
by the well-known Stroop (1935) experiments (see next chapter) where, 
for example, speed of naming the colour of the ink in which a word was 
printed could be affected by the word's name. While experiments in the 
Stroop tradition were typically carried out using single stimuli the 
experiments that were being developed currently used a separate priming 
stimulus. This allowed for the possibility of comparing automatic effects 
that result from priming with a task-related stimulus attribute as well as 
with a non-task-related attribute. The distinct advantage perceived in this 
approach was that the close comparison of such 'within-attribute' and 
`cross-attribute' priming effects would allow a more detailed analysis in 
terms of underlying mental mechanisms. 
The foregoing concerns thus led to the development of a series of 
experiments where the separate and combined effects of within- and 
cross-attribute priming upon a decision task could be compared. These 
experiments together with their attendant theoretical concerns are 
reported in detail in the remaining chapters. As with the earlier 
experiments using pattern-masked primes the effect of unattended 
information on the performance on some subsequent task was being 
taken as a measure from which speculation concerning underlying 
mental processes could be made. These underlying mental processes are 
now considered in some detail. 
CHAPTER 3 
PRIMING EFFECTS ARISING FROM THE PROCESSING OF 
VERBAL AND NONVERBAL ATTRIBUTES OF WORD STIMULI 
In Chapter 1 some of the main theoretical notions concerning the 
processes underlying contextual effects were introduced. These notions 
provided a basis from which some preliminary investigative work was 
conducted and could be interpreted. This preliminary work has been 
outlined in Chapter 2 and a theme common to much of this work was the 
automatic effects that context may exert. The purpose of the present 
chapter is to examine in detail the processing mechanisms already 
introduced in relation to some studies where priming has been used as an 
experimental tool. Through these studies further attendant theoretical 
issues are also introduced. Importantly in this respect the processing 
system is also taken to include those mechanisms that may underlie 
responding. This extends the discussion in the first chapter where the 
focus was on the representation and encoding of input. 
Since the performance of an experimental task may require some form of 
deciding and responding any detailed analysis of experimentally obtained 
contextual effects must take these aspects of processing into account. At 
this stage a number of questions arise in relation to deciding and 
responding processes. For example whether or not any mechanisms 
implied are distinct and autonomous in relation to encoding processes is 
a fundamental issue. Another related issue concerns whether deciding 
and responding processes may be distinguished from encoding processes 
in terms of their automaticity, or, being subject to conscious control. The 
similarity or dissimilarity of any contextual effects that may result 
through the processes of encoding or deciding and responding may also 
need to be established. The task of investigating these issues is not easy; 
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primed letter-matching experiments. The prime (also acting as a warning 
signal) consisted either of a single letter or a plus sign. This was followed 
500 msec later by a target which consisted of a pair of letters which 
required a decision concerning whether or not they matched. In this 
experiment there was an equal probability of a letter prime matching one 
or more of the target letters. It was found that decision times for 
matching letter pairs was 85 msec faster if preceded by the same letter 
(e.g., 'A' followed by 'AA') than if preceded by a different letter (e.g., 
`13' followed by `AA'). In comparison to decision times when the plus 
sign was used as a prime it was found that the congruent condition was 
71 msec faster and the incongruent condition 14 msec slower. Posner and 
Snyder termed these effects as facilitatory and inhibitory respectively on 
the assumption that plus-sign priming was effectively neutral. 
In a variation of the above method Posner and Snyder (ibid.) manipulated 
the probability of the recurrence of the prime letter within the target. This 
was in order to investigate the idea that active conscious expectational 
effects and automatic effects may be distinguishable. If, within a series 
of trials, it is arranged that the prime letter relatively frequently recurs 
within the target then a conscious strategy where the prime is attended to 
may provide certain benefits when the target is processed since on 
average one or more of the target items will be expected. If on the other 
hand the prime letter is a poor predictor of the target elements then less 
attention may be paid to it since on balance few benefits will accrue. 
When trials were presented with an increased probability (80%) of the 
prime letter recurring within the target it was found that both the 
facilitation (85 msec) and inhibition (36 msec) effects (measured in 
comparison to the `+' priming condition) in those conditions were 
increased in relation to the equiprobable trials. On the other hand the 
values for facilitation (31 msec) and inhibition (0 msec) (similarly 
arrived at) were lowered when the matching probability of the prime in 
the same conditions was reduced to 20%. These results were taken to 
support the theory that, while automatic processes result in activations 
which can coexist for different types of input, conscious processes have 
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for example the attempt to determine the precise nature of any 
experimental effects and establish a locus for them has been among the 
major concerns of many workers in this field. Some of the contributions 
that have been made in this respect are now examined. 
Automatic and Attentional Priming Effects 
In Chapter 1 spreading-activation was identified as a pervasive element 
common to a variety of encoding mechanisms. In particular one effect 
that would be expected to arise through the spread of activation is a 
facilitation of encoding of input which in turn would be detectable 
through a measure such as response time. Automatic facilitatory effects 
have been predicted by Keele (1973) on the basis that familiar items 
excite logogens where information about name, form and semantic 
content of an item is stored. Activation takes time both to build up and to 
decay and while a logogen is currently activated any further incoming 
information that has properties in common with the activated logogen is 
encoded more speedily. According to this model there is a certain degree 
of independence among logogens with the effect that many may be 
concurrently activated with the current activation pattern having no 
inhibitory consequences as far as other input is concerned. Although the 
above activation pattern is considered not to be under conscious control 
and likewise all its products may not become the subject of conscious 
attention there is, according to Posner and Klein (1973), a change which 
takes place should conscious attention be given to any of the activated 
information. Conscious attention is seen as a limited capacity device so 
that attention to one information item, or its respective logogen, should 
have inhibitory consequences for the processing of others. 
Differentiating Automatic and Attentional Priming Effects 
In an attempt to differentiate between automatic and attentional effects 
on stimulus processing Posner and Snyder (1975) carried out a series of 
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their 'costs' and are subject to limitations in capacity. For example when 
the primes were less likely to be attended to in the 20% probability trials 
only facilitatory effects (attributable to automaticity) were obtained when 
target letters matched; the absence of attentional effects being indicated 
by the apparent absence of inhibition. With automatic processing a given 
input results in activation that persists for a period of time so that 
processing of further input of a similar nature is facilitated. The 
processing of dissimilar input is not prejudiced since, on the basis of the 
logogen model, it was argued that the presence of activity in one area has 
no effect on the activity that may be generated in other areas. In the 80% 
probability condition both automatic and attentional effects may have 
given rise to the increased facilitation while attentional effects only 
would have produced the inhibition. 
When interpreting the above results it may be important to keep in mind 
that in the 80% probability condition the prime letter predicts the 
occurrence of one or more target letters rather than a match between the 
target letters. Because of this the identities of the letters used may 
become a dominant factor in the task. On this basis, as Posner and 
Snyder have pointed out, subjects may tend to employ a matching 
strategy where responses are influenced by the relationship between the 
letters comprising the prime and target rather than on a relationship of 
the elements within a target. One of the effects of this may be a 
facilitation where all three letters are identical. However in the case of 
the prime letter being different from a matching target pair (e.g., 'B' 
followed by `AA') a conflict may arise between responses to what are 
effectively competing tasks; this may result in increased response tine. 
Further support for this line of argument was obtained from the results 
for the non-matching target letter pairs; within these conditions response 
times were shortest of all when the prime was different from both target 
letters (e.g., 'C' followed by 'AB '). In this situation it was presumed that 
the `no' response was reinforced from the prime-target mismatch as well 
as the within-target mismatch. On this basis, then, facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects may have arisen for reasons other than those originally 
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suggested. This limitation may be relevant with reference to the apparent 
lack of inhibitory effects obtained in the low probability condition. The 
effect of the neutral prime may be important here; whereas letter primes 
can both match and mismatch targets the `+' used as a neutral prime can 
only mismatch. The possibility of a carry-over effect from a prime-target 
matching strategy to the neutral priming condition could mean that while 
only some mismatching target letter pairs will elicit fast responses, all 
matching letter pairs will be slowed due to the competing tasks. On 
balance over a total run of trials, then, the response times will be biased 
towards an increase for the 'neutral' condition; this may mask any 
inhibitory effects which may otherwise have been detected. Posner and 
Snyder's (1975) conclusions regarding the absence of automatic 
inhibitory effects arising from the results from the low probability 
priming condition are open to question on this basis. 
The possibility that subjects may have difficulty containing a matching 
task within the domain of a target stimulus suggests that the matching 
paradigm used by Posner and Snyder may have certain limitations when 
used as a tool to examine such within-attribute processing interactions. 
Additionally with a paradigm such as this a problem can arise concerning 
the effects of probability in regard to neutral priming in comparison to 
other priming conditions. It has already been mentioned that Posner and 
Snyder's conclusions regarding the degree of facilitation or inhibition 
were based on assumptions regarding the neutrality of the `+' primes and 
their ability to produce a baseline against which facilitation and 
inhibition effects could be compared. While in some circumstances these 
assumptions may be valid there are also occasions where there are 
difficulties regarding the comparability of such a priming condition. This 
is especially pertinent when comparing 'neutral' priming across those 
conditions where the predictive nature of the letter primes is varied. In 
the 80% probability condition a prime was highly predictive of one or 
more letters in a target only when it consisted of a letter; the `+' prime 
remaining unpredictive: observance of this fact would have been 
inescapable to subjects. If high probability events improve reaction time 
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(as Posner and Snyder, 1975, have pointed out, albeit in a slightly 
different context) then it is likely that response times for the `+' primed 
conditions will be slower in comparison to the letter primed conditions. 
On this basis, then, the full extent of any inhibition effects obtained with 
letter primes may not show up and facilitation effects will be exaggerated 
if the response time to `+' primes is used as a baseline. This, of course, 
may partially mask any priming effects obtained on those occasions in 
the highly predictive letter priming condition where the prime letter is 
different from a matching target pair. This probability effect may also 
work in conjunction with the alternative matching strategy that has 
already been suggested. 
Time-Course of Automatic and Attentional Priming Effects 
Although some problems with the paradigm adopted by Posner and 
Snyder have been mooted a further aspect of their work deserves 
mention. In a series of repetitions of essentially the same experiment as 
the one above, Posner and Snyder (1975) examined how facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects varied with prime-target onset asynchronies ranging 
between 10 and 500 msec. In all these experiments the probability of the 
prime letter recurring within the target was high so attention to the prime 
was likely. The main findings were that facilitatory effects (worked out 
in relation to a 'neutral' condition as before) increased rapidly between 
SOAs of 10 and 150 msec and then remained at about 40 msec. These 
contrasted with inhibitory effects which were not significant until an 
SOA of 300 msec when they remained at about 50 msec (Figure 3.1). 
Posner and Snyder suggested that the results of this study provided 
support for the idea that a benefit can automatically accrue early in 
processing if the predictive nature of the prime is low while further 
benefit but also cost may arise from later processing that may be 
dependent on a high probability of the prime matching the target. Put 
another way, if automatic benefit is attributable to spreading-activation 
then this is fast acting in comparison to limited-capacity attentional 
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FIGURE 3.1 The variation of facilitatory and inhibitory effects with onset 
asynchrony between prime and target for a letter-matching task. (Adapted 
from Posner and Snyder, 1975) 
nevertheless remains the possibility that the priming effects obtained 
may still be subject to an interpretation based on the consequences of the 
matching paradigm adopted and the debatable effective neutrality of the 
`+' primes used in that context as discussed earlier. This latter 
interpretation may be particularly relevant since in all the time-course 
experiments the letter primes were highly predictive of the target. 
Automatic and Attentional Semantic-Priming Effects 
The issue concerning automatic and attentional effects has also been 
investigated by Meyer and his associates (e.g., Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971; Schvaneveldt & Meyer, 1973; Meyer, Schvaneveldt 
& Ruddy, 1975). In contrast to Posner and Snyder's (1975) work which 
was based on physical-attribute letter matches Meyer and his co-workers 
studied semantic-priming effects. Two models which could account for 
such priming effects were proposed; a 'spreading-excitation' model and 
`location shifting' model (Schvaneveldt and Meyer, 1973). The 
spreading-excitation model assumes the existence of a logogen system 
similar to that adopted by Keele (1973) but in addition account is taken 
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of Morton's (1970) arrangement whereby semantically-related logogens 
are located with a higher degree of proximity than unrelated logogens. 
On this basis if activation for a given stimulus spreads to adjacent and, 
therefore, semantically-related logogens, facilitation would be expected 
for further semantically-related input. The location shifting model also 
assumes the same arrangement of logogens but this time semantic-
facilitation is explained in terms of a limited-capacity, attentionally 
driven device which can process the information available only from a 
small subset of logogens upon which it is focused. If the focus is on 
logogens activated by a given input which is then followed by a 
semantically-related input then only a short period of time is required to 
shift the focus a 'short distance' between the related logogens in 
comparison to unrelated logogens which would be 'further apart'. 
Although semantic-priming effects had previously been found (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971), Meyer, Schvaneveldt & Ruddy, (1972; cited in 
Meyer, Schvaneveldt & Ruddy, 1975) attempted to differentiate between 
the spreading-excitation and location shifting models by requiring 
subjects to perform a lexical-decision on the last of three successively 
presented words whose semantic relationship was controlled. The crucial 
finding was that the response time to related-unrelated-related triplets 
(i.e., where the first and third words were related to each other) was 
faster than to unrelated-unrelated-unrelated triplets. This finding is 
accountable with spreading-activation if it is assumed that there is 
sufficient residual activation remaining from the occurrence of the first 
word to facilitate processing of the target. A location shifting model 
cannot provide an account since only the shift from the logogen 
pertaining to the penultimate word (effectively unrelated in both 
conditions) is relevant. 
Meyer, Schvaneveldt & Ruddy's (1972) experiment however does not 
rule out the possibility that a location shifting mechanism may also act in 
conjunction with spreading-activation. The Posner and Snyder (1975) 
study for example suggests such a possibility in terms of automatic 
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spreading-activation in addition to the limited capacity attentional 
mechanism which is considered to correspond to the location-shifting 
model. In order to investigate this possibility at word-level Neely (1976) 
ran a primed lexical-decision experiment where subjects' responses to 
the word or nonword category of letter strings were timed. An intentional 
feature of this experimental paradigm was that the prime-target matching 
strategy which might have been adopted by Posner and Snyder's (1975) 
subjects could be avoided. In addition to primes which were 
semantically-related or unrelated to their respective targets, 'neutral' 
primes consisting of a row of Xs were used. It was argued that the 
neutral prime would not direct limited-capacity attentional mechanisms 
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FIGURE 3.2 Lexical-decision reaction times for correct responses to word 
targets as a function of prime-target relationship and SOA. (From Neely, 
1976) 
of 360, 600 and 2000 msec were used so that any time-course of effects 
was also examinable. These SOAs (relatively long in comparison to 
those used by Posner and Snyder) were chosen so as to allow time for the 
prime to be read and associated logogens to be activated. The relatively 
large facilitation effects in relation to the neutral priming condition 
(shown in Figure 3.2) may be accounted for in terms of automatic 
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spreading-activation as well as attention to prime-related logogens. The 
inhibitory effect obtained was also considered to lend support to the 
argument that separate automatic and attentional processes may be 
responsible for facilitation. This argument was based on the assumption 
that inhibitory effects do not arise from automatic spreading-activation 
thereby suggesting that attentional effects exist which, in addition to 
automatic effects, can also give rise to facilitation. This assumption, of 
course, is not in agreement with the inhibitory processes predictable 
according to the PDP mechanisms outlined in Chapter 1. Although some 
aspects of the results are in keeping with the general idea of a limited 
capacity attentional mechanism (such as the inhibitory effects obtained 
with unrelated primes) other aspects are problematical when considered 
in detail. For example there is no significant increase in inhibition with 
increasing SOA as might be predicted from Posner and Snyder on the 
basis of attentional processes being slow to take effect. However in order 
for this interpretation to have more weight the effects would need to be 
examined from earlier on in the time-course. Also of interest in the 
Neely (1976) findings is that, in comparison to a neutral prime, a word-
prime facilitated decision reaction times for nonwords. This counters the 
argument that a prime word may be attention demanding in comparison 
to a recurring string of Xs and has invited explanations in terms of 
subjects matching self-generated prime associates with the target word 
and responding in those terms rather than in terms of lexical identity. 
Although Neely's results may appear to bear some equivalence to those 
of Posner and Snyder (1975) and in that sense may counter some of the 
arguments concerning the limitations of the matching paradigm adopted 
by the latter it is nevertheless important to note that any conclusions 
concerning the coexistence of automatic and attentional effects rests 
upon the assumption that inhibitory effects are not obtainable at stages 
concerning automatic activation. Since reservations concerning this latter 
assumption have already been expressed it is difficult in the context of 
this logic to be conclusive regarding the role of automatic and attentional 
mechanisms on the basis of the data so far discussed. 
83 
In an attempt to further investigate any differential effects that might 
relate to automatic and attentional mechanisms operating at the semantic-
level Neely (1977) again used a primed lexical-decision task but, in a 
method having some parallels to Posner and Snyder (1975), now 
controlled subjects' expectations regarding the relationship of the prime 
Table 3.1 Reaction times (msec) obtained by Neely (1977) to word targets 
in terms of mean facilitation (+) or inhibition (-) scores for word-prime 
conditions for a prime-target SOA of 250 msec. (NS-Ex-R = nonshift-
expected-related; NS-Ux-U = nonshift-unexpected-unrelated; S-Ex-U = 




















+20 	 (p<.05, one-tailed) 
to the target. Table 3.1 shows the five combinations he used. For 
example in a `nonshift-expected-related' condition the category-word 
`bird' was used as a prime and subjects were told to expect a 
semantically-related target exemplar such as 'robin'. Similarly in a 'shift-
expected-unrelated' condition for the prime 'body' subjects were told to 
expect an exemplar from a building-parts category such as 'door'. Those 
trials where the prime category was not predictive of the target type were 
assigned to `nonshift-unexpected-unrelated' and `shift-unexpected-
unrelated' conditions. In these experiments the prime-target SOA was 
also varied, although this time over the range 250 to 2000 msec on the 
assumption that this would be sufficient to observe the differences in 
priming effect between the fast acting spreading-activation and the 
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slower attentional mechanisms. The results obtained were argued to be in 
general agreement with predictions based upon the model suggested by 
Posner and Snyder (1975), that is both attentional and non-attentional 
factors in the nonshift-expected-related condition (e.g., BIRD-robin) 
would contribute to facilitatory effects at all SOAs while attentional 
factors would facilitate at longer SOAs in the shift-expected-unrelated 
condition (e.g., BODY-door). 
In addition, attentionally induced inhibitory effects (cost) increased with 
SOA in both the shift-unexpected-unrelated (e.g., BODY-sparrow) and 
nonshift-unexpected-unrelated (e.g., BIRD-arm) conditions. Also 
facilitation arising from non-attentional influences which prevailed at 
short SOAs was masked by inhibitory effects at longer SOAs due to 
attentional factors in shift-expected-unrelated (e.g., BODY-heart) 
condition. Thus it was argued that regardless of attention, automatic 
effects which facilitate performance only were in evidence at prime-
target onset asynchronies as low as 250 msec while conscious attention 
demanding effects were slower acting and gave rise both to a facilitation 
and inhibition of performance which was in evidence at SOAs of 
400 msec and above. 
Neely's (1977) work is important in that it provides a more rigorous 
analysis of the coexistence of the effects of automatic and attentional 
mechanisms than has been available hitherto. However as far as 
automatic effects are concerned, although Neely argues that the results 
support a spreading-excitation model where any priming effects are only 
of a facilitatory nature the possibility that automatic inhibitory effects 
might also exist was never a part of his discussion. His statistical analysis 
although lengthy and comprehensive in many respects sought, as one 
might reasonably expect, to establish the probable existence of 
theoretically predicted effects rather than the possible existence of 
effects which were not predicted. With regard to this latter point, 
however, the possibility of an unpredicted automatic inhibitory effect is 
important in the wake of the principles articulated within many PDP 
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models where an interactive encoding mechanism which has inhibitory 
as well as facilitatory consequences may exist. It may be argued that 
Neely's (1977) conclusion regarding the non-existence of automatic 
inhibitory effects may have arisen for two main reasons. First, the 
shortest SOA of 250 msec, chosen so that only automatic effects would 
be elicited, was not short enough to reveal inhibition. In such a case any 
automatic effects at 250 msec SOA might have become contaminated 
with attentional effects. Second, the obtained levels of significance were 
in general too low to firmly establish some of the predicted trends, 
especially at the 250 msec SOA. 
Some specific illustrations regarding these reservations may help. These 
will be discussed with reference to Table 3.1 (Page 83) which shows the 
results obtained by Neely (1977) for a prime target onset asynchrony of 
250 msec. The possibility that an SOA of 250 msec was not short enough 
to sufficiently minimize attentional effects is suggested by the 
differences obtained in the two Related (R) conditions; a facilitation 
effect of 33 msec was obtained at the .001 significance level for an 
expected target while for an unexpected target the smaller 20 msec 
facilitation effect was only just statistically significant (p <.05, one-
tailed). Although this latter 20 msec facilitation effect was considered to 
support the predictions concerning the facilitative nature of automatic 
effects the 16 msec inhibitory effect obtained in the unrelated (BODY-
sparrow) condition was discounted, yet the mean priming effects in both 
these conditions were not very different in magnitude, and not entirely 
different with regard to statistical significance (SEM=11.7, N=179 and 
SEM=10.6, N=179 respectively). The Shift-Expected-Unrelated 
condition (BODY-door) is of interest insofar that on the basis of 
automatic effects consistent with most PDP models only an inhibitory 
effect should result at 250 msec SOA. If, however, attentional effects 
were also present then such an inhibitory effect would either be tempered 
or masked by the facilitation arising due to a target outcome congruent 
with expectation. The non-significant 4 msec facilitation effect obtained 
in the latter condition does not rule out the possibility of a 'hidden' 
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automatic inhibitory effect particularly in the context of the other 
findings in respect of the temporal onset of attentional effects. Finally 
although the non-statistically significant 3 msec facilitation obtained in 
the nonshift-unexpected-unrelated condition (BIRD-arm) is more 
consistent with automatic effects which are facilitatory-only, rather than 
also having the capacity to be inhibitory, the possibility of a type II error 
cannot be ruled out. In sum it may be argued that while Neely's (1977) 
data accord with an encoding mechanism that is based on spreading-
excitation they do not exclude an alternative possibility that an automatic 
encoding mechanism incorporating inhibitory as well as facilitatory 
processes may exist. 
Discrete Processing Stages 
A number of interrelated issues have emerged from the empirical work 
so far discussed; in particular the existence and nature of automatic and 
attentional priming effects. Although the possible mechanisms 
underlying such effects may have been implied this issue has so far not 
been addressed directly in relation to extant experimental data. An 
approach adopted by a number of experimentalists has been to assume 
that functionally separate mechanisms are responsible for different 
mental processes. This approach has already been discussed in Chapter 1 
where the modular nature of encoding was the reference. A similar 
grouping of mechanisms associated with encoding and responding may 
also be argued. For example with Posner and Snyder's (1975) letter-
matching experiments the obtained relative increase of facilitation with 
probability may suggest that automatic and attentional effects may be at 
least partially additive. This in turn may suggest that independent 
processes are involved. Although such an approach may be attractive it is 
not without its dangers. This may be exemplified by some classical work 
carried out last century by Donders. 
Donders (1868) attempted to investigate the underlying mechanisms 
involved in choice reaction time by running three types of experiment. 
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One experiment involved the measurement of simple RT (condition a), 
another involved the presentation of any one of five stimuli, each 
requiring its own specific stimulus-related response (condition b), while 
a third involved the presentation of five different stimuli, only one of 
which required a response (condition c). Response time was shortest for 
simple RT and longest for the choice task (b) which involved five 
distinct stimulus-response pairings. In order to explain his findings 
Donders assumed the processes of discrimination of a stimulus and the 
choice of a response were separable and did not vary between 
experimental situations. A further assumption was that the time occupied 
by each of these processes could be related to the overall response time 
by simple rules of addition and subtraction. Thus, as the 'b' condition 
involved both discrimination and choice while the 'c' condition only 
involved discrimination the choice time could be arrived at by 
subtracting 'c' from 'b'. Similarly by subtracting 'a' from 'c' the 
discrimination time was obtained. 
Although this 'subtractive' method introduced by Donders has enjoyed 
popularity it does not necessarily provide a tenable account of underlying 
processes. Some of the problems which arise when attempting to 
interpret these findings include the fact that the 'c' condition does not 
necessarily exclude response selection; the subject has still to decide 
whether or not the stimulus is the target. Another problem is that the 
response processes for a simple RT experiment may involve quite 
different strategies from those in a choice RT experiment. The principal 
difficulties arise from the possibility that complex processes cannot 
always be considered to consist of a simple summation of elements and 
that different processes are not necessarily governed by a temporal 
seriation which leads to simple subtractive rules; processes may overlap 
in time and furthermore the involvement of new elements on one task 
may cause changes in the functioning in the other elements involved in 
the other condition. In other words it cannot be assumed that, if any 
processing stages exist, they will function independently of each other. 
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Although Donders' original treatment may be too simplistic some of his 
ideas underlie more recent work. An important revision of the method 
used by Donders was carried out by Sternberg (1969). Subjects were 
asked to memorise a list of letters and then they were presented with a 
probe letter. The time that it took to decide whether or not the probe was 
in the list was measured. Lists of varying length were used and the 
results showed a linear relationship between the reaction time and the list 
size. The postulation of a serial search process of items in memory 
seemed reasonable. One thing that was found from the results was that 
the search time per list item was the same regardless of whether the 
probe was drawn from the list. This suggested that the search was 
exhaustive. The key difference between this method and that used by 
Donders is that it investigates the number of times a given process 
operates, not whether the stage is present or absent. 
Taylor's (1977) Study 
Taylor (1977) also assumes the existence of a series of discrete 
processing stages. These are shown in Figure 3.3. The 'feature 
extraction' and 'pattern identification' stages have, by Taylor, been 
collectively referred to as 'stimulus processing'. Similarly 'response 
determination' and 'motor activation' have been referred to as 'response 
processing'. It is assumed that these stages operate serially and that 
reaction times may be determined by the addition of the processing times 
required for each stage. This stage model provided a base from which 
Taylor could infer and investigate mechanisms underlying context 
effects. Experiments were devised which attempted to influence the 
processing in certain stages selectively; pairs of successive stimuli were 
used, one provided context (effectively a prime) while the other acted as 
a probe (or target) and required a response. The logic was that if these 
stimuli are manipulated in terms of their relationship and onset 
asynchrony then measurement of response times to the probe may lead to 
inferences concerning the processes that may occur at the relevant stages. 
























FIGURE 3.3 Processing stages and their arrangement. (Adapted from 
Taylor, 1977.) 
indication of the form of a typical experiment. This work will now be 
examined in detail since it provides some interesting analytical 
viewpoints. Because the interrelationships between the varieties of 
possible priming effect occurring within different mental mechanisms are 
relatively complex and the data therefore subject to different 
interpretations the discussion of Taylor's work is correspondingly 
lengthy. However its importance in relation to the present study is 
signalled here since the work provides some useful bases for further 
investigation. 
General and Specific Effects 
The processing of two stimuli rather than one may be viewed in terms of 
limited processing resources having to be shared. According to 
Taylor (1977) a so called 'general effect' on the processing of one 
stimulus may arise as a result of the processing of the other. This general 
effect may occur regardless of any relationship between stimulus content 
and has been likened to the psychological refractory effect (Appendix 1). 
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In contrast to such general effects it was expected that 'specific effects' 
would result from varying the relationship between probe and context. 
The relationship between stimuli may be determined by such factors as 
similarity of content or the responses assigned to them. Specific effects 
can be investigated by comparing one or more types of experimentally 
determined context-probe relationship with a control where the context is 
said to be neutral. Since it was assumed that a neutral context would 
produce the same general effect as an experimental one specific effects 
were considered to be deducible. 
Among the types of specific effect that may arise Taylor (1977) has 
made a further distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' effects. A 
primary effect can be illustrated by considering the fate of two stimuli 
presented simultaneously; here it may be argued that, providing the same 
processing stages are encountered and the stimuli processed in an 
equivalent manner, the effect of one stimulus upon the other will be 
reciprocal so that both stimuli are processed through the same stages at 
the same rate. In general it is conceivable that to an extent the processing 
of two stimuli, even if presented at slightly different times, will lead to 
mutual or reciprocal interactions that would produce a time-course of 
effects symmetrical about an SOA of zero. Secondary specific effects are 
considered to arise due to the completed processing of an initial stimulus 
on the processing of a subsequent stimulus. For example if two 
successively-presented stimuli are identical then the first stimulus may 
leave the processing system 'tuned' for a short period of time so that the 
processing of the second stimulus is speeded. Although the effect of this 
may alter any internal SOA-gap that may exist between the stimuli 
Taylor argues that the influence of the context on the target processing is 
unidirectional rather than reciprocal. In terms of a time-course, 
secondary effects would be expected to show up asymmetrically about a 
zero prime-target onset asynchrony. 
As did Posner and Snyder (1975), Taylor (1977) used single-letter 
stimuli, but instead of a matching task a choice-decision task was used. 
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FIGURE 3.4 An example of the stimuli used and the sequence of events 
comprising a single trial in Taylor's (1977) Experiment 1. Subjects 
respond with a right-hand key-press if the target letter is 'T' and a left-
hand key-press for a target letter 'K'. 
Subjects were required to press a left-hand response key on the 
occurrence of the target letter '1(' and press a right-hand key for the letter 
`T'. In Taylor's first experiment (again see Figure 3.4) a trial consisted of 
a target letter presented centrally within and temporally contiguous to a 
context which consisted of two representations of the same or another 
letter. In all there were three experimental conditions. In one condition 
both target and context consisted of the same letter (e.g., `KKK'), in 
another the context letter was the same as that assigned to an opposite 
key response to that of the target (e.g., 'TKT') while in a neutral 
condition the context consisted of a letter that was not used as a target 
(e.g., `0K0'). When the context was presented after the target no 
significant facilitatory or inhibitory effects (apart from one small 
inhibitory effect occurring at a 50 msec separation) were detected over 
the 250 msec stimulus onset asynchrony range used. When the context 
was presented simultaneously with or preceding the target, however, 
significant facilitatory and inhibitory effects were obtained; these 
reached a peak with an SOA of 50 msec and thereafter decayed with 
increasing SOA over the 250 msec range used. These results are 
summarised in Figure 3.5. Because primary specific effects were 
assumed to be symmetrical about an SOA of zero Taylor (1977) 
attributed the facilitation and inhibition obtained above 0 msec SOA to 
secondary specific effects. 
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FIGURE 3.5 The time-course of the variation in choice decision reaction 
time according to priming condition. 'Probe' refers to a stimulus to which a 
response is required. 'Before' and 'after' refer to the onset of contextual 
information. (From Taylor, 1977, Experiment 1.) 
So far, then, from Taylor's (1977) first experiment a picture is built up of 
automatic priming effects on a choice-decision task which appear to arise 
from a temporary change in state of a processing system as a 
consequence of a prior stimulus rather than arising from an ongoing 
interaction among concurrently processed stimuli. A major point that 
may be observed here is that, in contrast to priming studies such as those 
carried out by Posner and Snyder (1975) and Neely (1976, 1977), 
Taylor's account acknowledges the existence of automatic inhibitory 
effects. 
Automatic and Attentional Effects 
Taylor (1977, Experiment 2) also investigated automatic and attentional 
context effects. To achieve this the probability of the context matching 
the target was varied in a similar way to that in Posner and 
Snyder's (1975) experiments. The results, this time only obtained for 
target post-exposures (`probe after') ranging from 0 to 500 msec, 
suggested that in addition to facilitatory and inhibitory effects similar to 
the first experiment there were attentional effects which were also 
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facilitatory and inhibitory. The slope of the time-course of attentional 
inhibitory effects showed a decay with increasing SOA similar to that of 
the automatic inhibitory effects, except that the magnitude of the 
attentional effect was approximately twice that of the automatic effect 
and was accompanied by a corresponding increase in duration. By way 
of contrast, although the magnitude of the facilitatory effect obtained in 
the high probability condition was similar to that for equiprobable 
condition at zero SOA, the effect of high probability priming increased 
with SOAs up to a value of 200 msec before levelling out. Because the 
error rate for attentional inhibitory context was high in comparison to 
that produced by a facilitating context Taylor concluded that a response 
bias building up to a maximum at 200 msec SOA was responsible for the 
attentional facilitatory effect. Since a facilitating context in the 
attentional condition was more frequent subjects took context as a cue to 
the response to be made. 
Locating Automatic Facilitation and Inhibition 
Of particular interest with regard to the mechanisms that may be 
responsible for automatic facilitation and inhibition is Taylor's (1977) 
third experiment. A major concern at this point of the work was to 
attempt to assess the contribution of the individual processing stages 
(Figure 3.3, Page 88) to the overall context effects. To this end the 
format and procedure of his Experiment 2 was adopted but with an 
important variation: an extra letter was associated with each of the 
response keys. Whereas previously only one letter (T) corresponded with 
a right-hand response and similarly one (K) for the left-hand, this time 
there were two response possibilities for each hand; the letters 'F' and 
`R' being assigned to the left-hand while 'K' and 'T' were assigned to 
the right (Figure 3.6). With this set-up it was possible to have a 
`response-facilitation' condition where the context could be congruent 
with the response while remaining different from the target (e.g., `KTK') 
and an 'inhibition' condition where the context as well as being different 
from the target was also incongruently related to the response (e.g., 
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`FTF'). The idea was that the effects that might result from the above 
priming conditions could be specifically related to the two main 
groupings of the processing stages; stimulus processing and response 
processing as shown in Figure 3.3 (Page 88). 
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FIGURE 3.6 Letters assigned to left and right-hand key responses in 
Taylor's (1977) Experiment 3. 
A comparison of the automatic effects revealed that while inhibitory 
effects comparable with those of the other experiments were obtained in 
the inhibition condition (e.g., `FTF') there were no significant priming 
effects in the response-facilitation condition (e.g., `KTK'). Taylor argued 
that since in these two conditions the context and targets never matched 
the only distinguishing factor was the degree of association between 
context and response therefore the inhibitory effect must have resulted 
from response processing rather than stimulus processing. In the 
stimulus-facilitation condition the context and target always matched 
(e.g., `TTT') and so the only difference between this condition and the 
response-facilitation condition (e.g., `KTK') was the occurrence of 
matching stimuli since in both these conditions the context stimuli were 
congruent with the response. On this basis it was inferred that the locus 
of an automatic facilitation effect obtained in the 'stimulus-facilitation' 
condition was at a stimulus processing stage. This latter conclusion, 
however, is questionable in terms of the logic adopted by Taylor. Even if 
assumptions such as those concerning stages which work independently 
and serially are accepted, the argument that "effects of stimulus 
repetition ought to appear only in stages involved with stimulus 
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processing" (Taylor, 1977, p.419) is difficult to accept in view of the fact 
that if the same letter is used both as prime and target then as well as 
being congruent in terms of stimulus processing it is also (inevitably) 
congruent in terms of response processing. If the 'stimulus-facilitation' 
condition is now reinterpreted as a 'stimulus and response-facilitation' 
condition then, contrary to Taylor's conclusions, it may now be argued 
that the obtained automatic facilitation may be attributable to either or 
both of the stimulus processing and response processing stages. 
The possibility that inhibition could arise from a conflict at the stimulus 
processing stage, and, that facilitation could arise from response 
compatibility was also entertained by Taylor. However this was 
discounted on the grounds that a balance of inhibitory and facilitatory 
effects would be necessary to account for the net zero effect in the 
response-facilitation condition. This would mean that these effects 
should be equal in magnitude. Since Taylor claimed that the automatic 
facilitatory effects were on average nearly three times the magnitude of 
the automatic inhibitory effects the conclusion was that those results did 
not support such an alternative possibility. However the fact that the 
magnitude of automatic inhibition was well in excess of automatic 
facilitation for Taylor's (1977) first two experiments does not appear to 
have been considered in this context. Since it can be argued that the 
inhibition and stimulus-facilitation conditions for the third experiment 
are equivalent to the respective automatic priming conditions in the first 
two experiments then it appears that imbalance in automatic facilitatory 
and inhibitory effects obtained in the third experiment is not reliable. The 
alternative possibility where the obtained effects are based on stimulus 
conflict and response compatibility therefore cannot be eliminated. 
A further argument put forward by Taylor with regard to the possibility 
of inhibition resulting from stimulus processing and facilitation from 
response processing makes reference to the results for the high 
probability conditions that were also run in the third experiment. Here 
the argument was considered that the difference between the 'stimulus- 
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facilitation' (e.g., 'TTT') and the response-facilitation results (e.g., 
`KTK') could be attributed to inhibition from a stimulus mismatch rather 
than facilitation from a stimulus match. If this were so then, the argument 
continues, the inhibition results should show the same trend as the net 
inhibition effect obtainable from the 'stimulus-facilitation' and the 
response-facilitation results. Since the two time-course trends were very 
different in magnitude and quality Taylor considered his argument 
concerning the implausibility of inhibition arising from stimulus 
mismatch to be supported. 
This latter argument might have presented a deciding case if it were not 
for a number of other factors. Firstly the results obtained from the 
inhibitory condition which was used as a comparison could have arisen 
from inhibition occurring within responding mechanisms as well as 
stimulus mechanisms. Secondly, the fact that there are also other logical 
possibilities with regard to combinations of facilitatory and inhibitory 
effects within stimulus processing and response processing mechanisms. 
These logical possibilities will be shortly discussed. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, given the possibility that inhibition may arise from 
stimulus conflict, the status of the neutral prime is also called into 
question. Taylor considered the letter '0' to be neutral in all three 
experiments on the basis that it was not associated by instruction to either 
a left- or right-hand response. While it may be reasonable to assume that 
`0' is neutral with regard to response-mechanism-priming the situation, 
it is less clear with regard to stimulus processing mechanisms. Since 
Taylor uses the term 'stimulus conflict' to refer to prime-target events 
such as `KTK' and `FTF' regardless of the response congruity it may be 
assumed that the conflict arises due to a lack of stimulus repetition; in 
this case 'OTO' must also qualify in terms of its ability to give rise to a 
stimulus conflict and therefore cannot be regarded as a neutral prime 
where stimulus processing mechanisms are concerned. 
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Reinterpreting Taylor's Findings 
Before the implications of the problem with Taylor's assumptions 
regarding neutral priming are further considered a framework for 
analysis will be presented in terms of the various logical possibilities 
with regard to the automatic facilitatory and inhibitory effects that may 
arise within stimulus processing and response processing mechanisms. 
Since these possibilities when presented in the form of continuous prose 
may be difficult to follow they are presented in the form of a matrix in 
Figure 3.7. Within this matrix stimulus mechanisms are represented by 
`S' and responding mechanisms by `1V. The possibility that facilitation 
R- R+ R± 
S- S-,R- S-,R+ S-,R± 
S+ S+,R- S+, R+ S+, R+ 
S± S±,R- S±,R+ S±,R± 
FIGURE 3.7 The logical possibilities regarding the occurrence of 
automatic facilitatory (+) and inhibitory (-) effects within Taylor's (1977) 
stimulus processing (S) and response processing (R) stages. (See text.) 
Cell entries show each logical combination. 
can occur within a mechanism is represented by `+' and inhibition by `-'; 
thus `S+,R-' exemplifies Taylor's (1977) conclusion that, as far as 
automatic effects are concerned, only facilitation is possible in stimulus 
mechanisms and only inhibition is possible in responding mechanisms. 
If it assumed that Taylor's findings concerning the existence of both 
automatic facilitatory and automatic inhibitory effects are valid then the 
number of processing possibilities reduces. For example an `S-' model 
only allows for automatic inhibition; there is no mechanism here which 
would produce automatic facilitation. On this basis the `S-' possibility can 
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be eliminated if facilitation was assumed to occur. The `1Z-' and `S-,R2  
models also predict inhibition only and can also be eliminated from the 
matrix. A similar argument applies where only facilitation is predicted as 
with the `S+', `1Z-i-' and `S+,R+' models. In this way the number of 
automatic processing possibilities is reduced from fifteen to nine (those 
cells where only facilitatory, or, only inhibitory effects occur being 




St S±,R- S±,R+ S±,R± 
FIGURE 3.8 The remaining logical possibilities regarding the occurrence 
of facilitatory (+) and inhibitory (-) effects within Taylor's (1977) stimulus 
processing (S) and response processing (R) stages on the assumption 
that both automatic facilitatory and automatic inhibitory effects are 
obtainable. (See text.) 
One way of carrying this process of elimination further is to use 
Taylor's (1977, Experiment 3) finding that there were no automatic 
priming effects for the 'response' facilitation condition (KTK) as a 
reference point against which deductions concerning relative priming 
effects can be made. For instance, as already implied by Taylor, the 
apparent lack of effects could have resulted for two reasons; either 
facilitation and inhibition were absent, or, facilitation/s and inhibition/s 
of a roughly equal magnitude cancelled each other. In this context it may 
be reasonable to make the simplifying assumption that for both stimulus 
and response mechanisms congruent priming where applicable can 
produce one unit of facilitation and incongruent priming one unit of 
inhibition and that these effects are additive. With this in mind the 
conditions from Taylor's third experiment can be expressed 'inclusively' 
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in terms of the possible effects on stimulus-encoding and response 
systems. These are as follows: 
`stimulus-facilitation' 	 (e.g., TTT) 	 S+,R+ 
`response-facilitation' 	 (e.g., KTK) 	 S-,R+ 
`inhibition' 	 (e.g., FTF) 	 S-,R- 
`neutral' 	 (e.g., OTO) 	 S- 
These conditions can then be 'tested' against the processing 
environments applicable in terms of the matrix shown in Figure 3.8. 
Facilitation effects may, for example, accrue where the `R+' of the 
`stimulus-facilitation' condition occurs in a response processing 
mechanism which is capable of producing facilitatory effects, but not 
where, as in Taylor's conclusion, a response processing mechanism is 
only capable of producing inhibitory effects. Given the above logic the 
priming effects obtainable from the nine processing environments that 
remain after the elimination process so far are presented again in 
Figure 3.9. For the purpose of ease of reference the priming conditions 
will only be referred to by example at this stage of the argument. The 
subset of exemplars (ITT, KTK, FTF, OTO) listed above are thus used 
in the predictions of priming effects shown in Figure 3.9. 
An important point which arises from Figure 3.9 is that the OTO priming 
condition that was considered neutral by Taylor may not always produce 
a zero priming effect. On this basis the results Taylor obtained in the 
automatic response-facilitation condition can only be described in terms 
of their coincidence with the OTO condition rather than in terms of no 
overall priming effect. If Figure 3.9 is inspected it will be seen that only 
three of the nine processing environments are in keeping with Taylor's 
result that the resultant priming effects of OTO and KTK are the same; 
these are S+,R-, S±, and S±,R-. Of these S± can be discounted since it 
predicts no difference between the FTF condition and the OTO and KTK 
conditions which is clearly not in accordance with Taylor's results. Of 
the two remaining possibilities the S+,R- is consistent with Taylor's 
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FIGURE 3.9 A topological prediction of priming effects obtainable from 
the nine processing environments remaining in Figure 3.8. The priming 
conditions are those used by Taylor (1977; Experiment 3) and are shown 
in the form of exemplars; TTT = 'stimulus-facilitation', KTK = 'response-
facilitation', FTF = 'inhibition', OTO = 'neutral'. 
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conclusions while the S±,R- suggests that, apart from a responding 
mechanism which only produces inhibitory effects, the stimulus-
encoding mechanism, contrary to Taylor's conclusion, is capable of 
producing inhibitory as well as facilitatory effects. Further elimination 
from these two remaining environments is difficult on the basis of 
Taylor's data. If the suggested magnitude of the relative priming effects 
predicted in Figure 3.9 is compared with Taylor's result that the relative 
inhibitory effect in the FTF condition was considerably less than the 
relative facilitatory effect from the Trr condition then this can be 
considered more supportive of the S±,R- possibility. However since a 
comparison of the data across the three experiments suggests that the 
relative magnitude of the priming effects for equivalent conditions 
appears to vary this is indicative that the relative magnitude of effects 
across experiments as a measure is unreliable and so a conclusion in 
favour of one of the two processing environment possibilities is at best 
speculative. 
If the question concerning the existence of inhibitory as well as 
facilitatory processes occurring at the encoding stage is to be pursued 
empirically and Taylor's (1977) paradigm is adapted for this purpose 
then it is necessary to have a priming condition which is neutral against 
which congruent and incongruent stimulus-encoding effects can be 
compared. In the case of the letter classification task used by 
Taylor (1977) the requirements for a congruent stimulus encoding 
condition were met by a prime and target which consisted of physically 
identical components while in the incongruent condition the components 
were different. This context demands that the prime-form for the neutral 
condition should thus be neither identical nor different from the target; a 
clearly impossible requirement. Even if a non-existent or no-prime 
condition is used for comparison problems may arise due to general 
effects such as psychological refractivity (Appendix 1) since the 
dimension of presence and absence of a stimulus would become salient. 
The possibility of distinguishing between encoding and response effects 
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may be considered if Taylor's (1977) paradigm is modified so that the 
tasks are based on a higher level of stimulus-encoding such as word-
name. In this case it may be assumed that the dimension of 'congruity' 
can be expressed in terms of semantically or associatively related words. 
However a number of problems arise which would make the 
interpretation of any findings difficult. The associates obtainable from 
tables of norms such as Kucera and Francis (1967) are often in the form 
of the 'opposite' poles of a given conceptual dimension such as 'high-
low' and these associates produce speeded responses in semantic-
priming experiments (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). Accordingly 
the problem then becomes one of distinguishing a neutral condition from 
an incongruent one. That is, if a non-associate of a given target is used in 
an incongruent priming condition then what kind of prime can be 
regarded as neutral? Apart from this difficulty there is a further demand 
that arises from Taylor's paradigm; the arbitrary linking of certain 
stimuli with certain responses. With the stimulus repetitions necessarily 
occurring within such a paradigm it is possible that hitherto non-
associates which require the same response will become associated and 
that this association may also result in effects occurring at the encoding 
stage. 
It thus appears that a differentiation between both facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects which may occur at encoding and response stages is 
unlikely to be obtainable with an approach directly derived from 
Taylor's (1977) method. Taylor's work is, however, useful in that if 
processing is to be divided into encoding and responding stages then 
some possibilities with regard to facilitation and inhibition may have 
been eliminated. In particular the remaining possibilities suggest that 
automatic inhibitory effects are obtainable and that these may occur 
along with automatic facilitatory effects within mechanisms involved 
with stimulus-encoding. This is of contemporary interest in that it 
accords with the PDP models already discussed. 
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CROSS-ATTRIBUTE PRIMING EFFECTS 
Priming studies, of which those by Posner and Snyder (1975), 
Taylor (1977) and Neely (1977) are representative, are important in that 
they have provided a direction in which issues relating to automatic and 
attentional processes and their loci may be investigated. These studies 
involving word or letter stimuli are also characterised by the effects of 
information presented within the same modality as that upon which a 
task is based. This within-attribute approach has been developed in 
relation to putative encoding and responding mechanisms. In Chapter 1 
the relationship between the processing of verbal and nonverbal input 
was considered. From the models that were examined it appeared that 
although verbal and nonverbal information may be represented 
differently, encoding mechanisms were nevertheless considered to be of 
a similar nature. For example an analogy was made between logogens 
and imagens in relation to Paivio's (1978) dual-coding model, and, 
Nelson et al.'s (1977) single-encoding model was related to a 
microstructure where activation spreading among nodes could apply to 
both picture- and word-encoding. Furthermore with these models the 
results of picture- and word-encoding were assumed to commute to 
common responding mechanisms. On this basis some of the effects 
obtained in the studies involving letter or word stimuli so far discussed 
may also be common to priming experiments where either nonverbal or 
verbal and nonverbal stimuli are used. However making direct 
comparisons of existing work involving information in different 
modalities is not straightforward. One reason for this that different 
experimental 'traditions' appear to have evolved; for example those 
studying cross-attribute effects use different analytical tools to those used 
in the priming studies already discussed in this chapter and because of 
this have been concerned with a different set of questions. Although the 
existence of these different traditions may constitute a valid suggestion 
that significantly different mechanisms are responsible for priming 
effects according to modality it may also have the effect of masking any 
underlying similarities. With this in mind a comparison between within- 
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attribute and cross-attribute experiments may be of interest insofar that it 
may enable the effects of any underlying mechanisms to be differentiated 
and, furthermore, may also suggest ways in which mechanisms 
responsible for both types of priming may be assimilable. On this basis 
some obtained contextual effects which may be regarded as cross-
attribute in nature will now be examined. One example of cross-attribute 
priming is the well-known series of experiments using colour words and 
ink colours carried out by Stroop (1935). 
Stroop Interference 
An investigation into how the processing of object attributes may interact 
was carried out by Stroop (1935). Essentially he measured the time taken 
either to read lists of words, or, to name the colours of lists of words or 
shapes such as squares or swastikas. He presented lists of 100 items. On 
average reading a list of colour words printed in black ink took 
41 seconds, when the same words were printed in different colours it 
took 43 seconds (the 2 seconds difference not being statistically 
significant). Colour-naming took longer; 63 seconds in the case of shapes 
and 110 seconds in the case of incongruent colour words. In summary 
the effect found by Stroop appears to be asymmetrical; word-naming is 
faster and not affected by irrelevant colours while colour-naming is a 
slower process which is affected by irrelevant words. 
Further investigations using the Stroop paradigm have also revealed a 
`semantic gradient' effect. Klein (1964) in a colour-naming task used a 
variety of distractor types; these included the names of the target print 
colours, the names of other colours, the names of objects with strong 
colour associations and words unrelated to colour. The Stroop effect was 
greatest for names of colours, intermediate for colour-object associates 
and lowest for words unrelated to colour. 
In addition to naming tasks Stroop effects have also been investigated 
using comparison tasks. Within this context there are two types of 
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comparison task; firstly 'within-attribute' where a decision is required on 
whether a given attribute is the same for two items (e.g., whether two 
word-names are the same or whether two physical colours are the same) 
and, secondly, 'cross-attribute' where a decision is required on whether 
different attributes of objects are congruent (e.g., whether a word-name 
correctly denotes a physical colour or vice versa). In the case of within-
attribute comparisons, such as the ink colour of colour words, colour 
interference effects from irrelevant colour names have either been small 
(Morton & Chambers, 1973) or insignificant (Egeth, Blecker & 
Kamlet, 1969). On the other hand if cross-attribute comparisons are 
made, such as between the nominal identity of a colour word and the ink 
colour of a second object, then Stroop inhibition has been found in cases 
of incongruency (Treisman & Fearnley, 1969; Morton & 
Chambers, 1973). Both of these latter studies have also reported a 
`reverse Stroop effect' where a colour word in an incongruent ink colour 
inhibited the matching of the name of the colour word with the colour of 
a row of Xs. 
Although Stroop effects are usually discussed in terms of task inhibition 
there may also be facilitatory effects. Hintzman et al. (1972) found 
colour-naming of congruently coloured colour words took less time than 
words with no obvious colour association. Dyer (1973) used an across 
attribute comparison task and measured reaction times for decisions 
regarding the congruency of word names and ink colours for pairs of 
stimuli. The stimuli which had to be interrogated in terms of ink colour 
consisted either of a row of Xs or colour names which were either 
congruently or incongruently coloured. In comparison to those for the 
Xs, reaction times for conditions judged as 'same' (i.e., where the colour 
name matched the ink colour of the other item in the pair) were not only 
longer for incongruently coloured colour words but also shorter for 
congruently coloured colour words. If the effects of congruency are to be 
deemed facilitatory and incongruency inhibitory then assumptions have 
to be made regarding the nature of stimuli used in the 'neutral' 
conditions in the latter two studies. With this in mind it may difficult to 
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be conclusive as the possibility that only varying degrees of inhibition or 
facilitation exist cannot be entirely ruled out. This point will be discussed 
in more detail in relation to other data. 
The Stroop Effect as an Example of a General Phenomenon 
The possibility has also been investigated that Stroop effects are one 
example of a general pattern of interference phenomena that exist 
between verbal and non-verbal attributes of stimuli or, more generally, 
between all types of stimulus attribute. Rosinski, Golinkoff and 
Kukish (1975) used picture-word stimuli in an experiment analogous to 
Stroop's. Word-naming was not found to be affected by the presence of 
incongruent pictures while picture-naming was found to be affected by 
the presence of incongruent words. Similar findings with object-naming 
have also been obtained by Rayner and Posnansky (1978), and 
Posnansky and Rayner (1977). Additionally interference effects have 
also been found in the naming of quantity and location (Morton, 1969; 
Fox, Shor & Steinman, 1971). A further interference effect occurring 
within a lexical-decision task has been found by Rubenstein, Lewis and 
Rubenstein (1971); nonwords which were homophonic with words (e.g., 
leef, blud) took longer to be categorised than orthographically regular 
nonwords that had no homophonic word counterparts (e.g., lape, dibe). 
The occurrence of Stroop effects in the absence of a verbal component 
for both target and distractor stimuli has been found in experiments 
involving decisions on animal pictures (Paivio, 1975), digits (Banks, 
Fujii & Kayra Stuart, 1976) and direction (Clark & Brownell, 1975). In 
summary it appears that the effect discovered by Stroop is one example 
of a general phenomenon where irrelevant verbal or nonverbal stimuli or 
stimulus attributes can influence performance on verbal or nonverbal 
judgements. 
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Accounting for the Stroop Effect 
A general observation regarding Stroop experiments is that processing of 
task-irrelevant information appears to be automatically carried out. If this 
information conflicts with that required for a response then a relative 
delay results. A number of attempts have been made to explain the delay. 
One approach has been to establish a locus or loci for the delaying 
processes. The loci have been described in similar terms as the loci in the 
word or letter priming studies discussed earlier. Among the hypotheses 
put forward are those that suggest that loci may be cited at relatively 
early stages of processing, at a later 'semantic evaluation' or 'decision' 
stage, or alternatively, at an output or response stage. These hypotheses 
will now be discussed. 
Early Processing 
One possibility that has been suggested is that it is not possible to attend 
selectively to the target stimulus attribute without also attending to the 
non-target attribute and that one attribute interferes with the encoding of 
another. For example it is argued that colour-word name information 
interferes with the process of verbally encoding the name of an 
incongruent colour because the threshold of sensitivity to words 
semantically-related to the task attribute is lowered. This reasoning forms 
the basis of a 'perceptual-encoding hypothesis' put forward by Hock and 
Egeth (1970). One major (and perhaps obvious) problem with this 
hypothesis is accounting for the finding that interference is not obtained 
when the distracting stimulus attributes are semantically-congruent. 
Similarly the perceptual encoding hypothesis fails to provide an 
explanation of the semantic effects encountered in studies carried out by 
Rosinski (1977) and Lupker (1979) when words of varying semantic-
relatedness to target pictures were used as distractors. A word referring 
to an object belonging to the same category as that depicted by a target 
picture (e.g., dog (word) mouse (picture)) produced a slower picture-
naming response than did a word referring to a different category (e.g., 
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car (word) mouse (picture)). The above difficulties have led to 
explanations of interference effects in terms other than early encoding to 
be sought. 
Response-Competition 
An explanation of the S troop effect which has generally been regarded as 
more plausible than early encoding is in terms of a competition between 
covert responses to the relevant and irrelevant stimulus attributes; this is 
often expressed in the form of a 'response-competition hypothesis'. For 
example the verbal and physical colour attributes of a word are assumed 
to be processed in parallel up to a point where response processes are 
engaged. If both word attributes are congruent the same response 
programme is activated and no conflict arises. In the case of 
incongruency, however, the resulting covert responses may interfere and 
make the choice of an overt response more difficult. The degree of 
interference is assumed to depend upon the relative times of arrival of the 
relevant and irrelevant information. This may be evidenced with the 
effects of irrelevant words on colour naming since, as the reading of 
words has been found to be faster than the naming of colours 
(Fraisse, 1969), the verbal attribute of a word will have more time to 
influence output processes in comparison to the colour attribute. 
Additionally time may be required to suppress a response to the verbal 
attribute. Conversely, when considering the effects of irrelevant colours 
on reading, the task information is assumed to arrive at the response 
stage before the distractor information so that no interference is obtained. 
Support for the above argument has been obtained from the interference 
effects found in those studies where the legibility of words was reduced 
and the naming of colours was extensively practised in an attempt to alter 
the relative times required for reading and naming (e.g., Dyer & 
Severance, 1972; Gurmenik & Glass, 1970). Additional support for the 
response-competition hypothesis has been offered by Keele (1973) who 
found that if a key press is used, rather than a vocal response, words that 
do not denote colour fail to produce the small interference effect that 
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they produce in comparison to nonwords in a naming task. In short, then, 
in addition to being dependent upon the relative times of arrival of 
relevant and irrelevant stimuli at the response stage the response-
competition effect is inhibitory rather than facilitatory in nature. 
Semantic-Encoding 
Seymour (1977) has suggested that interference effects arise from an 
overlap produced as a result of the semantic-encoding of word-name and 
colour. Congruent information, regardless of its task relevance, assists 
the semantic-coding of a task relevant stimulus attribute. However if 
incongruent irrelevant information is also present then a further distinct 
semantic-code will be constructed. The resulting semantic-codes must 
then be distinguished in terms of their task relevance in order for any 
further stages of processing to proceed. It is assumed that the process of 
making the task relevant discrimination takes time and that this time is 
increased if the semantic-codes are closely related. 
The evidence cited in support of this explanation is drawn from a series 
of experiments which attempted to separate response-related effects from 
semantic-encoding and decision effects. For example Seymour (1977) 
used the colours associated with months and seasons as a vehicle for this. 
In addition to finding a reliable association of spring, summer, autumn 
and winter to the colours green, yellow, brown and white respectively it 
was also found that months were also reliably allocated to seasons and 
that spring and autumn were regarded as opposites as were summer and 
winter. In a 'direct naming condition' subjects were required to name the 
season associated with the colour in which a season or month word was 
printed (e.g., responding 'spring' to 'winter' printed in green ink). In the 
`opposite-naming condition' the requirement was to name the season 
opposite to the one associated with the colour (e.g., responding 'spring' 
to 'winter' printer in brown ink). Congruency of colour with a season or 
month word facilitated direct-naming responses. Of particular interest, 
however, was the finding that a word congruent with its ink colour also 
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resulted in a faster response in the opposite-naming condition while no 
facilitation was obtained when the verbal components of the stimulus and 
response were congruent (for example the response 'winter' to yellow 
ink was facilitated by the word 'summer' or a summer month but not so 
simply by the word 'winter' or the name of a winter month). Seymour 
argued that if response processes were responsible for Stroop effects then 
a name oppositely associated to an ink colour would facilitate opposite-
naming whereas if earlier stages of encoding were responsible opposite-
naming would be facilitated by a congruent word and ink colour. Since 
the results were consistent with the latter it was argued that a conceptual 
encoding hypothesis was supported. A problem with the above 
experiment, however, is that in the opposite-naming condition subjects 
may have also applied the task of opposite naming to the verbal content 
of the stimulus. In this situation the response 'winter', for example, to the 
word 'summer' would be more consistent with the treatment given to 
nonverbal information than the response 'winter' to the word 'winter'. In 
view of this Seymour's conclusion may have to be treated with caution. 
Another experiment carried out by Seymour (1974) required subjects to 
respond 'yes' or 'no' in accordance with the congruency of the position 
of a set of symbols in relation to the preposition 'above' or 'below' that 
was printed centrally in a box. In addition to the symbols being 
positioned either above or below the box their verbal content was varied; 
a row of Xs was used in a neutral condition, while other conditions used 
words related to the response (` yes', 'no', 'right', or `wrong'), or, words 
related to the word inside the box (`up' or `down'). A finding that was 
regarded as important was that a Stroop effect was only obtained with the 
words that were incongruously related to the preposition 'above' or 
`below' rather than with response-related words. That this finding is 
suggestive of a cross-attribute encoding effect has, as with the previously 
mentioned experiment, also to be treated with caution since the strong 
semantic relationship between the verbal content of the two words might 
have prompted a response that was based according those terms rather 
than in terms of any conflict between verbal and spatial congruity. 
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Although interpretation of Seymour's experimental work is not 
straightforward the possibility that both facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
may arise as a result of semantic-encoding cannot, of course, be ruled 
out. So far, then, two viable loci for Stroop effects have emerged; a 
response stage, which may give rise to inhibitory effects dependent upon 
the temporal relationship between the task and distractor information, 
and, semantic-encoding, which, albeit advisedly, may give rise to both 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects. 
Processing Macrostructures and Stroop Interference 
Each of the above attempts to account for Stroop interference is 
concerned with only one out of a number of assumed processing stages 
or modules. Although these accounts may be valid they all suffer from a 
major omission; a concern with how the various elements that may 
comprise a processing system may interact as a whole. An attempt to 
repair this omission may be made by considering the encoding and 
responding stages that has so far been assumed but, importantly, also 
considering those macrostructures where the processes of picture and 
word-encoding have been delineated. Obvious candidates here are the 
`single-encoding' and 'dual-coding' models relating to the processing of 
pictures and words introduced in Chapter 1. With dual-coding models 
picture and word information are represented differently in systems 
which are separate. This was compared with a common amodal semantic 
system in the single-encoding models. The importance of such 
macrostructures in accounting for Stroop interference will be first 
illustrated with reference to the single-encoding model proposed by 
Nelson et al., (1977); the sensory-semantic model of picture and word-
encoding. 
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Single-Encoding Models and Stroop Interference 
Figure 3.10 shows an adaptation of the sensory-semantic model for the 
purpose of analysing colour-word interference. One of the features of 
this model is the order in which different information attributes are 
encoded. The link between colour information and word information is 
effected through the semantic system where the concept of a particular 
colour is activated in order for a verbal descriptor to be attached. Thus 
the process of naming a colour involves both identifying the colour in 
pictorial attributes 	 verbal attributes 
WORD INPUT 
FIGURE 3.10 The sensory-semantic model of picture and word-encoding 
(Nelson et al., 1977) adapted for the purpose of interpreting Stroop 
interference effects with colour words. 
terms of its physical and semantic properties before any phonemic 
information enabling an oral response can be accessed. Although reading 
a word implies an initial identification of a particular word-form a 
difference between this and colour-naming in the present model is that 
identification is already in terms of the verbal label upon which an oral 
response can be based. In the above structure, then, colour-naming 
necessarily involves semantic access whereas reading (merely word-
naming) does not; the routing of information being distinctly different. 
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In the traditional Stroop colour-naming experiment with colour-word 
distractors it is likely that the first information available to the 
articulatory mechanisms will be the distractor since it is already in verbal 
form. This is also in keeping with the finding that reading is faster than 
colour-naming. Word-name distractor information will have to be 
suppressed if it is contradictory with the word-name evoked from the 
colour to word conversion process. Similarly if the task and distractor 
information is congruent output from the articulatory mechanisms may 
continue uninterrupted. On this basis the colour-naming response time is 
likely to be increased or decreased according to congruency of verbal 
distractor information in line with the usual Stroop findings. 
In the traditional 'reverse Stroop' situation the processing demands are 
very different. Since the task is one of 'reading', the target input attribute 
is already in word-form and a process to convert from one attribute into 
another via a semantic link is not necessary. Task relevant information 
thus has a relatively direct route from input to output. In order for the 
distracting colour information to affect reading performance it has to 
start to be converted to word-form. If the time-scale required for such a 
conversion is reflected by colour-naming being slower than reading then 
any output from colour is thus unlikely to be available before the task-
relevant information. Consequently the effect of distractor information in 
colour form upon a reading response time is likely to be minimal since a 
response based on the target attribute will be well underway (or 
effectively completed) before contrary or corroborating information 
arrives. This situation is also reflected within the structure of the sensory-
semantic model shown in Figure 3.10 and the findings from typical 
reverse Stroop experiments bear this out. 
The effects resulting from a structure such as that comprising the 
sensory-semantic model may also be considered with tasks other than 
reading and naming. More recently a number of experiments requiring 
subjects to categorise stimuli have been carried out. Smith and 
Magee (1980), for example, found that word-categorisation was 
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disrupted by incongruent pictures while picture-categorisation was 
relatively unaffected by incongruent words; this may be seen as a 
reversal of the usual Stroop findings. In their experiments subjects were 
asked to indicate by saying 'yes' or 'no' whether or not a word or a 
picture belonged to a predesignated semantic category. Smith and Magee 
explained their results through the hypothesis that pictures access their 
semantic-codes more rapidly than words and that an early arrival of the 
distracting code was sufficient to cause an interference effect. In their 
study the demands on semantic processing to categorise the variety of 
exemplars used may be assumed to be relatively high and the explanation 
offered seems plausible. In terms of the structure represented by the 
sensory-semantic model it may be assumed that the information upon 
which an outputted response is based is processed in terms of the 
`meaning features' before the phonemic codes required for the yes/no 
response are activated (see Figure 3.10, Page 112). Although the form of 
response was verbal the routing of information is different from that 
necessitated in the traditional word- or colour-naming paradigm. 
The possible effects of response-competition and semantic-encoding 
discussed earlier are not necessarily incompatible with the effects that 
may be predicted from a structure such as implied by the sensory-
semantic model of picture and word-encoding. Indeed the role of 
response-competition, as has just been illustrated, may be considered 
along with the sensory semantic structure. The important contribution 
that such a structure appears to offer is that it may easily account for a 
variety of Stroop phenomena. Furthermore it also draws attention to the 
idea that both the precise nature of the task and the form in which a 
response is effected may be important factors to be considered when 
interpreting cross-attribute priming effects. 
Dual-Coding Models and Stroop Interference 
With a dual-coding model, such as Paivio and Begg's (1981), within-
attribute priming effects are predictable since the activation-level of 
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logogens or imagens is raised by the presence of verbal or nonverbal 
input respectively. The existence of referential links between imagens 
and logogens similarly allows for cross-attribute priming. As with the 
sensory-semantic model such a dual-coding arrangement can also 
account for the differences in time required for picture naming and word 
reading and Figure 3.11 shows Paivio and Begg's (1981) model re- 
Decision and responding mechanisms 
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Referential relations IMAGENS LOGOGENS 
Sensory analysis 
Pictorial attributes 	 Verbal attributes 
WORD INPUT 
FIGURE 3.11 Paivio and Begg's (1981) model of picture and word-
encoding adapted for the purpose of interpreting Stroop interference 
effects with colour words. 
expressed for this purpose. With word-naming verbal input is routed to a 
logogen system from which a verbal output is directly obtainable while, 
with picture naming, an input has to excite its respective imagen before 
being communicated to a logogen from which verbal output can be 
derived. If the processing of ink colour in a traditional Stroop task is 
equated with picture processing then it might be anticipated that colour 
information would not be available to output mechanisms in time to 
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influence the response to name input. By similar reasoning a reverse 
Stroop effect would not be expected with this dual-coding arrangement. 
Smith and Magee's (1980) findings that word-categorisation was 
disrupted by incongruent pictures while picture categorisation was 
relatively unaffected by incongruent words may also be explained by a 
dual-coding arrangement. Their hypothesis that pictures access their 
semantic-codes more rapidly than words is in keeping with 
Paivio's (1971) view that language develops from an imaginal base and 
this in turn would result in the dual-coding model being image-biased. 
Word- and picture-categorisation tasks may be thus carried out intra-
verbally or intra-imaginally and the results of the respective semantic-
categorisation processes may then be outputted for a yes/no response. If 
the output of picture categorisation takes no longer to be communicated 
in yes/no terms to the verbal system than the internal communication of 
yes/no then Smith and Magee's findings are also consistent with the 
early arrival of the distracting code being sufficient to cause an 
interference effect. 
Relative Speed of Processing Different Stimulus Attributes 
The above accounts of cross-attribute priming in relation to the single-
and dual-coding structures have also involved assumptions about the 
relative times of arrival of encoded information at responding 
mechanisms. A further assumption that has so far been implicit in the 
discussion of encoding and response-competition hypotheses is that 
interference effects are determined by the relative times for the different 
input attributes to be processed. This will now be examined more 
closely. 
The idea that different amounts of time are required for the processing of 
different types of stimulus attribute and that a response to irrelevant 
information available prior to the response to relevant information has to 
be suppressed is central to both the semantic-encoding and response- 
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competition arguments. With the traditional Stroop paradigm, for 
example, experiments such as those by Fraisse (1969) suggest that 
reading is faster than colour-naming. On this basis the asymmetry in 
Stroop interference effects would be due to an irrelevant word being 
processed faster than an irrelevant colour. This idea has been referred to 
as the 'relative-speed hypothesis' (Glaser & Diingelhoff, 1984) and in its 
strongest form is considered to be both necessary and sufficient to 
account for Stroop phenomena while in a weaker form it is only 
considered necessary. 
One way that the two forms of relative-speed hypothesis have been 
tested is through an examination of the time-course of interference 
effects. Investigations carried out by Neumann (1980) and Glaser and 
Glaser (1982) were based upon the argument that if the prior availability 
of distracting information is both necessary and sufficient for Stroop 
interference then varying the onset of the distracting stimulus attribute 
alone should alter the interference effect. The findings were that prior 
presentations of an irrelevant colour at varying time intervals up to 
300 msec produced no significant effect on colour-word reading tasks 
and so it was argued that the strongest form of the relative speed 
hypothesis was not supported by those data. The weak relative-speed 
hypothesis was upheld, however, on the assumption that there is a greater 
degree of automaticity in reading than for naming (Keele, 1972; Posner 
& Snyder, 1975). Such an argument is also consonant with an 
interpretation based upon the sensory-semantic model (Figure 3.10, 
Page 112); although not expressed in terms of automaticity it may be 
argued that an effectively stronger link exists between the word-name 
features and phonemic features than between nonverbal visual features 
and phonemic features. Because a reading task in the above experimental 
context may be thought of as primarily one of direct conversion from 
graphemes to phonemes the directness of this link may explain the 
automaticity of the reading task. Although explanations in terms of 
automaticity as opposed to relative-speed may be allowable with the 
sensory-semantic model this may only be applicable by virtue of the 
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nature of the reading task. At this stage there remains the possibility that 
a relative-speed argument in its strongest form may be tenable and 
verifiable given a different task type; especially one that avoids the 
automaticity that may prevail in grapheme to phoneme conversion. 
Further investigation of this issue where interference effects on different 
tasks have been compared has been carried out by Glaser and 
Diingelhoff (1984). 
An argument upon which Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) investigation 
into the weak form of the relative-speed hypothesis is based may be 
summarised as follows: With the semantic-coding hypothesis 
interference arises from the accumulation of competing internal evidence 
for both the target and distractor and in this situation distracting effects 
arise from temporal proximity rather than precedence. By way of 
contrast, the response-competition hypothesis relates only to interference 
arising from the suppression of irrelevant information that arrives before 
the target information. 
Glaser and Diingelhoff ran two picture/word interference experiments; in 
the first the tasks consisted of naming and reading picture and word 
stimuli while in the second they consisted of picture-categorisation and 
word-categorisation where subjects were asked to name any one of nine 
previously learned categories in which the word or picture exemplars 
were grouped. The distracting stimuli for both experiments were 
presented over a range of up to 400 msec before and 400 msec after the 
onset of the target. With the picture-naming task the prediction was that 
the usual Stroop interference effect should prevail throughout the range 
of onset asynchronies used. However with reading, in accordance with 
the already cited work by Neumann (1980) and Glaser and 
Glaser (1982), no distracting effect was expected due to a special reading 
automatism that overrides relative-speed effects. For the second 
experiment, on the basis of a strong relative-speed hypothesis, and, the 
apparent fact that pictures require less time to be encoded semantically in 
comparison to words, it was predicted that with a sufficient pre-exposure 
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of an incongruent word distractor picture categorisation should be 
influenced if reading automatism presents an irregularity relevant only to 
interference effects with reading tasks. Glaser and Di.ingelhoff cited the 
word- and picture-categorisation experiments with simultaneously 
presented word and picture stimuli carried out by Smith and 
Magee (1980) where interference effects essentially arose only with 
incongruent pictures on word-categorisation, picture-categorisation 
remaining unaffected by incongruent words. In view of these findings 
Glaser and Diingelhoff also predicted that a similar pattern of results 
should hold with categorisation tasks regardless of the onset asynchrony 
between target and distractor if the relative speed explanation is merely 
epiphenomenal and marginal. In terms of their second experiment this 
meant that word-categorisation should be disrupted by incongruent 
pictures while picture-categorisation should be relatively unaffected by 
incongruent words. 
The findings for Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) first experiment, as 
predicted, were similar to those of Glaser and Glaser (1982); namely that 
picture-naming and reading were largely unaffected by the onset 
asynchrony of distractors, and, that while picture-naming was affected by 
irrelevant words reading was not affected by irrelevant pictures (see 
Figures 3.12a and 3.12b). Apart from the assumed contradiction of the 
strong relative-speed hypothesis these findings were taken as an 
indication that the same processes underlie both colour/word and picture/ 
word interference. 
Of particular interest, however, were the results of Glaser and 
Diingelhoff's (1984) categorisation experiment; here it was found that 
with picture-categorisation the inhibitory effect of distracting words only 
became significant when the pre-exposure time for the distractor was 
300 msec or more (see Figure 3.13a, Page 121). This was weak in 
comparison to the effects obtained with picture-naming and with word-
categorisation (see Figures 3.12a and 3.13b). A conclusion drawn from 
this was that the process responsible for inhibitory effects in picture- 
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FIGURE 3.12 The variation of facilitatory and inhibitory effects with 
stimulus onset asynchrony obtained by Glaser and aingelhoff (1984) 
according to; a) congruency of word-distractors with a picture-naming 
task, and; b) congruency of picture distractors with word reading. 
naming and word-categorisation was unlikely to be the same as that for 
the picture-categorisation task. With word-categorisation strong 
inhibitory effects were maintained for the greater part of the onset 
asynchrony range, decreasing only as the post-exposure times of the 
distractor approached 400 msec. Since in this second experiment pre-
exposed words had little effect on picture-categorisation in comparison 
to that of pictures on word-categorisation the temporal explanation 
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FIGURE 3.13 The variation of facilitatory and inhibitory effects with 
stimulus onset asynchrony obtained by Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984) 
according to; a) congruency of word-distractors with a picture-
categorisation task, and; b) congruency of picture distractors with word-
categorisation. 
forming an essential component of the response-competition hypothesis 
was thrown into doubt. In view of the above results, then, it was 
considered that the strong form of relative-speed explanation was 
untenable while the weaker form could be supported only insofar that for 
interference to occur a degree of temporal proximity is required. 
Because the time-course functions for reading were considered to be 
122 
similar to picture-categorisation and those for picture-naming similar to 
word-categorisation Glaser and thingelhoff suggested that certain 
similarities may also exist with regard to the internal processes connected 
with these pairs of activities. The similarity of the reading and picture-
categorisation results may, however, be questionable, particularly when 
the results for pre-exposed distractors are considered. In the case of 
picture-categorisation, the increase in facilitation and inhibition with 
increasing post-exposure of the target may indeed be contrasted with the 
non-significant effects obtained with reading. Glaser and Diingelhoff 
argued that the fact that the picture categorisation effects were small in 
comparison to the strongest obtained with picture-naming and word-
categorisation is not supportive of a relative-speed explanation and the 
trend may be explained either by the slow preparation of a false response 
or, by a similarly obtained response priming effect. In support of the 
explanations regarding response effects Glaser and Diingelhoff referred 
to Taylor's (1977) and Glaser and Glaser's (1982) work. However 
support from these latter studies is questionable in this respect for a 
number of reasons of which two follow. Firstly a response priming 
effect, upon whose existence Glaser and Diingelhoff's conclusions are 
mainly based, was only obtained by Taylor when subjects expected to 
actively make use of prime information; Glaser and Diingelhoff's 
subjects were told to ignore the primes because they were not predictive 
of the target. Secondly, the 'slow' facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
obtained by Glaser and Glaser (1982) were obtained on reading and 
naming tasks in experimental conditions which had but a minimal 
correspondence with the picture-categorisation paradigm used by Glaser 
and Diingelhoff. 
Contrary to Glaser and Diingelhoff's conclusions it may be argued that a 
relative-speed account remains a possibility on the grounds that the range 
of pre-exposure times for the distracting stimulus was not large enough 
to obtain significant priming effects with the tasks that they used. An 
indication of this latter possibility may be gleaned from a comparison of 
the response times obtained across the experiments by Glaser and 
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Diingelhoff (1984). For picture categorisations these varied from about 
730 to 810 msec while those for word-categorisations ranged between 
approximately 820 and 1030 msec, word-categorisations typically 
requiring well in excess of 100 msec time in comparison to picture 
categorisations. If this difference in response time is taken as an 
indication, albeit a very rough one (Taylor, 1977), of time differentials 
that may exist internally between the progress of analysed information 
prior to output then, on the basis of relative-speed of processing, it is 
conceivable that interference effects will not be detectable until the 
distracting stimulus precedes the target by at least 100 msec. With this in 
mind a trend in interference effects which only becomes statistically 
significant at target post-exposures in excess of 200 msec suggests that 
Glaser and Diingelhoff's conclusions on this matter might be reassessed 
in the light of results from experiments which include a greater range of 
target post-exposures. The above reservations of course suggest that 
response-competition together with relative speed of processing as an 
explanation for interference effects on picture-categorisation by 
irrelevant words cannot be ruled-out. 
Since Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984) do not consider that their data are 
supportive of a relative-speed explanation for interference effects, 
questions concerning alternative explanations arise. To this end Glaser 
and Diingelhoff simply suggest, albeit tentatively, that the overall pattern 
of results is accountable through stimulus-encoding mechanisms 
involved in reading and picture-categorisation being immune to 
inhibitory effects while those for picture-naming and word-
categorization remain susceptible. This suggestion, however, may be 
seen as little more than a re-description of the apparent data patterns 
rather than a more fully-fledged explanation regarding underlying 
mechanisms. Of interest within this context would be why early 
encoding might or might not be immune to interference according to 
both modality of input and task nature. Glaser and Dtingelhoff, however, 
do not pursue this stimulus-encoding argument in depth. 
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If Glaser and Diingelhoff's suggestion that interference arising between 
the processing of different information attributes is a function of 
encoding rather than response mechanisms is to be heeded, then a closer 
examination of such encoding mechanisms is warranted. Since the 
concerns of interference studies similar to those discussed so far are not 
with such details of encoding an appeal must be made beyond the 
boundaries that characterise this area of investigation. 
INTERFERENCE AND PRIMING STUDIES COMPARED 
It is now of interest to consider the conclusions arising from the 
discussion of the Stroop-type interference studies leading up to and 
including Glaser and Diingelhoff s (1984) work along with the 
conclusions arising from the discussion leading up to Taylor's (1977) 
work. In the context of the interference studies characterised by cross-
attribute priming (i.e., where the experimentally-controlled priming 
attribute is the same as that upon which the task is based) stimulus 
encoding was seen as being susceptible to interference arising from the 
accumulation of competing internal evidence such as that which may 
arise from a target and distractor. In this context inhibitory effects are 
expected and, furthermore, may be attributed to the encoding stages (e.g., 
Seymour, 1977). This portrait is encapsulated in the semantic-coding 
hypothesis. 
A further account of interfering effects represented by the response-
competition hypothesis is also possible in inhibitory terms. By way of 
contrast, in priming studies characterised by within-attribute primes (i.e., 
controlled priming attribute and task attribute being the same) such as 
those of Posner and Snyder (1975), Neely (1977), and Taylor (1977), 
automatic contextual effects were characterised by facilitation. One 
mechanism underlying facilitatory effects was assumed to be the spread 
of activation. 
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On the basis of the conclusions arrived at within the respective studies, 
then, a broad generalisation is that cross-attribute priming has been 
interpreted in terms of its giving rise to inhibitory effects while within-
attribute priming has been expressed in terms of its giving rise to 
facilitation. This contrast is an interesting one insofar as it might be taken 
to suggest that fundamentally different mechanisms may underlie what 
are seen as differing contextual effects. In view of the implied 
commonalities that exist within the processing and representation of 
information carried in verbal and nonverbal modalities as was evident in 
the earlier discussion in Chapter 1 the contrast in results from the two 
experimental traditions seems surprising. From closer inspection of the 
results of these experiments, however, it has been argued that the 
disparities are only apparent and in some cases may only arise spuriously 
as a result of the task requirements. 
With the above arguments in mind, a series of experiments where within-
and cross-attribute priming effects could be compared more directly 
would be of value. If the encoding mechanisms for different stimulus 
modalities, which have been considered collectively in the case of 
interference studies have properties in common with the encoding 
mechanisms referred to within the priming studies then cross-modality 
priming effects should be similar in many respects to within-modality 
priming effects. Furthermore this prediction is also likely to hold in view 
of the assumption that similar responding mechanisms apply in both 
types of priming situation. If differences do exist then it may also be 
reasonable to predict that they are likely to be of a quantitative rather 
than a qualitative nature. 
A further issue that arises from a comparison of the cross- attribute 
priming work carried out by Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984) and the 
within-attribute work of Taylor (1977) concerns the temporal precedence 
of priming stimuli. It is interesting at this point to note that the 
conclusion in favour of temporal precedence, or, secondary specific 
effect arising from work involving within-modality prime-target pairs 
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may be put in contrast with Glaser and Dtingelhoff's (1984) cross-
modality picture-naming and word-categorisation results which were 
considered to be supportive of a temporal proximity, or, primary specific 
effect. 
A consideration of the two broad groupings of encoding models outlined 
in Chapter 1 suggests that regardless of whether or not dual-coding or 
single-encoding systems exist they assume that verbal and nonverbal 
information attributes are encoded initially in functionally separate 
mechanisms. Interaction between these mechanisms, however, differs 
according to the arrangement of the overall system; in the case of a 
single-encoding system such as the sensory-semantic model (Nelson et 
al., 1977) interaction is via the common semantic system while Paivio 
and Begg's (1981) dual-coding model allows interaction to take place via 
referential links between the verbal and imageable representational 
systems. 
With this in mind it may also be reasonable to consider these overall 
structures in relation to the primary and secondary specific effects 
postulated by Taylor (1977). In Paivio and Begg's (1981) model 
referential links are possible once representational codes in the verbal or 
nonverbal systems have been activated, in other words once the relevant 
logogens or imagens fire. This may be translated, for example, in terms 
of word-priming information having to be identified before it can 
influence the processing of nonverbal information. On this basis it can be 
argued that cross-attribute priming effects would not be expected for 
post-exposed primes. 
Predicting the nature of the time-course of cross-attribute priming with 
the central semantic model may be more difficult. If encoding is 
considered to be continuous through time then as evidence for a given 
input in one modality builds-up this continuous process will be reflected 
in the way that information is communicated via the semantic route to 
encoding in another modality. On this basis a secondary effect may be 
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expected, although the onset of this may be characterised by a gradual 
build-up of cross-attribute priming with time. This might contrast with a 
more rapid onset which may arise from logogens or imagens reaching 
threshold and suddenly firing as with the dual-coding model. However 
Taylor's (1977, Experiment 1) finding that the onset of within-attribute 
priming effects is represented by a sudden transient suggests that the 
time for the build-up of information in the encoding process is relatively 
short. One result of this may be that cross-attribute priming effects may 
also be established in a relatively short time as with Paivio and Begg's 
model. To reiterate, Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) analysis comes out 
in favour of an ongoing interaction among concurrently processed 
stimuli thereby favouring a primary specific effect with interference 
occurring with post- as well as pre-exposed primes. This contrasts with 
Taylor's (1977) conclusion in favour of temporal precedence. With this 
latter issue in mind a comparison which could be made more directly 
between the time-courses of within and cross-attribute priming effects 
might assist in reconciling these apparent discrepancies. 
Although the distinction between stimulus-encoding effects and 
response-related effects may be a useful one this too has led to apparent 
incompatibilities; while Taylor (1977) concludes that response-
competition accounts for automatic inhibitory effects, Glaser and 
Diingelhoff (1984) conclude that response-competition may not provide 
such an account. Although no inconsistencies between Taylor's 
conclusions and his findings were apparent, from closer inspection in 
relation to this issue the same can not be said with reference to the work 
by Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984). On this latter point the results of the 
time-course of cross-attribute priming effects for target post-exposures 
ranging beyond the 400 msec value used by Glaser and Diingelhoff 
would be of interest. The difficulties encountered when attempting an 
empirical differentiation of encoding and response effects have already 
been discussed with reference to Taylor's (1977) work and at present it is 
not obvious how this matter may be further pursued. It may be of 
interest, however, to examine the consistency of the results of the within 
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and across- attribute priming experiments to be carried out in this study 
with the predictions that may be made from the two possible processing 
environments that remain after the eliminations that have been made on 
the basis of Taylor's (1977) data. Any predictions that are made, of 
course, can only be crude owing to the lack of an adequate theoretical 
base which encompasses the required details and to any simplifying 
assumptions that are necessarily incurred. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is suggested, then, that the 
comparison of the results of within-attribute and cross-attribute priming 
experiments is of interest for the following reasons. Firstly it is argued 
that within-attribute and cross-attribute priming effects should be 
qualitatively similar in terms of time-course and magnitude. Secondly, 
and additionally, it is argued that the effects of temporal precedence of a 
prime on the processing of a related target should be detectable for both 
within- and cross-attribute priming. Thirdly, any priming effects obtained 
should be consistent with a system where response processing is subject 
only to inhibitory effects while encoding may be subject either only to 
facilitatory effects or both facilitatory and inhibitory effects. 
With the above arguments in mind a major problem that arises when 
comparing within-attribute and cross-attribute priming effects is that the 
many variations that can exist even within the most basic priming 
paradigms can make such comparisons difficult. One reason for this is 
because the objects for comparison that already exist have emanated 
from different experimental and theoretical traditions where different 
types of question have been asked. There is thus a need for a series of 
within-attribute and cross-attribute priming experiments where the 
comparisons are not unnecessarily obscured and to this end such features 
as the task requirements, stimuli and range of prime-target onset 
asynchronies are kept as uniform as possible. The experiments to be 




The experiments described in this chapter were carried out in an attempt 
to compare the effects of within- and cross-attribute priming where the 
experimental conditions were, as far as possible, equivalent. Since the 
results of reading and naming tasks have given rise to problems when 
interpreting priming effects in some of the experiments that have already 
been discussed another type of task is called for. In view of the pilot 
work described in Chapter 2 an obvious solution is a binary-
categorisation task where the different to-be-identified target categories 
can be assigned to a signalling system such as a left- or right-hand key-
press. Such a method is particularly suitable when comparing tasks based 
upon different word-attributes on the grounds that the complications 
arising from a verbalised response can be avoided. 
One form of categorisation task that was found to be easily implemented 
involves typographic case. A priming experiment is possible where 
strings consisting of letters in the same physical case, upper or lower, are 
used to prime a binary-choice, case-decision task on similarly 
constructed target strings. Thus 'CHAIR-TRAIN' or 'chair-train' would 
represent examples of 'congruent case-priming' while 'chair-TRAIN' 
would be 'incongruent'. Typographic case also lends itself to cross-
attribute priming if the words 'upper' and 'lower' are taken to denote the 
physical case-quality of letters. For example 'UPPER-WHITE' or 
`upper-WHITE' would be regarded as congruent while 'UPPER-white' 
or 'upper-white' considered incongruent. Such cross-attribute 
experiments can be likened to interference experiments in the S troop 
tradition where the physical case-form, which is an integral feature of a 
word, is considered to have a nonverbal, or, pictorial quality. Indeed if 
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typographic case is represented mentally as an identifiable physical 
quality then in some ways it may be considered to have pictorial 
properties. This is similar to Stroop research where ink colour is often 
treated as a limiting case of a pictorial attribute a word, regardless of any 
other information that it may carry. A word can thus be thought of as a 
`typographic picture' of an object. Although the analogy has already 
been made between the use of typographic case and the use of other 
forms of nonverbal information that characterise Stroop research it is at 
this stage worth underlining the implications this may have as far as 
stimulus-encoding is considered. If a word or a letter-string is encoded in 
terms of a typographic picture then, without going into elaborate 
justification, it seems plausible that both the nature and the degree of 
analysis involved may be regarded as being similar to that found for 
other attributes or objects that can be represented pictorially. To this 
extent, case-encoding may be treated similarly to picture-encoding when 
priming effects are considered. 
A comparison of within- and cross-attribute priming effects with 
typographic case is to be sought by means of experiments of the form 
where a priming stimulus is presented briefly in temporal and spatial 
contiguity with a target stimulus upon which a speeded binary-choice-
decision task is performed and registered by pressing one of two 
response keys. For example in such an experimental set-up a subject 
would observe a viewing area containing markers, between which would 
be presented a word or letter-string consisting of letters in the same 
typographic case. This initial priming stimulus would be replaced shortly 
afterwards (say, a few hundred milliseconds) by another word or letter-
string. This second, or target stimulus, would also consist of letters 
drawn from one of the two typographic cases. If the letters were in 
upper-case then the subject would be required to press, say, a right-hand 
key (as opposed to a left-hand key which would be assigned to lower-
case letters). The response would terminate the display, the case-decision 
reaction time being measured from the onset of the target. After a brief 
interval, say two or three seconds, another trial would begin. Such a 
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sequence is represented in Figure 4.1. In the above situation a subject 
would be familiar with the general sequence of events. However the 
prime-target pairs would be randomised in terms of case-congruency and 
the target case would not be predictable. In such an experiment the 
subject would be informed that the effect of the primes was being 
investigated. This would be reasonable on the grounds that the primes 




	 # Target is presented 
-ipndg- 
Prime is presented 
 
# Trial begins 
 
FIGURE 4.1 An example of one trial in an experiment designed to 
measure within-attribute priming effects. Typographic case information is 
used as a prime for a case-decision reaction time task. 
The above experimental paradigm may be extended. If the two word-
attributes to be used are the physical case-form (henceforth referred to as 
`case') and the case-denoting word-name (henceforth referred to as 
`name') then it follows that there are four basic priming and task 
relationships as shown in Table 4.1. Two of these four possibilities are of 
the within-attribute variety where case primes case (e.g., HJOTI-
CNHEV) and name-primes name (e.g., upper-UPPER) while cross-
attribute priming is represented by case priming name (e.g., BTYRG-
upper) and name-priming case (e.g., upper-APWML). It may also be 
apparent that within- and cross-attribute priming effects may be 
combined. For example, 'upper-UPPER' is name-congruent and case-
incongruent while 'UPPER-UPPER' is both name- and case-congruent. 
Such combinations will be considered in more detail later. Table 4.1 also 
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indicates the within or cross-attribute status of each priming possibility 
together with location of treatment in the series of experiments to be 
described. In addition to congruent and incongruent priming conditions a 
TABLE 4.1. Four basic possibilities for priming experiments arising from 
the use of typographic case information (referred to as 'case') and case-
denoting word-name information (referred to as 'name') either as a 
controlled priming attribute, or, as an attribute upon which a choice 
decision task is based. ('case-case' signifies for example that case 
information is used to prime a case-decision task, 'name-case', that name 

























further priming condition which may be assumed to be effectively 
neutral is also provided. Examples of neutral priming conditions are 
included with examples of congruent and incongruent priming in 
Table 4.2 for each of the four main experimental possibilities. The 
effective neutrality of neutral primes may be at issue and so the choice of 
the given neutral primes used will be discussed within the context of 
each individual experiment. Since automatic priming effects are the main 
focus in this investigation equiprobable congruent, incongruent and 
neutral trials were used. 
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TABLE 4.2. Examples of each of the priming conditions used in the 
choice-decision experiments relating to typographic case. (`case-case'; 
case information is used to prime a case-decision task, `name-case'; 









congruent 	 (c+) HRWIH 
eihrq 
YGSRO 
hj of i 
incongruent (c-) hidBruFw XBLHT 
rej hf 




	 (n+) upper lower 
UPPER 
LOWER 




neutral 	 (N) UPPER LOWER 
name-case 
(Expt. 3) 
congruent 	 (n+) upper lower 
FDIKR 
 igtpo 









congruent 	 (c+) H5RWE iribiripr 
upper 
 lower 
incongruent (c-) j muds WPTYU 
upper 
 lower 
neutral 	 (N) upper  lower 
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GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Some of the broader issues relevant to the performance of primed 
decision tasks have already been discussed and the present concern is to 
consider those issues that are specific to the effects of case- or name-
primes in a case- or name-decision task. 
Individual Letters or Letter Strings 
Although words or letter-strings for both primes and targets have been 
used to illustrate the above case- and name-priming possibilities the 
choice between words or strings consisting of several letters rather than 
individual letters has yet to be considered. A question that immediately 
arises concerns the extent to which each of the typographic cases is 
identifiable so that case can in principle be used as an effective priming 
attribute. It is possible that typographic case can be perceived in terms of 
general graphemic qualities. Thus the existence of such general features 
as ascenders or descenders and contour provides a graphemic quality 
which may allow identification of each of the two typographic cases to 
be independent of letter or word context. Since some letters (such as 'c' 
or 'k') when presented individually have a degree of ambiguity with 
respect to their case the use of strings consisting of a variety of letters all 
either in upper- or lower-case is likely on balance to reduce such 
ambiguities on account of some case-typifying features being more 
identifiable in the context of a group of letters. For example the string 
`ckwps' may be more readily classified as lower-case then any one of its 
elements would be if presented individually. 
Distinguishing Between Prime and Target Stimuli 
Performance on a primed case-decision task requires not only the ability 
to categorise incoming stimuli in terms of typographic case but also the 
ability to identify which stimulus from a given spatial and temporal array 
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is the target and then to respond appropriately. If the prime and target 
stimuli are displayed over the same area and at the same position then 
distinguishing between the prime and target may not be easy, especially 
in congruent priming conditions (e.g., NUERL-RVFKI) where prime and 
target may be identical or similar in form. With this in mind and with a 
further view to allowing the use of identical primes and targets the prime 
and target positions were spatially offset, even though any priming 
effects may possibly be reduced owing to influence of an 'input 
selection' effect dependent upon spatial location (Triesman, 1969). 
The Time-Course of Priming Effects 
The time-course of any priming effects obtained in cross-attribute 
experiments (see Table 4.1) is of interest in view of the issues that have 
arisen with regard to the possibility of the relative-speed account offered 
by Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984) for priming (or interference) effects. In 
particular, from the discussion of Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) work 
in the last chapter it was indicated that the range of target post-exposures 
should be well in excess of the difference in times required for word- and 
picture-categorisation tasks, that is, at least 200 msec. In view of this and 
also with the possibility in mind that the time difference in case- and 
name-decision is likely to be of a similar order of magnitude to that for 
Glaser and Diingelhoff's categorisation tasks it was decided to present 
primes up to 480 msec before and up to 480 msec after their respective 
targets. Added together, then, the total range of prime pre- and post-
exposures was 960 msec. 
In addition to deciding the range of SOA values to be used there is a 
further consideration with regard to the required resolution of the time-
course. Although measurements taken at small increments in SOA over a 
wide SOA range may be useful this, of course, has to be balanced against 
the inevitable demands that this would entail upon subjects' time and 
concentration, since large numbers of trials are necessary for testing each 
priming situation. A compromise has been reached for the present series 
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of experiments where relatively smaller intervals in SOA are used as the 
positive and negative SOAs approach zero. This is because issues 
concerning the relative speed of processing different stimulus attributes 
are of interest in the present study and since the effects arising from 
relative speeds are likely to be detectable at shorter SOAs. With this in 
mind and also with regard to the available instrumentation the SOAs 
used were -480, -320, -240, -160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 
480 msec, where the minus sign indicates target preceding prime. 
Choice of Subjects 
The research strategy has been to carry out the main experimental work 
required for developing the argument on a 'self case study' basis. There 
were two reasons for this. The first is practical in that the arduous regime 
could not have engaged a disinterested subject for the needed length of 
time. The second reason is epistemological, in that the investigator 
wished to have the maximum possibility of tuning design modification in 
step with the research as being monitored from the dual perspective of 
experimenter and subject. However, whenever an apparently stable key 
phenomenon emerged in this process it was then retested in some form 
on ten or more additional subjects. Only if confirmed would the feature 
be allowed a place in the developing model. For reasons of continuity 
across experiments and readability the data quoted in the main text relate 
to the investigator as subject. If these data differ substantially from 
additional-subject data then this is discussed as appropriate; any 
references to additional-subject data being made explicit. Although full 
details of the results obtained with additional subjects are contained 
within Appendix 3 a convention nevertheless adopted is to present a 
reduced-size copy of the graphical representation of additional-subject 
data as a footnote on the same page below the graphical representation 
for the corresponding main-subject data. Experimental procedures are 
reported in third-party form. However, apart from the administration of 
instructions, the procedures followed by the investigator as subject were 
identical to those followed by the additional subjects. 
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Bias and Practice Effects 
Choice reaction time experiments generally require a large number of 
trials for priming effects to be detectable. In order to investigate the time-
course of priming effects an even larger number of trials is required for 
any one subject. In view of this the effects that may arise from 
overfamiliarity with an experimental situation will be briefly considered. 
Apart from an expected overall reduction in response latencies in 
keeping with other reaction time results, extensive practice may lead to 
bias resulting from subject-generated hypotheses arising from perceived 
patterns of events occurring across experimental trials. 
A guessing bias as to the nature of the target might be additionally 
imposed. For such a bias to have a condition-dependent effect, however, 
either the prime-types would have to be predictive of priming conditions, 
or, the occurrence of the priming conditions themselves would have to be 
predictable. The possibility of the latter can be minimised by the use of a 
different random sequence of trials for each experimental run while the 
possibility of bias arising simply from prime-type, rather than priming 
condition, can be minimised by ensuring that a given prime-type is used 
equally across priming conditions. The use of a computer to generate and 
present stimuli randomly prevents the investigator along with other 
subjects from having prior knowledge of the order of trials. 
138 
EXPERIMENT 1: Case-Priming of Case-Decision 
In this first experiment the aim is to look for any effects of case-priming 
upon a speeded case-decision task. In addition to establishing whether or 
not case-priming effects are obtainable the results of this experiment will 
provide a baseline against which the results from the other priming 
experiments can be compared. 
This experiment, in line with the experiments that are to follow, attempts 
to provide what are termed congruent, incongruent and neutral priming 
conditions. A 'case-congruent' condition is where both the prime and 
target letter strings are in the same case, and a 'case-incongruent' 
condition is where the prime string is in a different case to that of the 
target. Examples of these conditions are shown in Table 4.3. In order to 
ascertain whether priming is facilitatory or inhibitory in nature it is 





























necessary to have a neutral priming condition for comparison. The 
difficulties of devising 'neutral' priming conditions have already been 
discussed (see Chapter 3) and in this experiment the prime consisted of a 
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string of minus signs, chosen because they were judged to be least biased 
to either of the typographic cases. This is referred to as the 'neutral' 
condition (also shown in Table 4.3). 
PREDICTED PRIMING EFFECTS 
From the discussions in the earlier chapters two important likely sources 
of influence upon a case-primed-case-decision task have emerged; 
encoding processes and response processes. These processes will be 
examined in turn. Since the response times that are measured 
experimentally may be considered to be a resultant of encoding and 
response effects a way in which such a resultant can be predicted will 
also be included. 
Encoding Effects 
While it has been argued that response processes may only account for 
inhibitory effects (Chapter 3) the encoding models so far considered may 
be put into two groups; those that account only for facilitatory effects and 
those that account both for facilitatory and inhibitory effects. If 
typographic case is an attribute that is capable of sustaining priming 
effects then predictions occurring as a result of encoding processes may 
be in accord with those traditionally made with regard to prime target 
congruency and as such may be considered to be relatively 
unproblematic. Such predictions are shown in Figure 4.2. Table 4.3 
(Page 138) may be consulted for notation and examples. 
Since response latencies cannot be determined precisely, the predictions 
are essentially ordinal rather than interval. However some assumptions 
regarding the magnitude of priming effects are implied and are expressed 
in terms of the arbitrary units of scaling shown. In the facilitatory and 
inhibitory model the degree of inhibition obtained with incongruent 
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priming at the encoding stage is assumed for present purposes to be of a 
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FIGURE 4.2. A schematic representation of the relative effects of 
encoding processes upon case-decision latencies according to priming 
condition. ('c+' = case-congruent priming, 'c-' = case-incongruent priming, 
N = neutral priming.) 
Responding Effects 
From the discussion in Chapter 3 it is here assumed that response 
mechanisms may account for inhibitory effects arising from incongruent 
primes (c-) while for congruent priming (c+) they will have no effect. 
The magnitude of inhibition obtainable with incongruent priming at the 
responding stage is considered to be similar to the magnitude of any 
effects that might occur due to encoding. While there are no theoretical 
grounds to support this latter assumption some guidance may be taken 
from Taylor's (1977, Expt. 3) findings. Figure 4.3 summarises the effects 
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FIGURE 4.3. A schematic representation of the relative effects of 
responding processes upon case-decision latencies according to priming 
condition. ('c+' = case-congruent priming, `c-' = case-incongruent priming, 
N = neutral priming.) 
Resultant Effects 
For the present, predictions of the combined effects of encoding and 
responding processes will be based upon the model used by 
Taylor (1977). In this model it is assumed that the processes occur both 
independently and serially. The possibility remains, however, that 
encoding and responding processes may interact so that prediction of 
combined effects becomes difficult. In answer to this it may be argued 
that since the two groupings of mechanisms differ significantly in 
function as well as in terms of the peripheral mechanisms with which 
they may commute, assumptions such as those used by Taylor are not 
unreasonable as a starting point. On this basis additive rules can be used. 
Of particular interest is the response latency for the incongruent (c-) 
condition in relation to the two encoding models discussed. Where the 
encoding stage is characterised only by facilitatory processes inhibition 
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from an incongruent case-prime is only obtained at the responding stage. 
By way of contrast when encoding is characterised by both facilitatory 
and inhibitory processes a measure of inhibition is obtained both at the 
encoding stage as well as at the responding stage. If the inhibitory effects 
at the encoding and responding stages are assumed to be additive then 
the final response latency would be expected to be correspondingly 
greater than with encoding processes which are only facilitatory. 
Facilitatory 
Encoding 
Facilitatory and Inhibitory 
Encoding 
After Encoding After Encoding 
and Responding 












































































FIGURE 4.4. A schematic representation of the relative resultant effects 
of encoding and responding processes upon case-decision latencies 
according to priming condition. ('c+' = case-congruent priming, `c-' = case-
incongruent priming, N = neutral priming.) 
Figure 4.4 summarises the resultant priming effects arising from both 
encoding and responding processes for the models presently considered; 
essentially from adding Figures 4.2 and 4.3. For ease of reference the 
information contained in Figure 4.2 is repeated in the 'after encoding' 
columns of Figure 4.4 so that the derivation of the resultant predicted 
effects may be more easily assessed. 
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Inspection of Figure 4.4 suggests that support for the existence of either 
the 'facilitation-only' or the 'facilitation and inhibition' processing 
model may be obtained from the relative magnitudes of facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects obtainable experimentally. However a note of caution 
is necessary as it may only require relatively minor variations in 
magnitude in the predicted effects occurring at each stage for the 
resultant priming profile (`Encoding plus responding' columns in 
Figure 4.4) to be the same in the case of either model. With this in mind 
a comparison of the relative magnitudes of facilitatory and inhibitory 
effects obtained from this experiment alone does not provide reliable 
support in favour of one or other of the encoding models. 
Predicted Time-Course of Encoding and Responding Effects 
If Taylor's (1977) notion of 'specific effects' is considered in relation to 
the encoding stages, then in the present within-attribute experiment two 
basic types of time-course are possible. Firstly, in the case of primary 
specific effects the ongoing interaction that may occur between prime 
and target information would result in priming effects being detectable at 
both positive and negative SOAs. This is in accord with the principle of 
temporal contiguity expressed by Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984). With 
secondary specific effects the necessity of temporal precedence would 
suggest that priming effects would only be obtainable for positive SOAs. 
With this in mind it would be expected that while priming effects might 
not be obtainable at an SOA of zero, there might be sufficient initial 
processing of prime information for any facilitatory or inhibitory 
processes to take effect. This would be within, say, a few tens of 
milliseconds or, at least, by the shortest SOA of 40 msec used in the 
present experiment. If inhibitory effects are also obtainable at the 
encoding stages then these should follow a similar time-course as any 
facilitatory effects. This latter prediction is based upon the earlier 
proposal derived from PDP accounts that inhibitory mechanisms are of a 
similar but complementary nature to facilitatory ones. 
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If a response-competition account is used as a basis for predicting the 
time-course of inhibitory effects occurring at the responding stage then 
interference effects should not be obtained if incongruent prime 
information arrives after the target. With simultaneous or previously 
presented distracting information covert responses should interfere and 
inhibition should result. It thus follows that differences in response 
latencies between neutral and incongruent priming conditions should 
only be obtained for SOAs of zero or above. 
Other Factors that may affect Response Latencies 
Apart from the already discussed priming effects in relation to encoding 
and response-competition other factors may result in selective effects 
being derived from general effects. For example general effects in the 
region of the shorter SOAs (less than 200 msec, say) may arise as a result 
of the temporal resolution of various peripheral and mental processing 
elements that may be involved (cf., Turvey, 1973). The resulting 
phenomenal effect of successive stimuli may be in the form of a 
detectable flicker. Such a flicker may not only signal target arrival but 
also have the effect of increasing the level of phasic alertness (see 
Appendix 2) which may lead to a speeded response. Conversely, a 
detectable flicker may distract or lead to a psychological refractory effect 
(again see Appendix 1) and a delay also becomes a possibility. Although 
the effects of phasic alertness and refractivity are essentially general they 
may also have condition-dependent repercussions. For the present, this 
possibility of indirect condition-dependent effects is merely noted with a 
view to a more detailed discussion in the results later on. 
Summary 
From the discussion so far it appears that the effect of a prime containing 
typographic case information on case-decision may vary according to 
both the prime-target case-congruency and onset asynchrony. The 
145 
principal factors identified as responsible for congruency-dependent 
priming effects are encoding and responding mechanisms. However it is 
also provisionally suggested that more general factors such as phasic 
alertness and psychological refractivity may also indirectly lead to 
congruency-dependent effects. While the predictions relating to the 
magnitude of effects arising from encoding and responding mechanisms 
are highly speculative they may be considered along with other evidence 
in relation to the time-course of effects in order to indicate the role of 
underlying mechanisms in priming. In this first experiment the 
distinction between primary and secondary specific effects has been 
considered in relation to predictions concerning the time-course of 
effects. Additionally the effect of 'facilitation-only' and 'facilitation and 
inhibition' models of encoding have been considered along with the 
effect of responding mechanisms to make further predictions regarding 
the time-course and magnitude of congruency-dependent effects. The 
above predictions are now tested. 
METHOD 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
An Acorn A310 microcomputer and video monitor were used to present 
stimuli and time the responses. Responses were indicated by pressing 
one of two conveniently sited keys at either end of the computer 
keyboard with the forefinger of either hand. The monitor employed 
conventional raster scanning with a recycling time of 40 msec and thus 
the minimum increment in stimulus duration and onset asynchrony was 
limited to this amount. Apart from a centrally positioned 7 x 3 cm 
rectangular aperture the monitor screen was masked with grey card. 
Stimuli consisted of strings of five random letters or a row of five 
horizontal bars (the minus sign used in arithmetical notation) which were 
the same width as most of the letters. Within each string all the letters 
were entirely in upper or entirely in lower-case. The letters were in white 
on a dark ground and each formed within a 5 x 9 matrix. Each completed 
grey card masking monitor screen ,j 
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string occupied an area which measured approximately 30 mm 
horizontally by 6 mm vertically. In order to aid both fixation and target 
identification two arithmetic minus signs arranged horizontally and about 
45 mm apart acted as markers. All target stimuli were located centrally 
between the markers while all primes were presented one centimetre 
below the targets as shown in Figure 4.5. The viewing distance was 
approximately 50 cm. 
FIGURE 4.5. An example of a prime and target display used in 
Experiment 1 showing the spatial arrangement in relation to two line 
markers. 
Pairs from a set of stimulus items was used for each trial, one item as a 
prime and the other as a target. The stimuli were arranged according to 
the three experimental conditions shown in Table 4.2 (Page 133). The 
conditions were sequenced quasi-randomly so that there was no 
excessive clustering of any one experimental condition. Experimental 
trials were in blocks of 72 and similarly-created practice trials were in 
blocks of 24. 
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Procedure 
General instructions were given about the task and it was stated that 
reaction times were being recorded. The purpose of the experiment was 
disclosed insofar that it was said that the effect of the presence of one 
letter-string upon the response time to another was being investigated. 
Subjects were informed that a target string of letters would appear level 
with the markers and were asked to respond to this as quickly and as 
accurately as possible by pressing one of two keys situated beneath the 
index finger of each hand; right for upper-case strings and left for lower-
case strings. Subjects were also informed that another string of letters or 
characters to which no response was required would appear just below 
the target. Figures 4.6a to 4.6c show the sequences for each trial; these 
vary according to the temporal order of the prime and target. For positive 
SOA values (pre-exposed primes) trials began with a priming stimulus 
which remained visible throughout the duration of the onset asynchrony 
set for the experimental block. A target stimulus was then presented 
which, along with the prime, remained visible until the subject 
responded. As there was no dark interval between the prime and target 
for pre-exposed primes the prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony was 
also equal to the duration of the prime. For negative SOAs (post-exposed 
primes) each trial began with a target stimulus which remained visible 
until the subject responded. For each of these trials a prime was also 
destined to be exposed at a point in time after the beginning of the trial 
that was equal to the SOA duration set. If the subject's response time was 
less than the predetermined SOA duration then the prime would not be 
presented. If the subject's response time was greater than the SOA 
duration then the prime would be presented and remain visible along 
with the target until the subject responded. For SOAs of zero the prime 
and target were presented simultaneously, both remaining visible until 
terminated by the subject's response. Reaction times for all trials 
(measured from the onset of the target) were recorded by the computer 
and only those response times falling within a 200 to 1000 msec range 
were accepted for analysis. A dark interval of 1500 msec elapsed 
between successive trials. 
(a)  
+ + 
dark  prime prime & target ' , dark 
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SOA CDRT 1500 msec 
inter-trial interval 
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(b) trial 	 response 	 beginning of 
begins 	 indicated 	 next trial 
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FIGURE 4.6. Schematic representation of the sequence comprising a 
single trial for Experiment 1: a, for positive SOA values; b, for negative 
SOA values; and c, for zero SOAs. (CDRT = case-decision reaction time.) 
dark 
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Each session began with the block of 24 practice trials, the SOA being 
set at a value equal to that used in the first experimental block. If 
necessary further blocks of practice trials were run until a balance 
between speed and accuracy was attained; the criterion being at least 
80% accuracy for mean response times of 700 msec or less. SOAs of 
-480, -320, -240, -160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 480 msec 
were used in the experiment. The SOA was held constant within each 
block of trials but was altered randomly between blocks, each SOA value 
being used for two blocks. Each block of experimental trials lasted 
approximately five minutes and was separated by a rest period of 
approximately three minutes; in total a session of nearly two hours. At 
the end of the session the subject was asked (in the form of a leading 
question) to say whether the horizontal bars which were occasionally 
visible were more similar to upper-case or lower-case letters and the 
response was noted. Experimental sessions were repeated so that a total 
of twelve sets of results were obtained. 
RESULTS 
Out of a total of 11,232 case-decision responses 15 fell beyond the 
allotted 200 to 1000 msec interval. Three of the 15 outlying responses 
were shorter than 200 msec and due to false starts while those above 
1000 msec were due to factors such as insufficient pressure on a response 
key or minor lapses in attention. The 15 outliers were not considered in 
any further analyses including the compilation of error scores. 
Response Latencies 
Latencies for correct responses were subjected to a 13 (SOA) by 
3 (Congruency) ANOVA. Case-priming effects were obtained; the 
variation of mean response time with stimulus congruency was 
significant, F(2,10063) = 38.41, p<.001, as was the main effect for SOA, 
F(12,10063) = 31.75, p<.001. A significant interaction between SOA and 
Congruency was also obtained, F(24,10063) = 4.02, p<.001. 
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The above data were further examined in terms of prime-target order. An 
SOA by Congruency ANOVA indicated significant case-priming effects 
for pre-exposed primes, that is, for the SOA range 40 to 480 msec 
F(2,4683) = 82.10, p<.001. No significant case-priming effects were 
obtained for post-exposed primes (SOA range -480 to -40 msec), 
F(2,4622) = 0.02, p>.001. Interaction between SOA and congruency was 
both non-significant for pre-exposed primes F(10,4683) = 1.61, p>.001, 
and non-significant F(10,4622) = 0.24, p>.001 in the case of post-
exposure. The main effect for SOA for both pre- and post-exposed 
primes was significant, F(5,4683) = 17.67, p<.001 and F(5,4622) = 
33.14, p<.001 respectively. 
The variation in the magnitude of case-priming for different SOAs was 
further examined by calculating the mean correct response times for each 
of the SOA-levels for each priming condition. These means are 
represented in Figure 4.7 as a time-course. The means for the case-
congruent and case-incongruent priming conditions were also subtracted 
from the means for the neutral condition so that difference scores were 
obtained. These differences are shown in Figure 4.8; as is conventional, 
the term 'inhibition' refers to positive differences from neutral values 
while 'facilitation' refers to negative differences. A further convention 
adopted is one where the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of the prime 
and target is measured in relation to the onset of the target so that prime 
pre-exposures are shown by positive SOA values while prime post-
exposures are shown by negative SOAs. 
The time-course plots in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 display a visual consistency 
which may be seen as supportive of the reliability of the obtained effects. 
This reliability was largely confirmed by a series of one-way ANOVAs 
carried out across congruency conditions for each SOA. When a 
significant (p<.05) congruency effect was obtained for a given SOA, 
multiple comparisons of response time means were made using the 
Newman-Keuls method. The test statistic derived from this method is 
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only when the significance or non-significance of an effect is germane to 
the argument and may not be obvious from the above representations. A 
significance criterion of p<.05 is used for the results quoted in the 
remainder of this section. 
FIGURE 4.7. RESPONSE TIMES: Mean response times for correct 
case-decisions as a function of priming condition and prime-target 
stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 1. Each mean is based on 288 
trials for one subject. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.7 below.) 
From Figures 4.7 and 4.8 it is clear that no significant differences were 
found between the CDRTs obtained for any of the three priming 
conditions over the SOA range -480 to -40 msec. Although some 
variance in CDRT at zero SOA might be inferred from inspecting the 
main-subject data in Figure 4.8 this was found to be non-significant, 
F(2,758)=1.69, p>.05. The situation was different, however, throughout 
the range 40 to 480 msec where CDRTs were found to be modulated 
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response times while incongruent primes produced the longest. For 
positive SOAs a difference in response times for incongruently-primed 
targets in relation to the neutral condition was well-established by 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.8. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean response times 
for congruent and incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming for 
correct case-decisions as a function of prime-target stimulus onset 
asynchrony for Experiment 1. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained 
over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.8 below.) 
40 msec SOA, Q,763=4.88, p<.05. This difference averaged 10.4 msec 
across the 40 to 320 msec SOA range. However significant case-
incongruent effects were not obtained at SOAs of 160 and 480 msec; 
Q,780=2.50, p>.05 and Q,797=2.32, p>.05 respectively. The difference 
in response-times for congruently-primed targets in relation to the neutral 
condition averaged 11.1 msec but varied markedly according to SOA; a 
maximum of 17.0 msec, Q,746=5.91, p<.05 was reached at 80 msec 
SOA while the differences of 5.5 msec at 240 msec SOA, and 3.1 msec 
at 320 msec SOA were not significant; Q,793=1.92, p>.05 and 
FIGURE A4.8. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.8; The difference in mean response 
times in relation to neutral priming for ten 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
details.) 
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Q,804=1.00, p>.05 respectively. The variations in the relative differences 
in priming effects for the positive SOA range shown in Figure 4.8 is 
consistent with the significant SOA by congruency interaction reported 
earlier. 
Although this opening experiment was designed to investigate the 
variation of the priming effect between congruency conditions at 
different SOAs rather than the variation of response time with SOA some 
observations regarding this more general response time variation may 
nevertheless be made. Since separate blocks of trials for all SOAs were 
run consecutively in randomly varied sequences it may be reasonable to 
assume that over the twelve experimental sessions any systematic 
variation with SOA of carry-over effects resulting from such factors as 
practice or fatigue would be minimal. An inspection of Figure 4.7 
suggests that the minimum disruptive effect on response latency was 
obtained at prime post-exposures of 480 msec. A subjective observation 
that was made in the course of the experimental trials was that very few 
primes were visible at the longest negative SOA value. This, of course, 
may be explained by trial-terminating responses being made before the 
occurrence of a prime. The observation is backed-up statistically; at the 
longest prime post-exposure of 480 msec the mean response time across 
priming conditions was 356.6 msec, SD=46.3. Although no clear trend in 
overall response latencies for the remainder of the SOA range is apparent 
it may be noted that local maxima occur at SOAs of -240, 80, and 
320 msec. 
Error Rates 
The error rates for the three priming conditions are expressed in 
Figure 4.9 as proportions of the total responses for each condition at each 
SOA-level. As with response latencies the differences in error rates for 
the congruent- and incongruent-priming conditions in comparison to the 
neutral condition were also computed and these are shown in 
Figure 4.10. The statistical significance of the effects suggested by 
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tests, the results of which, again, are reported only when the significance 
or non-significance is germane to the argument and may not be obvious 
from the figure. 
FIGURE 4.9. ERRORS: The variation in error rate according to priming 
condition and stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 1. Each mean is 
based on 288 trials for one subject. (Results for ten additional subjects 
obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in 
Figure A4.9 below.) 
Differences in error rates between the priming conditions followed a 
pattern which had some broad similarities to those of the response 
latencies; that is reliable case-priming effects were obtained only when 
primes were pre-exposed. Significant differences in error rate were 
obtained for the 40 (x2 = 27.11, p<.05), 80 (x2 = 55.99, p<.05), and 160 
(x2 = 19.87, p<.05) msec SOAs. (The error differences obtained at 
-320 msec SOA were not found to be significant; x2 = 5.52, p>.05.) 
Apart from the condition-dependent effects occurring between SOAs of 
40 and 160 msec Figure 4.9 suggests that error rates exhibit a general 
decline from an average of 0.125 at -480 msec to 0.072 at 480 msec. 
FIGURE A4.9. ERRORS: As for Figure 4.9: 
The variation in error rate for ten additional 
subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
details.) 
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FIGURE 4.10. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for congruent and 
incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-
target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 1. (Results for ten 
additional subjects obtained over the SAO-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.10 below.) 
Additional-Subject Data 
Results were obtained for ten additional subjects over a restricted SOA 
range (-160 to 240 msec). From Figures A4.7 to A4.10 it is apparent that 
the additional-subject data are qualitatively similar to the above main-
subject data. Additionally this conclusion drawn from the graphical 
summaries is consistent with the further statistical details given in 
Appendix 3. 
The most notable difference between main- and additional-subject data 
was that the latter were characterised by longer response latencies 
accompanied by fewer errors; this is apparent from comparing Figure 4.7 
with Figure A4.7 (Page 151) and Figure 4.9 with Figure A4.9 (Page 
154). Overall response times averaged 482.6 msec, that is 103 msec in 
FIGURE A4.10. ERRORS: As for Figure 4.10: 
The difference in error rates in relation to 
neutral priming for ten additional subjects 
obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
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excess of the main-subject data while the overall error rate was 0.073, 
compared with a figure of 0.110 for the main subject. These latter 
comparisons however relate to an SOA range of -480 to +480 msec with 
main-subject data compared with the -160 to +240 msec range with 
additional-subject data and in view of the time-course effects obtained 
must be interpreted advisedly. 
Finally it is noted that all of the ten additional subjects considered the 
horizontal bars used occasionally for priming were no more similar to 
upper-case letters than they were to lower-case letters. 
DISCUSSION 
From the results it appears that both the latency and accuracy of case-
decision responses is affected by pre-exposed case-priming information. 
In general, where case-priming effects were obtained, the fastest 
responses and the lowest rates of error were for congruently-primed 
targets while incongruent priming elicited the slowest responses with the 
highest error rate. 
General Effect of the Presence of a Prime 
With regard to the general effect of the presence of a prime the results 
obtained for those primes exposed 480 msec after their respective targets 
may appear to be of especial interest. If, as argued above, these primes 
may be regarded as effectively absent for the -480 msec trials then one 
conclusion that may be drawn from Figure 4.7 (Page 150) is that in 
general the presence of any prime appears to have a slowing effect upon 
response time regardless of whether it is pre- or post-exposed. However 
it should also be noted from a comparison with Figure 4.9 (Page 154) 
that this trend to slower response times over the range -480 to -240 msec 
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is also matched by a downward trend in error rates. There is thus a 
possibility that a change in equilibrium between speed and accuracy of 
response may have occurred. This possibility is reinforced by a 
subjective observation that the longer negative SOAs effectively provide 
an incentive to 'beat the arrival of the prime' by responding early. 
The downward trend in response time over the range -240 to 0 msec 
SOA (Figure 4.7, Page 150) is itself more difficult to account for. As 
with the remainder of the negative SOA range the slope appears to be 
negatively correlated with the trend in error rates apparent from 
Figure 4.9. However no solution can be offered as to why the local 
maximum in disruptivity is exhibited by primes which follow their 
respective targets by 240 msec. 
The general tendency for any pre-exposed prime to result in longer 
response latencies than for post-exposure may be accounted for by the 
psychological refractory effect described earlier. This appears to reach a 
maximum over the +80 to +320 msec SOA region. From a comparison of 
Figures 4.7 and 4.9 a speed-accuracy tradeoff does not appear to operate 
in this region; apart from the selective effects (to be discussed shortly) 
the presence of a pre-exposed prime slows down case-responses without 
any accompanying variation in error rate. 
In summary, then, although the presence of a prime may affect case-
decision latencies in a way that may be broadly accounted for in terms of 
a speed-accuracy tradeoff and psychological refractivity, conclusions 
regarding the finer points relating to the general effect of the presence of 
a prime are difficult to draw. 
Case-Congruency Effects 
In addition to the more general considerations regarding the presence of 
a prime are considerations relating to congruency-dependent effects. An 
158 
explanation for the observed effects has already been given in terms of 
typographic case information. Since a different combination of letters 
was used for each prime-target pair the only letter attributes that 
distinguished each of the priming conditions used were those features 
that typified typographic case. On this basis the possibility that 
typographic case is an identifiable physical attribute that may be used as 
a vehicle for further investigation of processing interactions is 
supportable since significant priming effects were obtained according to 
case condition. Earlier on, however, the possibility was raised that 
condition-dependent effects might arise indirectly from the more general 
effects of phasic alertness or psychological refractivity. In particular 
since the relative difference in the spatial distribution of letter features is 
greater with incongruent case-primes than with congruent ones, phasic 
effects may be comparatively greater in the incongruent condition. This 
suggestion is in accordance with such general findings that reaction time 
increases as relative stimulus level or area decreases (Hovland, 1936; 
Froeberg, 1907). From these latter studies it may be predicted that at very 
short SOAs the response times for case-congruent conditions (e.g., with a 
prime `vftco' and a target `1qhtp') may be lengthened while those for 
incongruent conditions (e.g., with a prime TILDP' and a target `irhys') 
may be shortened. Although the effects of alertness or distraction may be 
small when letter primes are used, responses to a neutral condition where 
the prime consists of a row of dashes (") may be more affected 
because of the greater difference in stimulus area in comparison to letter 
primes. If the effects of phasic alertness were to prevail responses in the 
neutral condition would be speeded and this would result in an apparent 
increase in any inhibitory effect obtained for for case-incongruent primes 
in comparison to the facilitatory effect that may be obtained for case-
congruent primes. A similar but converse argument may apply to neutral 
primes in terms of their distracting effect, that is, if refractivity prevailed, 
facilitation of congruent primes would appear to increase and inhibition 
of incongruent primes diminish. 
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Although the significant differences between the case-congruent and 
case-incongruent conditions at the shorter positive SOAs may be at least 
partly accountable in the above terms, the position of the response 
latencies relative to the neutral condition is not. This is because the 
greatest relative difference in stimulus area for the neutral condition in 
comparison to both of the other priming conditions should give rise to 
either, a lowest ranking in response latency if indirect effects arising 
from phasic alertness prevailed, or, a highest ranking if refractivity 
prevailed. Since neither of these situations occurred the earlier 
explanation based upon typographic case information will be assumed; 
the effects of phasic alertness or refractivity being regarded as either 
counteractive or minimal. 
Facilitation and Inhibition 
At this point a further question arises as to whether the differences in 
response time signify both facilitation and inhibition (as opposed to 
varying degrees of inhibition, for example). Of relevance here is the 
reply by ten subjects who were additionally tested to a leading question 
regarding which of the two cases the horizontal bars more closely 
resembled. The fact that no subjects reported any association between 
either of the case-forms and the dash or minus signs that were used as 
primes in the neutral condition lends support to the effective neutrality of 
this condition. If the 'neutral priming' condition is truly neutral then it 
may be inferred that both facilitation and inhibition were obtained. 
At this stage the possibility that facilitatory processes may be masked by 
inhibition from other sources must also be considered. In particular it is 
possible that a noticeable flicker from prime and target presentation at 
the shorter SOAs may distract and give rise to a general inhibitory effect 
which may bias the latencies for all priming conditions. This general 
effect may be large in comparison to any condition-dependent effect that 
may be indirectly obtained. The downward turn in response times at 
480 msec SOA where the prime-target sequence takes on the appearance 
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of two separate events rather than a flicker may be indicative of this. 
From the above arguments the view that both facilitatory and inhibitory 
priming effects arising directly from typographic case information may 
be occurring is held in relation to this experiment. 
Relevance of Findings for Rival Processing Models 
The occurrence of facilitatory effects is consistent with both the 
spreading-activation and PDP models of encoding as described. The 
obtained inhibitory effects are consistent with the predictions based upon 
response-competition and with PDP encoding mechanisms that involve 
inhibitory connections. If one is to attempt to distinguish between 
encoding models which are facilitatory-only and those that are also 
inhibitory then the present results need to be examined in more detail. 
If it is argued that there is a dissimilarity in the time-course of inhibition 
and that for facilitation then in turn it may be suggested that different 
rather than similar and complementary processes are at work. From an 
examination of Figure 4.8 (Page 151) it may be argued that if 
dissimilarities are evident then they exist by virtue of the local variations 
in the time-course of facilitatory and inhibitory effects. Such 
dissimilarities might favour the facilitation-only encoding alternative and 
thus be contrary to the predictions arising from facilitation and inhibition 
characterised by the PDP encoding models. Further to this end it may be 
argued that if significant inhibitory effects occur within both encoding 
and responding mechanisms then it is plausible that the resultant 
magnitude of the combined inhibitory effects might be greater than that 
for a facilitatory effect that arose only at an encoding stage. In relation to 
this latter point, however, the relative inhibitory and facilitatory effects 
obtained may be of interest, if valid. For example it is apparent from 
Figure 4.8 that the maximum inhibitory effects obtained are smaller in 
magnitude than the maximum facilitatory effects. In addition it has 
already been noted that facilitation in response latency averages 
161 
11.09 msec in comparison to a 10.35 msec inhibition over the positive 
SOA range. Although the magnitude of the inhibition may be strictly less 
than that for facilitation there is, nevertheless, some similarity in 
magnitude. If the possibility that relatively small inhibitory effects occur 
within both encoding and responding stages is disregarded then the 
relative magnitudes of the inhibitory and facilitatory effects shown in 
Figure 4.8 (Page 151) is in accord with the predictions for the 
`facilitation-only' model summarised earlier in Figure 4.4 (Page 142). 
However speculation on the basis of relative magnitudes is unwise at this 
stage and further discussion must await the results from later 
experiments. 
The absence of any significant facilitatory effects for targets that 
coincide with or precede their respective primes may be argued to be in 
accordance with the basic predictions that may be made from models 
involving spreading-activation or pathway facilitation. Here the 
assumption is that a finite amount of time is necessary for one stimulus 
to raise the level of activation of the elements concerned. Furthermore, 
for a given stimulus attribute the simultaneous or subsequent arrival of a 
second stimulus has no effect upon the speed of processing of the first. In 
terms of the terminology adopted by Taylor (1977) the obtained time-
course is consistent with the earlier predictions that were based upon a 
secondary, rather than primary, specific effect. Here the implication is 
that facilitation is attributable to completed, or at least partially 
completed, processing of a previously presented stimulus. 
As with facilitation, inhibitory effects were obtained with pre-exposed 
primes. Although the longer response latencies for incongruent primes at 
zero SOA apparent in Figure 4.8 (Page 151) are non-significant the trend 
is in keeping with the earlier suggestion that according to the response-
competition hypothesis inhibitory effects due to interfering covert 
responses might be expected at SOAs of zero and above. 
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It may also be apparent that the time-course of response latencies as 
shown in Figure 4.8 (Page 151) is to some extent similar to the time-
course of error rates shown in Figure 4.10 (Page 155). That is, while no 
significant priming effects were obtained for negative SOAs this was not 
the case for the shorter positive SOAs. The difference between the error 
rate for the neutral and case-incongruent conditions may be explainable 
in terms of an initial response formation to the prime which in some 
cases is not suppressed by the time a response to the target is attempted. 
A similar mechanism with case-congruent primes may also result in a 
lower error rate in comparison to neutral primes. A further explanation of 
the error difference between neutral and case-congruent priming may be 
in terms of activated encoding mechanisms encoding congruent target 
stimuli more reliably. 
That no significant differences in error rates were found at zero SOA for 
incongruent prime-target pairs is less easily explained in terms of 
conflicting response formation. However, at zero SOA, the combined 
prime-target array may be perceived differently from a prime followed 
by a target with the result that a response to the prime is not begun as if it 
were the target. In this situation it may be less likely that erroneous 
responses would be formed initially. 
The discussion so far has focused mainly on the SOA range of -480 to 
about 160 msec. If the relatively long-term effects (i.e., in the latter half 
of the positive SOA range used) of prime information are also considered 
then the results in Figure 4.8 (Page 151) suggest that inhibitory effects 
are held fairly consistently for nearly least half a second. The error rate, 
however declines rapidly from a sharp maximum at 80 msec (Figure 4.9, 
Page 154). If response-competition is used to explain the inhibitory 
effects then these results suggest that while the suppression of an 
erroneous covert response may occupy responding mechanisms for 
nearly half a second the error effect that may result from the probability 
of a prime being responded to as if it were the target appears to diminish 
more rapidly. This might be predictable if it is assumed that a relatively 
163 
long delay in target presentation does not interfere with the identification 
of the initial stimulus as the prime stimulus. With regard to the time-
course of facilitation shown in Figure 4.8 (Page 151) it appears that the 
initial peak may be due to spreading-activation having a transient effect 
which may be attenuated by about 240 msec, perhaps due to a form of 
habituation. If the significant facilitation effect at 480 msec SOA is 
treated as reliable then this may indicative of another process beginning 
to take effect. One possibility here is the occurrence of slower-acting 
non-automatic effects mentioned in the context of Neely's (1977) work 
in Chapter 3. 
The time-course data obtained in Experiment 1 for case-priming effects 
can be used to provide a comparison for within-attribute priming effects 
based on word-name. In accordance with the discussion in the last 
chapter decisions involving word-name do not necessarily involve access 
to semantic information relating to a word's reference; word-name 
simply refers to nominal identity. It was also argued that the mechanisms 
responsible for word-name identification are fundamentally similar to 
those responsible for other word-attributes such as case. Accordingly, a 
similar experimental procedure to the present one based on the 
categorisation of word-name should produce qualitatively similar time-
course results. This is now considered in Experiment 2. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: Name-Priming of Name-Decision 
In this experiment the effect of name-priming upon a speeded name-
decision task was examined over the same range of prime-target onset 
asynchronies that was used in Experiment 1. The case-representing 
words 'upper' and 'lower' were used for both primes and targets. In 
order to reduce the probability of graphemic priming masking results 
when the same word is used both for prime and target all primes were 
presented in lower-case and all targets in upper-case. Table 4.4 shows the 
stimuli used and their arrangement according to priming condition. The 
occurrence of the same word, independently of typographic match, for 
TABLE 4.4. The three priming conditions used in Experiment 2. 

























both prime and target constituted name-congruent priming while the 
occurrence of a prime carrying name information that would elicit a 
response opposite to its respective target constituted incongruent 
priming. In an attempt to obtain a neutral priming condition the word 
`ether' was used. This was chosen because it has the same same number 
of letters and syllables as the other stimuli and is readily approximated to 
the word 'either' which was assumed to relate equally to both target 
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stimuli. Any response bias on the basis of semantic content of 'ether' 
was assumed to be unlikely because it was considered that the word's 
usual meanings are not readily associated with 'upper' or 'lower'. 
PREDICTED PRIMING EFFECTS 
In the task of pressing one or other of two response keys each arbitrarily 
assigned to one of a given set of two target words, it may be argued that 
word-name information, as distinct from other forms of information, may 
be of particular importance. Attention has been drawn to the importance 
of word-name information in view of tasks involving single-word stimuli 
that have been adopted in semantic-priming paradigms; these having 
implications with regard to the role of a word's semantic content. In the 
present experiment the effects that may arise from a prime carrying name 
information that is either identical to or different from that of the target 
are to be investigated. Although any priming effects may be due partly to 
semantic content there is also the possibility that name content may be 
partly or wholly responsible. There is thus an implied distinction here 
between name-priming and semantic-priming. Although semantic-
priming may occur along with name-priming it is considered safer in 
view of possible mechanisms which have already been discussed to treat 
word meaning and word-name as separate entities and refer to priming 
only in terms of the form of information upon which the task is based. 
Although the present experiment may be classed as a semantic-priming 
experiment in which identity primes are used in the present context the 
distinction between semantic-priming and name-priming is regarded as 
important. 
If it is assumed that the mechanisms responsible for word-name 
identification are fundamentally similar to those responsible for other 
word-attributes such as case then the present experiment based on the 
categorisation of word-name should produce qualitatively similar time- 
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course results as the last experiment. The similarities to be expected 
include the relative facilitatory and inhibitory effects which should be 
detectable only for positive SOA values. These similarities are also 
assumed to be attributable to encoding and responding effects equivalent 
to those detailed in Experiment 1. 
The main difference expected between the results from the two 
experiments is in overall response times to the targets. This follows from 
the assumption that the identification of a word-name involves more 
processing than that required for the identification of case-typifying 
features and that the amount of processing is reflected in the response 
latency. If it is assumed that processing in terms of word-name involves 
the activation of relatively more nodes or pathways than with case then it 
is also probable that any priming effects may be sustained over a 
relatively long period of time so that there should be a slower decay of 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects with increasing positive SOAs. The 
greater number of processing elements that may be involved with name-
encoding may also have consequences with regard to the magnitude of 
any facilitatory or inhibitory effects obtained in comparison to case-
priming. 
An inherent problem with investigating the effect of word-attributes that 
form an integral part of the words that are used experimentally is that in 
some circumstances the occurrence of unwanted relationships between 
stimulus attributes may arise. In the present experiment such a 
relationship exists by virtue of the fact that both the prime and target 
words contain physical case information as well as name information. If 
the stimuli used in the present experiment as shown in Table 4.4 are 
considered in terms of their case-priming content as well as in terms of 
name-priming then it can be seen that the priming influences are 
potentially complex. If the n+ condition is taken as an example it can be 
seen that while the prime word contains congruent name information it 
also contains incongruent case information. A further complication arises 
by virtue of the case of the letters comprising the targets; for the target 
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`UPPER' the case is congruent while for the target 'LOWER' the case is 
incongruent. Although the unwanted case-priming effects may balance 
out, a measure of 'noise' may nevertheless be introduced and this will 
have to be considered when interpreting results. 
METHOD 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and the viewing conditions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Stimuli were also of the same form and dimensions as 
Experiment 1; the only major difference was that the words 'upper' and 
`lower' were used in place of the random letter strings and that the prime 
for the neutral condition consisted of the word 'ether' rather than a row 
of minus signs. All primes were in lower-case while all target stimuli 
were in upper-case. Table 4.4 (Page 164) shows the arrangement of 
stimuli according to the three experimental conditions used. The 
conditions were sequenced quasi-randomly so that there was no 
excessive clustering of any one experimental condition. Experimental 
trials were in blocks of 72 and similarly created practice trials were in 
blocks of 24. 
Procedure 
Apart from the instruction to categorise in terms of word-name rather 
than case the procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. That is, the 
sequence comprising a single trial depended upon whether the primes 
were presented simultaneously or before and after the targets as shown in 
Figures 4.5a to 4.5c (Page 148). The occurrence of the word 'upper' was 
registered by pressing a right-hand response key while a left-hand 
response key was used for the word 'lower'. Reaction times were 
measured from the onset of the target and only those falling within a 200 
to 1000 msec range were accepted for analysis. 
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The session began with the block of 24 practice trials, the SOA being set 
at the value to be used in the first experimental block. Practice trials were 
run until a suitable balance between speed and accuracy was attained; 
this was according to a criterion of at least 80% accuracy for mean 
response times of 700 msec or less. As with Experiment 1 SOAs of -480, 
-320, -240, -160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 480 msec were 
used. The SOA was held constant within each block of trials but was 
altered randomly between blocks, each SOA value being used for two 
blocks. Each block of experimental trials took approximately five 
minutes to complete and was separated by a rest period of approximately 
three minutes; in total a session of some two hours. At the end of the 
session the subject was asked (in the form of a leading question) to say 
whether the word 'ether' which was occasionally visible was more 
similar to the word 'upper' or the word 'lower' and the response was 
noted. Experimental sessions were repeated so that a total of twelve sets 
of results were obtained. 
RESULTS 
From a total of 11,232 name-decision responses 3 fell outside the allotted 
200 to 1000 msec interval. One of the 3 outlying responses was shorter 
than 200 msec and due to a false start while insufficient pressure on a 
response key accounted for the other two outliers. The 3 outliers were 
not considered in any further analyses including the compilation of error 
scores. 
Response latencies 
Significant name-priming effects were obtained; a 13(SOA) by 
3(Congruency) ANOVA yielded, F(2,10017) = 70.39, p<.001. The main 
effect for SOA was also significant, F(12,10017) = 87.68, p<.001, as was 
the interaction between SOA and congruency, F(24,10017) = 9.80, 
p<.001. 
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As with Experiment 1 the above data were examined in terms of prime-
target order. An SOA by Congruency ANOVA for pre-exposed primes 
(SOA range +40 to +480 msec) indicated significant name-priming 
effects, F(2,4586) = 51.91, p<.001 while no significant effects were 
obtained for post-exposed primes (SOA range -480 to -40 msec), 
F(2,4679) = 2.07, p>.001. Interaction between SOA and congruency was 
neither significant for pre-exposed primes F(10,4586) = 1.11, p>.001, 
nor in the case of post-exposure, F(10,4679) = 1.22, p>.001 in the case of 
post-exposure. While name-decision latencies were not affected by 
prime-target onset asynchrony for pre-exposed primes, F(5,4586) = 6.78, 
p>.001, the reverse was found for post-exposed primes F(5,4679) = 
93.61, p<.001. 
The mean correct response times for each of the SOA-levels for each 
priming condition are represented in Figure 4.11. As with Experiment 1 
difference scores were obtained by subtracting the means for the case-
congruent and case-incongruent priming conditions from the means for 
the neutral condition. These differences are shown in Figure 4.12 with 
the terms 'inhibition' and 'facilitation' used with reference to positive 
and negative differences as before. Similarly the SOA of the prime and 
target was measured in relation to the onset of the target so that prime 
pre-exposures are shown by positive SOA values while prime post-
exposures are shown by negative SOAs. 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 suggest a reliable pattern of name-priming effects. 
This reliability was confirmed by a series of one-way ANOVAs carried 
out across congruency conditions for each SOA followed by the use of 
the Newman-Keuls method when a significant (p<.05) congruency effect 
was obtained for a given SOA. As in the previous experiment the results 
of these tests will be reported only when the significance or non-
significance of an effect may not be obvious from the above 
representations; the 'Q' statistic, being obtained from the Newman-Keuls 
procedure and a significance criterion of p<.05 being used. 














No significant differences were found between the name-decision RTs 
obtained for any of the three priming conditions over the SOA range 
-480 to 0 msec as is evident from Figures 4.11 and 4.12. This contrasts 
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SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.11. RESPONSE TIMES: Mean response times for correct 
name-decisions as a function of priming condition and prime-target 
stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 2. Each mean is based on 288 
trials for one subject. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.11 below.) 
above where in relation to neutral priming NDRTs for congruent primes 
averaged 13.7 msec shorter while NDRTs for incongruent primes were 
17.2 msec longer. All condition-dependent effects obtained in the 
positive SOA range were found to be significant except for the neutral 
and incongruent priming at 480 msec SOA, Q,779=1.32, p>.05. The 
difference in response times for congruently-primed targets in relation to 
the neutral condition was subject to minor variation over the positive 
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FIGURE A4.11. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.11; mean correct name-decision 
response times for ten additional subjects over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. Each mean 
is based on 288 trials. (See Appendix 3 for 
	
4;0 further details.) 
es. 
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overall trend. For incongruently-primed targets, priming in relation to the 
neutral condition reached a maximum of 26.2 msec at 160 msec SOA 
Q,760=8.6, p<.05 before falling to the non-significant level of 3.7 msec 
at 480 msec SOA. 
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SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.12. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean response 
times for congruent and incongruent name-priming in relation to neutral 
priming for correct name-decisions as a function of prime-target stimulus 
onset asynchrony for Experiment 2. (Results for ten additional subjects 
obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in 
Figure A4.12 below.) 
Observations regarding the variation of response time with SOA (rather 
than the variation of the priming effect relative to the neutral condition) 
may be made, albeit with the assumptions applicable to Experiment 1. 
That is, because the sequence of trial-blocks was randomly varied with 
regard to SOA then overall any systematic variation of carry-over effects 
resulting from such factors as practice or fatigue is assumed to be 
minimal. From Figure 4.11 it is apparent that a minimum disruptive 
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Figure 4.12; the difference in mean response 
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	 +240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
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effect on response latency was obtained at an SOA of -480 msec and, as 
with the last experiment, it was observed that very few primes were 
visible at this SOA value. The explanation that trial-terminating 
responses were made before the occurrence of a prime is also supported 
statistically since at an SOA of -480 msec the mean response time across 
priming conditions was only 361.7 msec, SD=46.4. The overall response 
latencies rise linearly from the mean of 361.7 msec at -480 msec to a 
maximum of 393.7 msec at -160 msec SOA before falling to a mean of 
376.1 msec at zero SOA. For SOAs above zero response latencies follow 
an inverted 'U' function with condition-dependent maxima occurring at 
around 320 msec SOA. It is also noted that, across all SOAs, the name-
decision RTs obtained in the present experiment averaged 391.2 msec 
while the case-decision RTs of Experiment 1 averaged 379.6 msec. This 
11.6 msec difference in response times is, however, at best only 
indicative of any relative differences in case- and name-decision speeds 
since the experiments were run at different times and not designed with 
such direct comparisons in mind. 
Error rates 
The error rates for the three priming conditions are expressed in 
Figure 4.13 as a proportion of the total responses for each condition at 
each SOA-level. In Figure 4.14 the same data are presented in terms of 
the congruent and incongruent priming conditions in comparison to the 
neutral condition. The consistencies apparent in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 
were largely in agreement with a series of chi-square tests, the results of 
which are reported only when the significance or non-significance may 
not be obvious. 
As in the previous experiment the differences in error rates between 
priming conditions followed a pattern which had similarities to those for 
the response latencies. Reliable effects were only obtained when primes 
preceded the targets. The difference in error rates between the 
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than between the neutral and congruent priming conditions. With the 
exception of the +480 msec SOA (x2 = 2.06, p>.05) significant 
differences in error rate were found over the entire positive SOA range. 
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SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.13. ERRORS: The variation in error rate for name-decisions 
according to priming condition and stimulus onset asynchrony for 
Experiment 2. Each mean is based on 288 trials for one subject. (Results 
for ten additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec are shown in Figure A4.13 below.) 
from Figure 4.14 that error rates exhibit a small but general decline from 
an average of 0.107 at -480 msec to 0.093 at +480 msec. 
Additional-Subject Data 
As with Experiment 1 results were obtained for ten additional subjects 
over the restricted SOA range -160 to 240 msec. Overall name-decision 
response times averaged 492.4 msec, that is nearly 101 msec in excess of 
the main-subject data. The overall error rate was 0.062. This compares 
FIGURE A4.13. ERRORS: As for Figure 4.13; 
the variation of error rate for ten additional 
subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
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with a figure of 0.117 for the main subject. The increase in response 
latency accompanied by a lower error rate for the additional subjects in 
comparison to the main subject matches a similar trend for the 
additional-subject data obtained in Experiment 1. From Figures A4.11 to 
FIGURE 4.14. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for congruent and 
incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-
target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 2. (Results for ten 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.14 below.) 
A4.14 it appears that the priming effects obtained with the additional 
subjects were qualitatively similar to those obtained for the main subject. 
Again this is further supported by the more detailed results given in 
Appendix 3. It is also noted that all ten additional subjects considered the 
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FIGURE A4.14. ERROR RATES: As for 
Figure 4.14; the difference in error rates in 
relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 




As with case-priming the present results suggest that the presence of 
name-primes affects the speed and accuracy of name-categorisation 
tasks. If the validity of the neutral priming condition is argued on similar 
grounds to those for Experiment 1 then it may again be assumed that 
both speeding and slowing effects occurred. Since no significant name-
priming effects for targets that coincided with or preceded their 
respective primes were obtained they may be described as being 
`secondary' in nature (cf., Taylor, 1977). 
Although the pattern of response latencies for name-decisions has 
similarities to that for case-decisions a difference that is observable is 
that the reaction time for name-decisions averages approximately 
12 msec longer. Such an increase in response time applies for all priming 
conditions which are equivalent in terms of congruency across the two 
experiments. Although similar error rates occurred in the two 
experiments indicating a similar speed/accuracy response criterion the 
comparison of absolute response times must be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless the observation is supportive of the earlier assumption that 
the identification of a word-name involves more processing than that 
required for the identification of case-typifying features. The prediction 
that a slower decay of facilitatory and inhibitory effects with increasing 
positive SOAs may result if processing in terms of word-name involves 
the activation of relatively more nodes or pathways than case-processing 
is difficult to verify. If name-priming is sustained over a relatively long 
period of time its presence may be masked by the effect of the continued 
presence of the primes used at the longer SOAs. If habituation results 
from the continued presence of a prime then the results from the two 
experiments carried out so far suggest that measurements at SOAs in 
excess of 480 msec would be necessary to detect this. 
The trend across Figure 4.11 shows that the presence of any pre-exposed 
prime appears to have an inhibitory effect upon name-decision response 
176 
latency. The similar pattern of response times and error rates of the 
present experiment in comparison to Experiment 1 invites a similar 
account to that already detailed. That is, regarding the general effect of 
prime presence, a speed-accuracy tradeoff may account for the negative 
correlation between response time and error rates apparent from a 
comparison of Figures 4.11 and 4.13 (Pages 170 and 173). Similarly the 
overall increase in response latencies for pre-exposed primes may be 
accounted for in terms of psychological refractivity. As with 
Experiment 1 the recurrence of a local maximum in response latency in 
the region of -240 msec SOA (Figure 4.11, Page 170) is again not easily 
explained. 
If the reporting that the string 'ether' was no more associated with the 
word 'upper' than with the word 'lower' is taken to suggest a truly 
neutral condition for the present experiment then facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects may be assumed. The probability that selective 
facilitatory or inhibitory effects arise from the occurrence of low-level 
graphemic attributes such as those involved in case-recognition is 
reduced on account of the prime and target words being in a different 
typographic case. In this way case differences are spread evenly across 
priming conditions. This incongruency might result in a general increase 
in both error rate and response latency. However the factor of case-
incongruency alone accounting for longer name-decision latencies in 
comparison to case-decision latencies may be counter-argued on the 
grounds that name-decision latencies were some 5 msec in excess of 
case-decision latencies for post-exposed primes (Figures 4.7 and 4.11, 
Pages 150 and 170). This latter argument, of course, assumes that 
incongruent priming information has no effect over the greater part of the 
negative SOA range. 
It may be noted that even after the extensive practice at word 
identification implicated by the repeated trials the average name-decision 
latency was some 12 msec in excess of case-decision latency. In 
accordance with the earlier predictions this may be taken to suggest that 
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the analysis of name-input may involve different mechanisms, or, 
involve more extensive processing than with case-input. With these 
observations in mind and in view of word-name being the controlled 
priming attribute the selective priming effects may be assumed to be 
attributable to name content rather than other stimulus attributes. If this 
assumption holds then word-name may be used as a priming attribute in 
the course of further investigation. 
The relative facilitatory and inhibitory effects as shown in Figure 4.12 
are, as predicted, qualitatively similar to those obtained with case-
priming in Experiment 1. In this respect the possibility of facilitatory and 
inhibitory encoding effects remains, as does a response-competition 
account for inhibitory effects. A further important similarity is reflected 
in the time-course of results; relative facilitatory and inhibitory effects 
were only detected for positive SOA values. This, again, supports 
predictions based on models involving spreading-activation. Priming can 
still be viewed as a specific effect (Taylor, 1977) resulting from the 
completed, or at least partially completed, processing of a previously 
presented stimulus. 
In summary, then, the similarities in name-priming effects with those 
obtained for case-priming suggest, as predicted, that similar mechanisms 
may be responsible with both types of word-attribute. If the priming 
effects obtained in the present experiment are interpreted similarly to 
those in the previous experiment then the basic predictions relating to 
facilitation that may be made from models involving spreading-
activation or PDP are again supported. The possibility that inhibition 
may be due either to response-competition, or, the inhibitory encoding 
processes characteristic of some PDP models is also consistent with these 
data. The time-course of priming effects suggests that facilitation and 
inhibition results from the completed or partly completed processing of 
previously presented name information. 
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EXPERIMENT 3: Name-Priming of Case-Decision 
In this experiment the words 'upper', 'lower' and 'ether' are used as 
congruent, incongruent and neutral primes on case-decisions carried out 
on random letter strings which are displayed, as in Experiment 1, entirely 
in upper-case or in lower-case. An illustration of each priming condition 
is given in Table 4.5. Primes and prime conditions are identical with 
Experiment 2, but now the conditions are described in terms of the 
congruency of the prime's name-attribute with the target case as shown 
TABLE 4.5. The three priming conditions used in. Experiment 3. 



























in the table. One assumption that is implicit in any cross-attribute 
priming effect obtained is that the experimental subject is either already 
aware of the relationships between the physical case and the priming 
words or that through given information and practice trials the 
relationships will become quickly established. The use of the word 
`ether' as a neutral prime was considered unlikely to create a strong bias 
in responses for similar reasons as with the second experiment. 
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Relationship Between Prime and Target Information 
In the present cross-attribute priming paradigm the inclusion of case 
information with word-name information is, of course, unavoidable 
unless a spoken presentation is used. Since the time durations required 
for a spoken stimuli would be well in excess of the shorter SOAs 
necessary for the time-course range that is under scrutiny this method of 
presentation was not used. In answer to the problem concerning double 
priming effects it is possible to use priming stimuli of both typographic 
cases and create a number of priming conditions in order to provide a 
relatively comprehensive control. Alternatively, as with the present 
experiment, all the prime words may presented in the same case with, as 
deducible from Table 4.5, half the trials in each of the name-priming 
conditions being case-congruent and the other half being case-
incongruent. Although name-priming will be confounded with case-
priming, any case-priming effects will be assumed, for the moment, to 
balance-out. Although this latter option may conceal some important 
effects of double priming it does have the advantage that considerably 
fewer priming conditions are involved. The conditions as given in 
Table 4.5 are thus used in the first instance to establish whether name-
priming effects on case-decision are detectable and also used to obtain a 
time-course of any overall effects. 
PREDICTED PRIMING EFFECTS 
Encoding and Responding Effects 
If cross-attribute priming is to be predicted at the encoding stage then a 
link between the mechanisms responsible for verbal and nonverbal 
information is required. In this respect the dual- and single-encoding 
structures introduced in Chapter 3 are relevant. Cross-attribute priming 
effects are predictable with both models. With a single-encoding system 
such as that represented by the sensory-semantic model verbal input is 
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assume to activate semantic codes which in turn activate nonverbal codes 
(Figure 1.5, Page 51). Paivio's dual-coding model allows for verbal 
codes to be communicated to the image system via referential processing 
(Figure 1.6, Page 53). With both encoding models it is again assumed 
that the encoding of case and name information may be facilitated or 
inhibited according to those principles relating to the relevant 
microstructures and are independent of the original form of the priming 
information. 
As with the earlier experiments it is also assumed that responding 
processes are subject to interfering effects arising from incongruent 
cross-modality information in a similar manner as with incongruent 
within-modality information. In view of the earlier discussion of the 
classical Stroop findings this latter assumption may be claimed to be 
reasonable. 
In view of the above assumptions it is predicted, as with Experiments 1 
and 2, that case-decisions which are congruently name-primed may be 
facilitated due to encoding effects while those incongruently-primed may 
be subject to inhibition according to the different encoding and response 
processing models that have been adopted. The predictions of the 
resultant effects of encoding and responding mechanisms according to 
these models are summarised in Figure 4.15. These predictions have 
been formulated in an analogous way to Experiments 1 and 2, and, as 
might be expected, it can be seen that there are close parallels with the 
earlier within-modality predictions given in Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
(Pages 140, 141 and 143 respectively). 
Predicted Time-Course of Encoding and Response Effects 
Although the magnitude of the cross-attribute priming effects could be 
expected to be similar to the within-attribute effects, by way of contrast it 
could also be argued that the time-courses should be distinctly different. 
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FIGURE 4.15. A schematic representation of the relative resultant effects 
of encoding and responding processes upon name-decision latencies 
according to priming condition. ('n+' = name-congruent priming, 'n-' = 
name-incongruent priming, 'N' = neutral priming.) 
that priming effects arise from either completed or partially completed 
processing of previously presented prime information rather than arising 
from the ongoing processing of a prime. If this latter inference is also 
applicable to cross-attribute priming effects then the time-course of any 
effects will be determined by the nature of the structure which allows 
communication between nonverbal and verbal codes. 
If a dual-coding model similar to that proposed by Paivio & Begg (1981) 
is taken as a linking structure (Figure 1.6, Page 53) then referential 
processing is possible once the representational codes for verbal or 
nonverbal input become available. On this basis it may be argued that the 
referential links that exist between the verbal and nonverbal systems 
allow priming to be of a 'secondary' nature (Taylor, 1977). On this basis 
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if a prime precedes a target it is likely to have an effect upon response 
time. This dependence upon temporal precedence may be contrasted with 
the Taylor's 'primary' specific effect which requires temporal proximity; 
the order of presentation of prime and target not being relevant. However 
with cross-attribute priming where name information is used to prime a 
task based upon case information temporal precedence is dependent upon 
the time for a word to activate its respective logogen plus the time for the 
representational verbal code to connect with the image system. If the 
time for the processing of verbal information exceeds that for nonverbal 
information, as a comparison of the response time in Experiments 1 and 2 
suggests, then the effect of name-priming information should be delayed. 
The extent of the delay may be similar in magnitude to the difference in 
times required for verbal and nonverbal processing. If the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 are used for guidance in this matter then it is 
expected that name-priming effects upon case-decision would only be 
obtained for SOAs in excess of a few tens of milliseconds. 
In the case of a single-encoding model such as that suggested by Nelson 
et al. (1977) it can also be argued that a relatively large time duration 
would be necessary for interaction to occur between verbal and 
nonverbal stimulus components via the semantic route. If information is 
at a relatively late stage of analysis before going via the semantic route it 
may be argued that the time-course of any priming effects would depend 
upon the relative speeds of encoding of name and case information. If a 
comparison of the overall response times for Experiments 1 and 2 is 
again taken to suggest that name-encoding requires more time than case-
encoding then a prime carrying name information would have to precede 
a target in order to have any effect on a case-decision; the time-course 
representing this would, as with the dual-coding model, be characterised 
by effects obtainable only for SOAs greater than zero. If an attempt were 
to be made to quantify such a time-course then, again, the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 may suggest very crudely that name information 
would have to precede a target by at least a few tens of milliseconds for 
significant priming effects on a case-decision task to be obtainable. 
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Both the single- and dual-coding models, then, predict a delay due to 
encoding in name-priming of case-decision in comparison to the within-
attribute priming effects obtained in the first two experiments. Although 
the extent of the delay is difficult to quantify precisely it is possible that 
encoding effects may be obtained at SOAs in excess of 40 msec. This 
therefore contrasts with the within-attribute experiments where 
significant effects were obtained at 40 msec SOA. 
If the response-competition hypothesis is used as before to predict the 
time-course of responding effects then the longer time for the processing 
of verbal input in comparison to nonverbal input will have similar 
repercussions for responding as well as encoding effects. That is if 
inhibitory responding effects are obtained then these may, again, only be 
significant at SOAs in excess of 40 msec. 
Summary 
In summary, then, it has been argued that while similar mechanisms are 
responsible for the magnitude of priming effects occurring across 
stimulus attributes as well as within attributes there may be a difference 
in the time-course of any effects. In particular it is suggested that with 
both single- and dual-coding models it is possible that significant 
encoding and responding effects may only be obtainable at SOAs greater 
than 40 msec duration. Experiment 3, then, aims to test these predictions. 
METHOD 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and viewing conditions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Stimuli were also of the same form and dimensions as 
Experiment 1. Primes consisted of the words 'upper', 'lower' and 'ether'; 
the latter being used in the neutral priming condition. Targets consisted 
of random letter strings, a different string for each trial. Examples of the 
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three experimental conditions used have been shown in Table 4.5 
(Page 178). The conditions, as with the other experiments, were 
sequenced quasi-randomly so that there was no excessive clustering of 
any one experimental condition. Experimental trials were in blocks of 72 
and similarly created practice trials were in blocks of 24. 
Procedure 
A procedure largely identical to that of the previous two experiments was 
adopted. However familiarity with the use of the words 'upper' and 
`lower' to denote specific typographic case forms was initially checked 
by asking the subject to categorise verbally a list of letter strings similar 
to those to be used as targets in the experimental trials. The list 
comprised ten upper-case and ten lower-case strings arranged randomly 
in terms of case but presented sequentially on the display monitor. The 
experiment was continued if at least eighteen of the twenty letter-strings 
were categorised correctly. 
The sequence comprising a single trial depended upon whether the 
primes were presented simultaneously or before and after the targets as 
shown in Figures 4.6a to 4.6c (Page 148). Again the purpose of the 
experiment was disclosed insofar that it was said that the effect of the 
presence of words upon the response times to letter-strings was being 
investigated. Information was given that a target string of letters would 
appear centrally between two markers and that a word or string of 
characters to which no response was required would appear just below 
the target. Subjects were instructed to respond according to typographic 
case of the target. The occurrence of an upper-case letter string was 
registered by pressing a right-hand response key while a left-hand 
response key was used for lower-case. Reaction times were measured 
from the onset of the target and only those falling within a 200 to 
1000 msec range were accepted for analysis. 
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The session began with a block of 24 practice trials, the SOA set at the 
value to be used in the first experimental block, the practice trials run 
until a suitable balance between speed and accuracy was reached, again 
the criterion being at least 80% accuracy for mean response times of 
700 msec or less. As with Experiments 1 and 2, SOAs of -480, -320, 
-240, -160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 480 msec were used. 
The SOA was held constant within each block of trials but altered 
randomly between blocks, each SOA value being used twice. A block of 
experimental trials took between five and ten minutes to complete and 
was separated by a rest period of approximately three minutes. An 
experimental session lasted approximately two hours. At the end of the 
session the subject was asked (in the form of a leading question) whether 
the word 'ether' which was occasionally visible was more suggestive of 
upper-case or lower-case letters and the response was noted. 
Experimental sessions were repeated so that a total of twelve sets of 
results were obtained. 
RESULTS 
Out of a total of 11,232 case-decision responses 9 fell beyond the allotted 
200 to 1000 msec interval. Five out of the 9 outliers were shorter than 
200 msec and were due to false starts while insufficient pressure on a 
response key or minor lapses in attention accounted for the remainder. 
The 9 outliers were not considered in any further analyses including the 
compilation of error scores. 
Response Latencies 
Significant name-priming effects were obtained; a 13 (SOA) by 3 
(Congruency) ANOVA yielded an F(2,10007) = 24.40, p<.001. The 
main effect for SOA was also significant, F(12,10007) = 48.54, p<.001, 
as was the interaction between SOA and congruency, F(24,10007) = 
4.37, p<.001. 
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The above data were examined in terms of prime-target order. An SOA-
by-Congruency ANOVA for pre-exposed primes over the SOA range 
+80 to +480 msec indicated significant name-priming effects, F(2,3851) 
= 60.76, p<.001 while no significant effects were obtained for post-
exposed primes over the SOA range -480 to -40 msec, F(2,4625) = 0.56, 
p>.001. Interaction between SOA and Congruency was non-significant 
for the pre-exposed primes F(8,3851) = 1.26, p>.001, and non-significant 
F(10,4625) = 0.50, p>.001 in the case of post-exposure. The main effect 
for SOA for - pre-exposed primes was found to be non-significant, 
F(4,3851) = 3.68, p>.001 while that for the post-exposed primes was 
significant, F(5,4625) = 32.17, p<.001. 
The mean correct case-decision response times for each SOA level for 
each priming condition are represented in Figure 4.16. Difference values, 
as with the first experiments, were obtained by subtracting the means for 
the name-congruent and name-incongruent priming conditions from the 
means for the neutral condition. These differences in response time are 
shown in Figure 4.17 with the terms 'inhibition' and 'facilitation' 
referring to positive and negative differences respectively. As before, the 
SOA of the prime and target was measured in relation to the onset of the 
target so that positive SOA values indicate prime pre-exposures while 
negative SOAs show prime post-exposures. 
A reliable pattern of name-priming effects is evident from Figures 4.16 
and 4.17. As in the previous experiments a series of one-way ANOVAs 
was carried out across congruency conditions for each SOA and followed 
by the use of the Newman-Keuls method when a significant (p<.05) 
congruency effect was obtained for a given SOA. These tests confirmed 
the significance or non-significance of those effects (p<.05) readily 
discernible from the graphs. The results of the tests are reported when the 
degree of significance may not be obvious. 
It is noticeable from Figures 4.16 and 4.17 that non-significant 
















target first target second 
360 
350 














460 400 -320 -240 -160 -80 	 0 	 80 
SOA (msec) 
160 240 320 
187 
+40 msec SOA in addition to the SOA range -480 to 0 msec. This 
contrasts with Experiments 1 and 2 where significant condition-
dependent effects were obtained at +40 msec SOA. For SOAs of 
+80 msec and above congruent CDRTs averaged 9.7 msec less than 
FIGURE 4.16. RESPONSE TIMES: Mean response times for correct 
case-decisions as a function of priming condition and prime-target 
stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 3. Each mean is based on 288 
trials for one subject. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.16 below.) 
those for the neutral condition while incongruent name-priming resulted 
in CDRTs averaging 12.3 msec longer than the neutral condition. All 
incongruent priming effects for SOAs of +80 msec and above were 
found to be significant. Congruent priming effects, however, were only 
significant at 160 msec SOA, Q,761=4.74, p<.05, and at 480 msec, SOA, 
Q,766=4.31, p<.05. Apart from an initial peak of 21.8 msec at 80 msec 
SOA the difference in response times for incongruently-primed targets in 
relation to the neutral condition remained fairly constant over the +80 to 
•
• 
FIGURE A4.16. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.16; mean correct case-decision 
response times for ten additional subjects over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. Each mean 
is based on 288 trials. (See Appendix 3 for 
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+480 msec SOA range. The time-course for congruent priming effects 
was subject to some variation. From Figure 4.17 it may be noted that the 
difference in latencies between the neutral and congruent priming 
conditions reaches a maximum of 16.3 msec at 160 msec SOA and a 
-40 	  
-480 -400 -320 -240 -160 -80 	 0 	 80 160 240 320 400 480 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.17. The difference in mean case-decision response times for 
congruent and incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a 
function of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 3. 
(Results for ten additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec are shown in Figure A4.17 below.) 
minimum of 5.5 msec at +240 msec SOA before gradually increasing 
again over the +320 and +480 msec SOA-levels. 
As with the previous experiments the variation of response time with 
SOA (rather than the variation of priming relative to the neutral 
condition) may be considered, assuming as before that any systematic 
variation in terms of carry-over effects is minimal. On this basis, 
Figure 4.16 indicates that a minimum disruptive effect on response 
FIGURE A4.17. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.17; the difference in mean response 
times in relation to neutral priming for ten 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 




latency was obtained at an SOA of -480 msec. As before it was observed 
that very few primes were visible at this SOA value since trial-
terminating responses were made before the occurrence of a prime; the 
mean response time across priming conditions being only 353.7 msec, 
SD=43.2. Response latencies increased from 353.7 to 377.3 msec over 
the SOA range -480 to -80 msec and then decreased to 369.4 msec at 
zero SOA. For all three priming conditions response latencies remained 
at about 369 msec between zero and +40 msec SOA. The remainder of 
the positive SOA range for the incongruent condition was characterised 
by a sharp increase in response latency of about 35 msec before levelling 
out. The latencies for the neutral priming condition followed a similar, 
although less extreme, pattern while latencies for congruently-primed 
targets increased by about 9 msec to about 379 msec across the 
remaining SOA range. 
The case-decision reaction times obtained in the present experiment 
averaged 376.6 msec; this nearly matched the average of 379.6 msec 
obtained for Experiment 1. It will be similarly recalled that the name-
decision reaction times for Experiment 2 averaged 391.2 msec. Again 
comparison of response times across experiments are made with caution 
since the experiments were run at different times and not designed so that 
such comparisons could be reliably made. 
Error Rates 
Figure 4.18 shows the error rates for the three priming conditions as a 
proportion of the total responses for each condition at each SOA-level 
and Figure 4.19 shows the error rates for the congruent and incongruent 
priming conditions in comparison to the neutral condition. The statistical 
significance of the effects suggested by the consistencies apparent in 
Figures 4.18 and 4.19 was largely in agreement with the results of a 
series of chi-square tests, the results of which are reported when the 
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As before the pattern of differences in error rates between the priming 
conditions has similarities to the pattern of response latencies. Reliable 
name-priming effects were only obtained when primes preceded the 
targets. Again, as in the previous experiments, the difference in error 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.18. ERRORS: The variation in error rate for case-decisions 
according to priming condition and stimulus onset asynchrony for 
Experiment 3. Each mean is based on 288 trials for one subject. (Results 
for ten additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec are shown in Figure A4.18 below.) 
rates between the incongruent and neutral conditions appear substantially 
more marked than between the neutral and congruent priming conditions. 
Significant differences in error rate were found for SOAs of 80 msec 
(x2 = 36.41), 160 msec (x2 = 36.80), and 320 msec (x2 = 10.55). With 
the exception of the maxima obtained with incongruent primes it appears 
from Figure 4.18 that error rates exhibit a slight general decline from an 
average of 0.12 at -480 msec to 0.11 at +480 msec. 
FIGURE A4.18. ERRORS: As for Figure 4.18; 
the variation of error rate for ten additional 
subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 




As with the first two experiments results were obtained for ten additional 
subjects over the restricted SOA range -160 to 240 msec. An increase in 
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FIGURE 4.19. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for congruent and 
incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-
target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 3. (Results for ten 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.19 below.) 
subject data in comparison to that for the main subject was obtained as 
with the earlier experiments; overall case-decision response times 
averaged 483.2 msec, just less than 107 msec in excess of the main-
subject data. The overall error rate was 0.098. This compares with a 
figure of 0.117 for the main subject. From Figures A4.16 to A4.19 it 
appears that the priming effects obtained with the additional subjects 
were generally similar to those obtained for the main subject. However 
some differences are apparent: there is no discernable facilitation with 
A 	 FIGURE A4.19. ERROR RATES: As for 
; 	 Figure 4.19; the difference in error rates in 
relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 
target ant 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
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congruent primes for SOAs of 80 msec. This compares with the trend 
apparent in Figure 4.17 (Page 188) for the main subject. Since this latter 
trend was non-significant, though, this difference in main- and 
additional-subject data is not considered to be one of substance. However 
a contrast between main- and additional-subject data was obtained with 
error rates at 40 msec SOA. While Figure 4.19 shows that no differential 
priming effects were obtained with the main subject the reverse was 
found for the additional subjects (x2 = 36.88, p<.05). 
All ten additional subjects considered the word 'ether' to be no more 
suggestive of upper-case letters than to lower-case letters. Detailed 
results for additional subjects are given in Appendix 3. 
DISCUSSION 
In general the case-decision response times obtained were similar in 
magnitude to those for Experiment 1 for priming conditions of equivalent 
congruency. Albeit with caution this may suggest a degree of consistency 
with regard to absolute response times between experiments, and if 
compared with the response times for Experiment 2 further suggests that 
case-decision requires less time than name-decision. 
The finding that significant name-priming effects were obtained 
throughout the greater part of the positive SOA range is of interest 
insofar as cross-attribute effects based upon typographic case are 
obtainable. Apart from the details relating to the time-course and the 
magnitude of any facilitatory or inhibitory effects this paradigm provides 
yet another example of a contextual effect that is characteristic of Stroop 
research. If, as before, it is assumed that the word 'ether' provides an 
effectively neutral priming condition then it follows that both significant 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects have been obtained for positive SOAs 
of 80 msec and above. 
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A comparison of the magnitude of the present facilitatory and inhibitory 
effects with those obtained in Experiment 1 is of interest in regard to 
both encoding and responding processes. Although there are dangers in 
comparing magnitudes across experiments some accounting for the 
findings can nevertheless be ventured. 
That the magnitude of facilitatory priming effects in the present 
experiment (9.7 msec) is on average very slightly less than the magnitude 
of those for Experiment 1 (11.1 msec) suggests that the strength of cross-
attribute facilitatory priming may also be slightly less than the strength of 
within-attribute facilitatory priming. (A similar comparison may also be 
made with additional-subject data.) An obvious problem when 
considering the priming effects of the present experiment, though, is the 
possibility that cross-attribute effects may have interacted unpredictably 
with the unavoidable within-attribute effects. If the within-attribute 
effects balance out across priming conditions then the smaller cross-
attribute effect may be readily accounted for within the sensory-semantic 
model by the notion of the 'focal code' put forward by Nelson et 
al. (1977). Here it is assumed that encoding can be selectively directed; 
with the present experiment this would mean that as name information is 
a task-unrelated stimulus attribute its influence on case-decision latency 
would be attenuated. Interpreting Paivio's dual-coding model is more 
difficult with regard to selectivity. It may be claimed that the effect of 
information communicated via referential links may be less influential 
than information encoded locally. Additionally Paivio's (1978) view that 
the representation of semantic information is derived from imagery can 
be taken to suggest that the system is image-biased and thus more 
responsive to case rather than to name-priming. A problem with this 
latter suggestion is that is does not accord with the relatively large 
priming effects obtained in Experiment 2 with both the main and 
additional subjects when name information primed name-decision. 
So far it has been argued that the smaller facilitatory effects in 
comparison to inhibitory effects on response time for this experiment is 
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suggestive of selective facilitatory priming effects. The corollary of this 
is that cross-attribute inhibitory priming is non-selective. If the selective 
effect is an encoding rather than a responding phenomenon then this 
comparison suggests that inhibitory effects do not occur at the encoding 
stage. This supposition may also be considered in relation to the finding 
that the facilitatory effects (9.7 msec) are on average less than those for 
the inhibitory effects (12.3 msec) in the present experiment, a similar 
comparison holding for additional-subject data. However it should be 
pointed out that the inhibitory effects obtained in Experiment 1 
(10.35 msec) were less than those for the present experiment. Although, 
as before, comparisons of the relative priming effects across experiments 
is problematic the results leave open the possibility that selective 
inhibition may occur with cross-attribute priming and that the same 
mechanisms may underlie both inhibitory and facilitatory effects. That is, 
as suggested by the PDP models, encoding could be both facilitatory and 
inhibitory. 
With regard to the time-course of results in the present experiment both 
inhibitory and facilitatory effects on response time appear to be absent at 
an SOA of +40 msec before increasing markedly within the next 40 msec 
to a level similar to that held for a greater part of the remaining positive 
SOA range. This time-course is of interest in that it does not appear to be 
consistent with Glaser and Diinglehoff's (1984) picture categorisation 
data where the effect of both word-primes and temporal precedence was 
considered weak. If the case-decision task is regarded as one which 
involves the categorisation of a relatively limiting example of a pictorial 
attribute then it can be argued that an equivalence exists between this 
experiment and that carried out by Glaser and Diinglehoff. The present 
data, then, not only suggest that significant word-priming effects are 
obtainable on case-decision but also that these effects are subject to the 
relative speed of processing of the priming and task attributes. This 
finding adds support to the proposal in Chapter 3 that Glaser and 
Diinglehoff only obtained a weak effect because the SOA range used was 




	 they 	 obtained. 	 Glaser 	 and 
Diinglehoff's (1984) rejection of the relative-speed hypothesis was 
consistent with what were considered to be the weak priming effects that 
they obtained. The findings from the present experiment thus contrast 
with Glaser and Diinglehoff's in that they are in keeping with the relative 
speed hypothesis. 
The time-course of cross-attribute priming effects is also of interest in 
relation to the. single- and dual-coding structures for the processing of 
word and picture information. In comparison to the within-attribute 
priming effects obtained with the first two experiments there is a delay in 
the time-course of cross-attribute effects upon respose latency. This is in 
line with the earlier predictions for this experiment and although this 
finding alone does not favour either one of the encoding models it can at 
least be taken to support a feature that both models have in common; 
namely that at some stage verbal and nonverbal attributes of a stimulus 
appear to be processed separately. Additionally the relative-speed 
explanation is supported by the suggestion arising from the first two 
experiments that name-encoding requires slightly more time than case-
encoding. If this is so then this can account for the delay in both 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects. It has already been noted that the time-
course of the effects upon error rate differ for the main and additional 
subjects. While the time-course of main-subject error data matched that 
for response latencies the same was not true for additional-subject data. 
Here it was found that effects upon error rate preceded effects upon 
response latency (see Figures A4.17, Page 188 and A4.19, Page 191). 
One explanation for the latter findings is that the errors could have 
resulted from the name-content of the prime being responded to as if it 
was the case-content of the target. Since on some occasions the 
additional subjects might have lapsed into a name-decision routine 
mediation between name- and case- information would not be necessary. 
This contrasts with the mediation that is required when case- and name-
information are linked so that cross-attribute effects are enabled thus 
accounting for the time-course differences for correct responses. 
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Although it could be claimed that a name-decisions prevailed when the 
intended task was one of case-decision this is unlikely in view of other 
aspects of the additional-subject data. For example, if responses were 
being made consistently to name-information of the primes then these 
would be relatively fast for both the prime-words 'upper' and 'lower' 
and would occur relatively early in the time-course as the name-
information would not have to be converted into its case-equivalent. On 
this basis the relatively slow response times occurring relatively late in 
the time-course as evidenced from the incongruent priming condition 
shown in Figure A4.16 (Page 187) would not be expected. 
By way of a final comment in relation of the results obtained in the 
experiments carried out so far it appears that the facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects obtained suggest that similar mechanisms are involved 
for both cross- and within-attribute priming. This is of interest in relation 
to the experimental traditions discussed in Chapter 3 where within-
attribute priming was characterised by facilitation, and the emphasis on 
inhibitory effects characterised by Stroop research. In particular this is 
relevant to the suggestion that spurious effects may have arisen from the 
particular reading and naming task requirements used in many Stroop 
experiments. 
The relative magnitude of the priming effects obtained is of interest in 
relation to the two types of encoding microstructure that have been 
discussed. The present results, however, are difficult to interpret, both in 
view of the difficulty in comparing the magnitude of priming effects 
across experiments and also because case-priming that was unavoidably 
included along with the name-priming. Before the implications relative 
priming effects can be further considered it is necessary to carry out a 
more comprehensive investigation where the priming effects of name 
and case information on a case-decision task can be more clearly 
delineated. This is attempted in Experiment 4. 
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EXPERIMENT 4: Case- and Name-Priming of Case-Decision 
An aim of the current experiment is to investigate the combined effects 
of typographic case and word-name information on a case-decision task. 
For this purpose target random letter strings are to be primed with stimuli 
containing both name and case information occurring in varying 
combinations of congruency as exemplified in Table 4.6. 
TABLE 4.6. The seven priming conditions used in Experiment 4. The 
abbreviated notation for each condition that is used in the text is given in 
brackets. 
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PREDICTED PRIMING EFFECTS 
From Experiments 1 and 3 it appears that both case- and name-priming 
information affect case-decision response latencies. As an analysis in 
terms of separate encoding and responding processes has been consistent 
with the results obtained so far this approach will be further pursued. In 
accordance with the predictions and the results obtained in Experiment 1 
significant case-priming effects upon a case-decision task are expected 
only for positive SOAs. Since the predictions of the name-priming 
effects for Experiment 3 that were based on relative speed still hold for 
the name-priming component in the present experiment significant name-
priming effects are again only expected for SOAs in the region of 
80 msec and above. Within this framework of expected gross time-
course effects the likely outcome of combined case- and name-priming is 
considered; firstly in relation to encoding processes, secondly in relation 
to responding processes and, finally, in terms of the resultant effects of 
encoding and responding. The predictions which follow are, of course, 
for SOAs in excess of 80 msec. 
Encoding Processes: Case- and Name-Priming Effects Combined 
From the experiments carried out so far the possibility remains that 
encoding mechanisms may produce either facilitatory effects only, or, 
both facilitatory and inhibitory effects. This applies to both case- and 
name-priming information. A central question concerns whether and if so 
to what extent such case- and name-priming effects are additive. 
Although a simple arithmetic addition rule linking priming input to the 
time required for a certain degree of target-encoding is not expected to 
apply it may be nevertheless be plausible that target-encoding may be 
faster if preceded with a prime carrying both congruent case and name 
information than with a prime which only carries name information. This 
may be argued from the 'microstructure' of the spreading-activation and 
PDP accounts of the mechanisms underlying encoding. The nodes 
postulated within these models are assumed to be capable of being 
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activated to varying levels according to context; more activatory 
connections arising from a greater range of congruent contextual 
information raise the level of activation of those individual nodes 
concerned. In the PDP models already discussed a similar argument also 
applies to the level of inhibition of particular nodes, that is, the degree of 
inhibition is related to the degree of incongruency of contextual 
information. Although an additive rule may be applicable it may, 
however, not be of a simple linear nature. This may be appreciated, for 
example, in view of an inevitable limit to the number of inter-nodal 
connections and the level of activation or inhibition that may be obtained 
within any one system; eventually a saturation point will be reached 
where further input effects no change in the level of activation or 
inhibition. 
For the purpose of rough prediction it will be assumed that the saturation 
level of nodes responsible for case representation may be sufficiently 
high so that the encoding system is responsive to differing degrees of 
information carried by singly- or doubly-congruent or by incongruent 
primes. Within this context a simple form of predictive model is one 
where name- and case-priming effects on encoding are additive 
according to linear rules. This rule has been adopted for the encoding 
predictions given in Figures 4.20 and 4.21 (Pages 201 & 202). However 
it is plausible that while congruent case input may not result in saturation 
it may account for a relatively large proportion of potentially available 
activation. In this situation it is likely that the effect of further congruent 
input arising from a different modality on encoding time for a 
subsequently presented target may be less pronounced. 
Encoding Processes: Inter-Attribute Dominance Effects 
Although it has been suggested that the combined priming effects 
resulting from case and name information may be additive the relative 
contributions of these attributes to any overall effect has not been 
considered. Whereas Can, McCauley, Sperber and Parmelee (1982) 
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argue that in a system characterised by a strong form of single-encoding, 
within-modality and cross-modality combinations of prime and target 
should produce equal facilitations, the sensory-semantic model of picture 
and word-encoding proposed by Nelson et al. (1977) allows for selective 
effects that may depend upon task requirements. These versions of the 
single-encoding model will be referred to as 'non-selective' and 
`selective' respectively. The issue regarding the selectivity of encoding 
models has been difficult to resolve; in Chapter 4 it was pointed out that 
a number of factors including the use of naming tasks may largely 
account for the inconsistent results that have been obtained with regard 
to the cross-attribute facilitation effects that were discussed. 
The issue of selectivity is relevant to the current experiment; in a 
selective model the effect of case-priming on a case-decision task may 
dominate over the effect of name-priming while with a non-selective 
model dominance effects would not be expected. The notion of the focal 
code that was discussed in the context of the last experiment suggests 
that selective properties may be attributed to the sensory semantic model. 
Selectivity may be assumed to apply regardless of the microstructure 
within the model; that is, to any spreading-activation models which are 
facilitatory-only in nature as well as the PDP models which are capable 
of producing both facilitatory and inhibitory priming effects. For 
example with case-decision a `c-' prime would be expected to produce a 
greater inhibitory effect than a 'n-' prime in the same way that in the 
same task facilitation arising from `c+' would exceed that from 'n+' 
priming. If the spreading-activation and PDP models are used as a basis 
for accounting for encoding at a microstructural level, together with the 
two main variations of selectivity pertaining to a central semantic model, 
then four major encoding options arise: 
1) selective & facilitation-only 
2) selective & facilitation and inhibition 
3) non-selective & facilitation and inhibition 
4) non-selective & facilitation-only 
Facilitatory Encoding Model 
Non-Selective Encoding Task-Selective Encoding 
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The predicted encoding effects arising from pre-exposed primes at SOAs 
well in excess of zero based on these models are summarised in 
Figures 4.20 and 4.21 and are expressed in the form of response latencies 
relative to a neutral priming condition. Although there is no reference to 
the exact relative magnitudes of these effects some rough quantitative 
rules have nevertheless been adopted for the purposes of illustration. 
Firstly, in spite of the possibility of the saturation effect outlined above, 
the effects of combined priming are shown according to simple linear 
FIGURE 4.20: A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding processes upon case-decision latencies according to priming 
condition. The predictions are based on a model in which encoding 
processes are facilitatory. Additionally the selective and non-selective 
effects dependent upon the decision task are considered (see text). 
(`c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, '+' = congruent priming, 
= incongruent priming, 	 'N' = neutral priming, arrows indicate 
responding effects) 
Facilitatory and Inhibitory Encoding Model 




additive rules. Secondly, with the non-selective facilitatory-only 
encoding model (Figure 4.20) it is assumed that the change in case-
decision response latency is the same both for congruent case and 
congruent name-priming. Furthermore, with a facilitatory and inhibitory 
encoding model the magnitude of the facilitatory effect for a congruent 
prime is assumed to be the same as the inhibitory effect for an 
incongruent prime. This latter assumption is derived from the similar but 
complementary facilitatory and inhibitory processes postulated in the 
FIGURE 4.21. A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding processes upon case-decision latencies according to priming 
condition. The predictions are based on a model in which encoding 
processes are both facilitatory and inhibitory. Additionally the selective 
and non-selective effects dependent upon the decision task are 
considered (see text). ('c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, 
`+' = congruent priming, '-' = incongruent priming, 'N' = neutral priming, 
arrows indicate responding effects) 
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PDP models discussed. On this basis in the facilitatory and inhibitory 
model the effects of case and name-priming information of alternate 
congruency with the target should cancel. This rule is implicit in the 
construction of Figure 4.21. 
In the case of task-selective-encoding models it is more difficult to 
suggest a rough rule relating to the relative magnitudes of within-
attribute and cross-attribute priming effects. Although a comparison of 
the relative response latencies in Experiments 1 and 3 (Figures 4.8 & 
4.17, Pages 151 & 188) suggests that facilitatory case-priming effects on 
case-decision may be greater than name-priming effects on case-
decision, this difference can only provide a rough indicator since the 
name-priming effects obtained in Experiment 3 may be confounded by 
case-priming effects. For convenience, and also so that the predicted 
effects of the selective and non-selective models are more readily 
distinguishable, in the figures below the change in case-decision 
response latency for name-priming has been made equal to half that for 
case-priming for a given congruency. This 'working figure' is applied to 
both facilitatory and inhibitory effects. 
Responding Processes 
Within responding mechanisms the basic question concerning the 
possible occurrence of facilitation and inhibition recurs. To deal with 
this, the argument from Taylor's (1977) data in Chapter 3 will be 
adopted in the way that it has been for Experiments 1 to 3. Briefly, the 
argument was that facilitatory priming effects result from stimulus 
processing rather than response processing. That is, factors at the 
response stage will be assumed to be responsible for inhibitory rather 
than facilitatory effects for both within- and cross-attribute priming. 
The results of Experiments 1 and 3 do not rule out the possibility that 
both case- and name-priming can give rise to inhibitory effects at the 
responding stage with a case-decision task. If inhibitory responding 
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effects are assumed then, as with encoding, two further questions arise. 
The first concerns whether the degree of inhibition arising from 
incongruent name-priming is the same as that from incongruent case-
priming. The second question that arises concerns whether such 
inhibitory effects arising from different forms of incongruent information 
are additive. In an attempt to answer these questions it is necessary to go 
into further detail regarding responding mechanisms. 
A mechanism that has been incorporated into response conflict accounts 
given by Morton (1969), Treisman (1969) and Neumann (1980) among 
others is a serial response buffer. In this context, response-competition 
can be interpreted in terms of access of competing motor programs to the 
response buffer which then becomes occupied. If a motor program which 
accesses the buffer is consistent with that for the response to a given 
target then the response is executed without delay. If, however, the 
program is inconsistent with that for a target then it has to be suppressed. 
With case-decision, for example, increased response latencies would 
result if the motor program for a right-hand key press had to be 
suppressed so that a left-hand response to the relevant target attribute 
could be effected. 
If a responding mechanism characterised by a single-channel buffer is 
considered with reference to the question concerning inter-attribute 
dominance effects then it may be argued that the degree of inhibition 
resulting from the suppression of an unwanted motor program may be 
the same regardless of its source. This would be because inhibition 
depends upon the nature of the unwanted motor program rather than how 
it was invoked. In this situation the inhibitory effect of 'n-' and `c-' 
priming components would be equal. A similar argument applies to the 
question concerning additivity of inhibitory priming effects. Since the 
same motor program would be activated with a c-' and a `c-n-' prime 
the degree of suppression in favour of a correct response to a 
subsequently presented target would be the same in both instances so that 
additivity would not be expected. With the mixed congruency conditions 
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`c+n-' and `c-n+' incongruent priming information would similarly elicit 
a respective motor program inconsistent with that required for an overt 
response. In this situation it would be expected that inhibitory responding 
effects would be obtained for both mixed priming conditions. 
Resultant Effects 
So far the nature of some processes that may occur within encoding and 
responding mechanisms have been considered. The resultant latencies 
are predicted, as before, in accordance with Taylor's (1977) assumption 
that encoding and responding processes act independently and serially. 
This simplifying assumption, which implies that the priming effects on 
encoding and responding may be additive, is again used only for the 
purposes of qualitative guidance rather than for strict quantitative 
prediction. To this end, the encoding predictions shown in Figures 4.20 
and 4.21 (Pages 201 & 202) have been modified in accordance with the 
effects expected from a responding mechanism containing a single-
channel response buffer. These resultant priming predictions are 
expressed in the form of the relative response latencies represented in 
Figures 4.22 to 4.25. The scaling units chosen, although arbitrary, are 
equivalent to those used in the predictions for Experiments 1 to 3. So that 
it is easier to see how modifications of the predicted encoding effects 
lead to the predicted resultant effects of encoding and responding 
processes, the left-hand panels of Figures 4.20 and 4.21 are repeated in 
the 'after encoding' panels of Figures 4.23 and 4.24. As before the 
representations are essentially schematic rather than quantitative. 
Figure 4.22 shows the predictions for the resultant effects of encoding 
plus responding for the facilitatory-only and task-non-selective encoding 
model. Here it is assumed that any inhibitory effects that occur are due 
entirely to responding processes. Although the resultant effects are 
inevitably crudely represented there are nevertheless some notable 
features. In particular no difference in response latency is expected 
between the `c-' and `c-n-' priming conditions. This follows from the 
Facilitatory Encoding: Non-Selective Model 





assumption that inhibitory responding effects are non-additive. It is also 
predicted that no difference in resultant effect should exist between the 
`c+n-' and `c-n+' conditions and, furthermore, the resultant response 
latency of these conditions should be coincident with the 'N' condition. 
Firstly this is in accordance with the assumption that encoding 
facilitation for congruent case and name information is equal in 
magnitude, and, that equal inhibitory effects result from incongruent 
name and case information at the responding stage. If the inhibitory 
FIGURE 4.22. A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding and responding processes upon case-decision latencies 
according to priming condition. The predictions are based on a model in 
which encoding processes are facilitatory-only and task-non-selective (see 
text). ('c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, `+' = congruent priming, '-' = 
incongruent priming, 'N' = neutral priming, arrows indicate responding 
effects) 
Facilitatory Encoding: Task-Selective Model 
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effect arising from responding mechanisms is equal in magnitude to the 
facilitatory effect from encoding then coincidence with the 'N' condition 
follows. 
The coincidence of `c-' and `c-n-' after encoding plus responding in 
Figure 4.23 for the facilitatory-only and task-selective encoding model is 
predictable for the same reasons as its task-non-selective counterpart 
(Figure 4.22). However the effect of task-selectivity results in a net 
FIGURE 4.23. A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding and responding processes upon case-decision latencies 
according to priming condition. The predictions are based on a model in 
which encoding processes are facilitatory-only and task-selective (see 
text). ('c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, '+' = congruent priming, 
'-' = incongruent priming, 'N' neutral priming, arrows indicate responding 
effects) 
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increase in response time for `c-n+' in comparison to `c+n-'. Again the 
coincidence of `c+n-' with the 'N' condition follows from the 
assumption that the inhibitory effect arising from responding 
mechanisms is equal in magnitude to the facilitatory effect from 
encoding task-dependent information. 
In Figures 4.24 and 4.25 predictions are based upon inhibitory effects 
that are due to encoding in addition to responding processes. Since 
inhibitory as well as facilitatory encoding effects are assumed to be 
FIGURE 4.24. A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding and responding processes upon case-decision latencies 
according to priming condition. The predictions are based on a model in 
which encoding processes are facilitatory and inhibitory and task-non-
selective (see text). ('c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, 
'+' = congruent priming, = incongruent priming, 'N' = neutral priming, 
arrows indicate responding effects) 
Facilitatory and Inhibitory Encoding: 
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additive a difference in latency between the `c-' and `c-n-' conditions is 
expected. This contrasts with the predictions for the facilitation-only 
encoding models. The only priming conditions expected be coincident in 
latency for facilitatory and inhibitory encoding models are `c+n-' and 
`c-n+' where task-non-selectivity is assumed. This, as with the 
facilitation-only model in Figure 4.22 (Page 206), is on account of the 
assumptions regarding encoding facilitation and inhibition being equal in 
magnitude and non-selective inhibitory responding effects. 
FIGURE 4.25. A schematic representation of the predicted effects of 
encoding and responding processes upon case decision latencies 
according to priming condition. The predictions are based on a model in 
which encoding processes are facilitatory and inhibitory and task-selective 
(see text). (`c' = case-priming, 'n' = name-priming, '+' = congruent priming, 
= incongruent priming, 'N' = neutral priming, arrows indicate responding 
effects) 
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A comparison of the predictions in Figures 4.22 and 4.23 (Pages 206 and 
207) draws attention to some response latency differences of a more 
general nature. For facilitatory-only encoding models the resultant 
facilitatory effects in comparison to the neutral condition are greater in 
magnitude than inhibitory effects. For facilitatory and inhibitory 
encoding models the resultant inhibitory effects are expected to exceed 
facilitatory effects in magnitude. Although the predictions of the 
resulting response latencies due to encoding and response processes are 
difficult to determine precisely the above characteristic patterns in 
relative magnitudes have nevertheless emerged. These predictions 
together with the predictions for the time-course of encoding and 
responding effects outlined earlier are now tested. 
METHOD 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and the viewing conditions were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1. The stimuli were also of the same form and dimensions as 
the first experiment. A row of five dashes and the words 'upper', 'lower' 
and 'ether' formed the set of items from which primes were drawn. 
Targets consisted of strings of five letters randomly chosen and 
sequenced. The words and letter strings forming primes and targets were 
printed entirely in lower-case or entirely in upper-case letters. The 
stimuli were arranged according to the seven priming conditions which 
have already been illustrated on Table 4.6 (Page 197). The conditions 
were sequenced quasi-randomly so that there was no excessive clustering 
of any one experimental condition. Experimental trials were in blocks of 
140 and similarly created practice trials were in blocks of 28. 
Procedure 
The procedure followed the same form as that adopted in the previous 
experiments. Familiarity with the use of the words 'upper' and 'lower' to 
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denote specific typographic case forms was initially checked by asking 
the subject to categorise verbally a list of letter strings similar to those to 
be used as targets in the experimental trials. The list comprised ten 
upper-case and ten lower-case strings arranged randomly in terms of case 
and presented sequentially on the display monitor. The experiment was 
continued if at least eighteen of the twenty letter-strings were categorised 
correctly. 
Subjects were -asked to categorise target stimuli in terms of case. Primes 
were presented before, simultaneously with or after the target and 
remained visible until the subject's response. The sequence of events 
comprising a single trial was identical in form to that used in the 
previous experiments and is shown in Figures 4.6a to 4.6c (Page 148). 
As before 1500 msec elapsed between trials. The occurrence of an upper-
case target letter string was registered by pressing a right-hand response 
key while a left-hand response key was used for the lower-case strings. 
Reaction times were measured from the onset of the target and only those 
falling within a 200 to 1000 msec range were accepted for analysis. 
The session began with the block of 28 practice trials, the SOA being set 
at the value to be used in the first experimental block. Practice trials were 
run until a suitable balance between speed and accuracy was attained; 
i.e., a criterion of at least 80% accuracy for mean response times of 
700 msec or less. As with the previous experiments SOAs of -480, -320, 
-240, -160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 480 msec were used. 
The SOA was held constant within each block of trials but was altered 
randomly between blocks, each SOA value being used for two blocks. 
Each block of experimental trials took between five and ten minutes to 
complete with intervening rest periods of approximately three minutes. 
An experimental session lasted some two hours. At the end of a session 
the subject was asked (in the form of a leading question) to say whether 
the word 'ether' which was occasionally visible was more similar to the 
word 'upper' or the word 'lower' and whether the dashes were more 
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similar to upper- or lower-case letters and the responses were noted. 
Experimental sessions were repeated so that a total of twelve sets of 
results were obtained. 
RESULTS 
Out of a total of 27,300 case-decision responses 17 fell beyond the 
allotted 200 to 1000 msec interval. Two out of the 17 outlying responses 
were shorter than 200 msec and were due to false starts while insufficient 
pressure on a response key or minor lapses in attention accounted for the 
remainder. The 17 outliers were not considered in any further analyses 
including the compilation of error scores. 
Response Latencies 
Significant priming effects were obtained; Mean correct case-decision 
time varied according to priming condition (F(6,24591) = 51.05, 
p<.001). The main effect for SOA was also significant, F(12,24591) = 
106.72, p<.001. This variation with SOA would be expected in view of 
the discussion of the general effect upon response time due to such 
factors as psychological refractivity. The interaction between SOA and 
congruency across the entire SOA range was also significant, 
F(72,24591) = 5.83, p<.001. Again this would be expected as a result of 
the onset of differential priming effects in the zero SOA region. 
As in Experiments 1 to 3 the data were examined in terms of prime-
target order. For pre-exposed primes (ranging from +40 to +480 msec 
SOA) an SOA by Congruency ANOVA indicated significant case- or 
case-and-name-priming effects, F(6,11350) = 120.73, p<.001 while no 
significant effects were obtained for post-exposed primes (-480 to 
-40 msec SOA), F(6,11388) = 0.57, p>.001. Interaction between SOA 
and congruency was significant for pre-exposed primes, F(30,11350) = 
2.13, p<.001, but non-significant for post-exposed primes, F(30,11388) = 
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0.69, p>.001. From these figures it appears that the differential priming 
effects with SOA detected by the interaction in the ANOVA for the 
entire SOA range would have occurred predominantly between -40 and 
+40 msec SOA. However while case- and name-priming effects do not 
vary differentially with congruency over the SOA ranges -480 to -40 the 
same is not true between +40 and +480 msec. The significant interaction 
effect obtained for SOAs above 40 msec may have arisen from delayed 
effects of name-priming as with Experiment 3. In the above respects the 
results so far appear to be consistent with those of the earlier 
experiments. 
The mean correct case-decision response times for each SOA level for 
each of the seven priming conditions are represented in Figure 4.26. 
Difference values, as with the earlier experiments, were obtained by 
subtracting the means for the case-congruent and case-incongruent 
priming conditions from the means for the neutral condition. These 
differences in response time are shown in Figure 4.27 with the terms 
`inhibition' and 'facilitation' referring to positive negative differences 
respectively. As before the SOA of the prime and target was measured in 
relation to the onset of the target so that positive SOA values indicate 
prime pre-exposures while negative SOAs show prime post-exposures. 
As with the earlier experiments no significant differences were found in 
response latency between any of the priming conditions over the SOA 
range -480 to 0 msec. For the positive SOA range a reliable pattern of 
case- and name-priming effects is evident from inspection of 
Figures 4.26 and 4.27. As in the previous experiments a series of one-
way ANOVAs was carried out across congruency conditions for each 
SOA and followed by the use of the Newman-Keuls method when a 
significant (p<.05) congruency effect was obtained for a given SOA. 
These tests confirmed the significance or non-significance of those 
effects (p<.05) readily apparent from the graphs. The additive effects of 
name- and case-priming were significant for case-congruent primes as 
indicated by the reliable differences in response time shown in 
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Figure 4.26. This observation was also supported by a further application 
of the Newman-Keuls method to the data collapsed over the positive 
SOA range. This yielded Q(11385)=6.2, p<.05 for name-congruent 




0 400 — 
a) 
390 





- — • c- 
c-n+ 
• 	  neutral 
c+n- 
	  c+ 
c+n+ 
target second 
-480 -400 -320 -240 -160 -80 	 0 80 160 240 320 400 480 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.26. RESPONSE TIMES: Mean response times for correct 
case-decisions as a function of priming condition and prime-target 
stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 4. Each mean is based on 300 
trials for one subject. (Results for additional subjects obtained over the 
SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.26 below.) 
case-congruent primes. However while significant differences were 
detected between the c- and c-n+ priming conditions, Q(11385)=4.1, 
p<.05 the same was not true with the c- and c-n- conditions, 
Q(11385)=0.2, p>.05. 
In addition to the time-course of the differences in response latency as 
shown in Figure 4.27 the figures for the relative magnitude of the 
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range are shown schematically in Figure 4.28. In relation to the neutral 
condition case-congruent-priming effects average some 15 msec while 
case-incongruency effects average approximately 9 msec. With case-
congruent primes the additive effect of congruent name-priming was 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.27. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean case-decision 
response times for congruent and incongruent priming in relation to 
neutral priming as a function of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony 
for Experiment 4. (Results for additional subjects obtained over the SOA-
range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.27 below.) 
very nearly 9.5 msec while with case-incongruent primes congruent 
name-priming resulted in a drop of nearly 5.1 msec in response latency. 
The asymmetry between the additive effects of incongruent name-
priming for case-congruent primes (7.70 msec) and case-incongruent 
primes (0.15 msec) is also shown in the diagram. 
The onset of case- and name-priming effects has so far been collectively 
reported within, the positive SOA range. However some more detailed 
FIGURE A4.27. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.27; The difference in mean response 
times in relation to neutral priming for fourteen 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
details.) 
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FIGURE 4.28. A schematic representation of the relative differences in 
mean case-decision response times for congruent and incongruent 
priming averaged over the +80 to +480 msec SOA range for 
Experiment 4. Each mean is based on 1500 trials for one subject. 
(Results for additional subjects over the SOA-range 80 to 240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.28 below.) 
observations may be made from both Figure 4.27 and the re-presentation 
of the name-priming effects in relation to the case-only priming 
conditions shown in Figures 4.29 and 4.30. While, for case-congruency, 
name-incongruent effects become established at 80 msec SOA 
0.94 msec 
	 4. 	 FIGURE A4.28. As for Figure 4.28; A 
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(Q,1861=3.9, p<.05) name-congruent effects develop more slowly; 
remaining non-significant at 80 msec SOA (Q,1861=0.8 p>.05) and 
becoming significant at 160 msec SOA (Q,1885=4.7, p<.05). In this 
respect the results shown in Figure 4.29 closely resemble the name- 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.29. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean case-decision 
response times for name-congruent and name-incongruent primes in 
relation to the respective case-congruent priming condition as a function 
of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 4. (Results for 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.29 below.) 
priming of case-decision results shown for the last experiment in 
Figure 4.17 (Page 188). The time-course in Figure 4.29 is distinctly 
different from that of Figure 4.30. Although this is mainly due to the 
absence of name-incongruent priming it may also be observed that 
significant name-congruent effects are obtained by the time that an onset 





FIGURE A4.29. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.29; The difference in mean response 
times in relation to case-congruent priming for 
fourteen additional subjects over the SOA-
range -160 to +240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for 
60 240 320 400 480 further details.) 
















The variation of response time with SOA (rather than the variation of the 
relative priming effects) may also be considered, as with the earlier 
experiments. As before it is assumed that any systematic variation of 
carry-over effects from one SOA value to another is minimal. On this 
basis it can be seen from Figure 4.26 that a minimum disruptive effect on 
FIGURE 4.30. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean case-decision 
response times for name-congruent and name-incongruent primes in 
relation to the respective case-incongruent priming condition as a function 
of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 4. (Results for 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.30 below.) 
response latency was obtained for SOA of -480 and -320 msec. The 
subjective observation that very few primes were visible at -480 msec 
SOA value is corroborated by the obtained mean response time across 
priming conditions of 356.2 msec, SD=46.4. Although most primes 
would have been visible at -320 msec SOA the relatively low response 








       
       
      
FIGURE A4.30. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.30; The difference in mean response 
times in relation to case-incongruent priming 
for fourteen additional subjects over the SOA- 
ge 	 range -160 to +240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for tart second 
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terminating responses occurring before the onset of the prime. Response 
latencies increased from 359.2 to 385.9 msec over the SOA range -320 to 
-240 msec and then decreased uniformly to 369.3 msec at zero SOA. As 
SOA values increased above zero the response latencies for all priming 
conditions also generally increased as is evident from Figure 4.26. 
Overall the case-decision reaction times obtained in the present 
experiment averaged 379.8 msec. This is very nearly equal to the average 
of 379.6 msec obtained in the first experiment and, furthermore, similar 
to the overall time of 376.6 msec obtained in Experiment 3. These 
figures may again be compared with the overall name-decision reaction 
times for Experiment 2 which averaged 391.2 msec. As before, however, 
the above cross-experimental comparisons are made with caution. 
Error Rates 
The error rates for each priming condition are shown in Figure 4.31 as a 
proportion of the total responses for each condition at each SOA level. In 
view of difficulties that may arise when attempting to identify trends in 
error rate for each priming condition from the composite graph, the error 
data are further represented in Figures 4.32 to 4.34. Figure 4.32 shows 
the error rates for the congruent and incongruent priming conditions in 
comparison to the neutral condition while Figures 4.33 and 4.34 show 
the error variations for name-priming in relation to the c+ and c- priming 
conditions respectively. The statistical significance of the overall effects 
of name- and case-priming upon error rate was assessed by a series of 
Chi-square tests carried out for each SOA. The results of these tests are 
reported when relevant to discussion and when the significance or non-
significance may not be obvious. 
As before the pattern of differences in error rates between the priming 
conditions has some similarity to the pattern of response latencies. From 
Figure 4.32 it appears that reliable trends in the time-course of priming 










SOA x2=11.9, p>.05 while x2=131.6, p<.05 and 100.7, p<.05 for SOAs 
of 40 and 80 msec respectively. Although the differences in error rates 
for the 160, 240 and 320 msec SOAs were less marked they nevertheless 
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FIGURE 4.31. ERRORS: The variation in error rate for case-decisions 
according to priming condition and stimulus onset asynchrony for 
Experiment 4. Each mean is based on 300 trials for one subject. (Results 
for additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec 
are shown in Figure A4.31 below.) 
At 480 msec SOA significant differences in error rate were not obtained; 
x2=7.1, p>.05. For the shorter positive SOA values the difference in error 
rates between the neutral and case-incongruent conditions is substantially 
more marked than for neutral and case-congruent priming. With the 
exception of the maxima obtained with case-incongruent primes it 
appears from Figure 4.31 that error rates exhibit a general decline from 
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FIGURE A4.31. ERRORS: As for Figure 4.31; 
the variation of error rate for fourteen additional 
subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to 
















A further noticeable feature of the error scores is that the sharp increase 
in the +80 msec SOA region was only common to incongruent case 
primes. Primes with an incongruent name component did not produce 
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FIGURE 4.32. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for congruent and 
incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-
target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 4. (Results for additional 
subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in 
Figure A4.32 below.) 
information. name-priming, however, does appear to have an effect on 
error rates as indicated by the trends apparent in Figures 4.33 and 4.34. 
Here additive effects may be detected throughout a greater portion of the 
positive SOA range. 
FIGURE A4.32. ERROR RATES: As for 
Figure 4.32; the difference in error rates in 
relation to neutral priming for fourteen 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 




As with the earlier experiments results were obtained for fourteen 
additional subjects over the restricted SOA range -160 to 240 msec. 
Again an increase in case decision response latency was accompanied by 
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FIGURE 4.33. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for name-congruent 
and name-incongruent primes in relation to the case-congruent priming 
condition as a function of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony for 
Experiment 4. (Results for additional subjects obtained over the SOA-
range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.33 below.) 
a lower error rate for the additional-subject data in comparison to that for 
the main subject; overall response times averaged 471.9 msec, almost 
92 msec in excess of the main-subject data. The overall error rate was 
0.080. This compares with a figure of 0.107 for the main subject. 
The priming effects obtained with the additional subjects were in general 
similar to those obtained for the main subject; this is apparent from 
Figures A4.26' to A4.34. However it should be noted that while 
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significant name-priming effects were obtained with case-congruent 
primes for SOAs of 80 (Q,1770=3.4, p<.05), and 240 (Q,1827=4.0, 
p<.05) msec SOA, the apparent trends between the `c+' and the 
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FIGURE 4.34. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for name-congruent 
and name-incongruent primes in relation to the case-incongruent priming 
condition as a function of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony for 
Experiment 4. (Results for fourteen additional subjects obtained over the 
SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.34 below.) 
not significant. Similarly trends in congruent name-priming with case-
incongruent primes that may be discernible in Figure A4.29 (Page 218) 
were also found to be non-significant. The differences here between the 
main- and additional-subject data are, however, minor. 
Apart from some perturbations the overall pattern of error data with main 
and additional subjects was similar; again the interested reader is referred 
to Appendix 3 for further details. 
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FIGURE A4.34. ERROR RATES: As for 
Figure 4.34; the difference in error rates in 
relation to neutral priming for fourteen 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to 
+240 msec. (See Appendix 3 for further 
target second 
160 240 320 4o 480 details.) 
0.05 
0.00 
     
  
target I irst 
   
-0,1s
-480 -400 -220 -240 -160 
   
   
 
-80 0 80 
SOA mann) 
224 
In response to a leading question regarding which of the two typographic 
cases the horizontal bars more closely resembled the answer from each of 
the additional subjects was to the effect that it was neither one nor the 
other. A similar response was obtained relating to a leading question 
regarding which of the two typographic case-denoting names the word 
`ether' more closely represented. 
DISCUSSION 
General Effect of the Presence of a Prime 
As with the previous experiments the presence of a prime, regardless of 
the specific information it may convey, appeared to have a general 
slowing effect upon response latency. Also, as before, a negative 
correlation between response speed and error rate was apparent. To this 
end variations in latency for post-exposed primes may be at least partly 
accountable by a speed-accuracy tradeoff as argued in Experiment 1. In 
the context of the discussions of the earlier experiments the present 
results do not appear to offer any further insights into the general effect 
of a prime upon a case-decision task. 
The additional finding with the main-subject data in the present 
experiment that case-decision response latencies were similar in duration 
to those obtained in Experiments 1 and 3 points to the consistency of the 
magnitude of response latencies for a given stimulus attribute across 
experiments. (Although a similar cross-experimental comparison of 
response times with the additional subjects is problematical the present 
results are also not inconsistent with the earlier experiments.) This in turn 
lends further support to the earlier arguments where a relative speed 
hypothesis was used to account for the delay in the effect of name-
priming in comparison to case-priming on case-decision latencies. 
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Time-Course of Congruency Effects 
The time-course of results for case-priming is consistent with the results 
obtained in Experiment 1, that is, case-priming effects were obtained for 
all positive SOAs. The present results are also consistent with those from 
Experiment 3 insofar that the obtained name-incongruent priming effects 
were significant by the time a +80 msec onset asynchrony was reached. 
Likewise, a name-congruent priming effect was obtained for case-
congruent primes by +160 msec onset asynchrony. However, unlike the 
last experiment name-congruent priming was obtained at +40 msec for 
the main subject. This was facilitatory only and obtained with case-
incongruent primes. The discrepancy between this result and that for 
Experiment 3 could be explained by a name-congruent priming effect 
with case-incongruent primes being masked at +40 msec by a non-
significant effect obtained with case-congruent primes. This relative 
delay in facilitatory name-priming for case-congruent primes in relation 
to case-incongruent primes may be accounted for in terms of relative 
speed of processing in that encoding of name input may require a few 
tens of milliseconds over that required for case input. In view of this it is 
possible that the speeded processing of case-congruent primes by some 
15 msec allows less time for the name component to take effect than with 
the more slowly processed case-incongruent primes. A similar argument 
could also apply regarding the availability of encoded name input to 
responding mechanisms: the additional facilitating effect of congruent 
name information with case-congruent primes has less time to take effect 
than when case facilitation does not take place. This may account for the 
asymmetry in the onset of congruent and incongruent name-priming 
obtained in the present experiment (Figure 4.29, Page 217) and in 
Experiment 3 (Figure 4.17, Page 188). 
Facilitation and Inhibition 
The case-priming effects obtained for SOAs of 40 msec and above can be 
regarded as facilitatory and inhibitory if, as before, it is assumed that the 
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row of minus signs provided an effectively neutral priming condition. 
The occurrence of case facilitation and inhibition is consistent with 
Experiment 1. To some extent there is also a consistency with the present 
results for name-priming of case-decisions and those of Experiment 3. If, 
as before, the word 'ether' is regarded as neutral in terms of name-
priming then it follows that significant facilitatory name-priming effects 
were obtained when combined with both case-congruent and case-
incongruent primes. The situation regarding inhibitory name-priming 
effects is, however, slightly different; the relative effects that were 
obtained with case-congruent primes were not apparent in conjunction 
with case-incongruency. This disparity emerges as a result of the 
resolution of the case- and name-priming components that is afforded by 
the present experiment. Clearly an aggregate of the name-priming effects 
collapsed across the two case-priming alternatives would bring the 
present results into line with those obtained in Experiment 3. 
If, upon the occurrence of a prime, subjects generated a set of expected 
targets then, if a target consistent with the prime was expected, the 
response to this could be speeded and that for an inconsistent target 
slowed. Although congruent and incongruent prime-target pairs occurred 
with equal probability subjects may nevertheless have generated an 
expected target set for reasons such as congruent relationships being 
noticed and remembered. On this basis facilitation would be predictable 
for case-consistent primes, and, it is possible that further facilitation 
could arise when case and name information were congruent. A similar 
argument is applicable to incongruent information leading to the obtained 
inhibitory effects (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Neely, 1977). However 
facilitation and inhibition would be likely to occur later rather than earlier 
in the time-course of SOAs if strategic priming effects are assumed to be 
relatively slow acting. For example, Posner & Snyder (1975) obtained 
inhibition, which they attributed to strategic effects, at prime-target 
intervals of 300 msec and above. In view of this, automatic effects in 
relation to possible mechanisms involved with encoding, decision and 
responding processes are now considered, the assumption being that 
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processing follows a series of independent stages with input being 
encoded prior to decision making and response generation. 
With encoding, facilitation of case-decisions with congruent case priming 
can be accounted for in terms of the level of activation of the respective 
case-form representation being raised. Similarly, if it is assumed that 
interconnections exist between representations of case and name 
information then it is also possible that any relative increase in level of 
activation obtained with congruent case and name input would be 
reflected in the magnitude of priming effects obtained. An assumption 
relating to the models involving spreading activation was that the level of 
activation depended upon the number of activatory connections. In turn 
the number of these connections was assumed to depend upon contextual 
information. On this basis, for example, congruent name and congruent 
case information would be expected to produce greater facilitation than 
congruent case information alone and the present results are consistent 
with this. If similar and complementary processes occur with inhibition 
as for facilitation (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1981) then inhibitory 
effects would be expected to follow a pattern similar to facilitatory 
effects. However, while increased facilitation resulted from combined 
congruent case and name primes, inhibition with combined incongruent 
primes was no greater than with incongruent case information alone. 
Here, within-attribute inhibition could have occurred in the absence of 
cross-attribute inhibition. Alternatively, and consistent with other 
spreading activation accounts (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975), is the 
possibility that while within- and cross-attribute facilitation could occur 
during encoding inhibition does not occur at all. 
With decision making the function may be regarded as at least twofold; 
firstly, to make a decision regarding whether an input has occurred which 
meets the requirements of a predetermined task and, secondly, to initiate 
an appropriate response. If case-decisions were based upon comparisons 
against a stored set of representations relating to the task then one 
assumption is that this set could contain case rather than name 
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information. Initial stages of decision making could then be subject to 
facilitation if the case attribute of a prime activated its representation 
within a task set and speeded comparison of consistent target information. 
Similarly, inhibition could result for such reasons as activation of one 
element of a task set resulting in the inhibition of other elements, or, 
inconsistent information having a threshold raising effect. In terms of the 
above mechanism case priming rather than name priming effects would 
be expected. While this could account for no relative increase in 
inhibition for target incongruent name and case information combined, 
there is clearly a difficulty with the relative inhibition found with 
incongruent name priming in conjunction with congruent case primes. 
However, name priming effects could have occurred if, in addition to the 
case representations, associated name information was held along with, 
or was accessible from, the task set. This could account for the relative 
increase in facilitation with congruent name primes, and, the relative 
inhibition with incongruent name priming combined with congruent case 
priming. As with encoding, though, if levels of activation vary according 
to an aggregate of within- and cross-attribute information, it is difficult to 
account for no relative increase in inhibition with incongruent case and 
name priming. Similarly, if responses could be pre-programmed on the 
occurrence of a prime and if these are subject to varying levels of 
activation then the degree of facilitation or inhibition could depend as 
before upon the overall consistency of prime and target information. 
Another possible account for facilitation is if responses proceeded on the 
basis of prime information alone, thus giving rise to an early start with 
consistent targets. In this case, however, the magnitude of facilitation 
might be expected to reflect the prime-target onset asynchrony and 
increase with larger positive SOAs. Since this did not occur it is unlikely 
that facilitation over the greater part of the SOA range can be accounted 
for in this way. It follows that information distinguishing a prime from a 
target could be used in processes leading to an execution of a response. 
The present results can also be considered in terms of response 
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competition. Here it is assumed that potential responses are generated for 
primes as well as targets and that these compete for access to a limited 
capacity output buffer. With consistent prime and target information 
identical response programs would be generated and one possibility is 
that these could be treated as a single response released on occurrence of 
the target. In this case it would be expected that target responses would 
be neither impeded nor facilitated. A further possibility, however, is that 
facilitation could arise as a result of mutual priming with compatible 
responses on access to, or, within the buffer. On this basis the effect of 
compatible case and name primes on case-response latencies could be 
greater than the effect of compatible case priming alone. Here though, the 
order in which responses become available may be an important factor; 
this is now considered also with reference to inconsistent responses. 
It has been noted that inhibition could result from competition for a 
limited capacity response channel if potential responses to primes 
inconsistent with targets were available first and had to be suppressed. 
With regard to pre-exposed combined primes, if it is assumed that 
responses to case information are generated in less time than those for 
name information, then a series of two potential responses could precede 
the target response. With combined target-inconsistent case and name 
primes one possibility is that each response is suppressed in turn before 
the arrival of the target response. However, this might require more time 
than suppression of a single response from case-only priming and, hence, 
it is difficult on this basis to explain the lack of a relative inhibitory effect 
between the above two conditions. Alternatively, with combined 
inhibitory priming, the first two responses (consistent with each other) 
could act as a singular response, in this sense making the combined 
condition equivalent to the case-only condition. With combined 
incongruent case and congruent name information, inhibition could still 
arise as the initial case-response would have to be suppressed before the 
remaining target-consistent responses arrive. With this latter condition 
relative facilitation in comparison to case-incongruent priming could 
have arisen from mutual priming between the consecutive name and 
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target responses, or, from other mechanisms. However, if facilitation was 
entirely due to mutual priming between consecutive responses then this 
would not explain the overall facilitation obtained with combined case-
congruent and name-incongruent primes. The relative inhibitory effect of 
name-incongruent information when combined with case-congruent 
primes, however, may be accounted for by response competition since an 
inconsistent response to name information would precede the target 
response. Again, the overall facilitation in comparison to the neutral 
condition could have arisen from other mechanisms. 
A further possibility is that response competition could result from only 
the response immediately prior to the target response having to be 
suppressed. This would be consistent with inhibition for combined case-
and name-incongruent primes being similar to case-incongruent primes, 
and, would also account for the relative inhibitory effect obtained with 
name-incongruent information in conjunction with case-congruent 
information. Here, though, other mechanisms would be responsible for 
the overall facilitation obtained with combined case-congruent and name-
incongruent primes. With combined incongruent case and congruent 
name primes, however, the obtained overall inhibition would not be 
expected. Apart from other possible sources of inhibition, this latter 
result suggests that response competition could arise from a target-
inconsistent response to a prime, but, without it having to be consecutive 
with the target response. It may be noted that the difference in error rates 
between case-incongruent and combined case and name-incongruent 
conditions suggested in Figure 4.33 (Page 222) may not be inconsistent 
with the latter arguments. The probability of occurrence of an unwanted 
response could increase as a result of the additional incongruent name 
input. The frequency in occurrence of incorrect responses, however, is 
not bound to vary in accordance with the latency of correct responses. 
A further point can be made regarding response competition and the 
magnitude of facilitatory and inhibitory effects. If it is assumed that any 
facilitation or inhibition depends upon the nature of responses rather than 
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how they were invoked then the magnitude of any case facilitation should 
be similar to that for name facilitation and, likewise, case inhibition 
should be similar to name inhibition. The inevitable combination of case 
information with name information in the present method, however, does 
not allow the magnitude of name priming to be directly obtained. 
Nevertheless, it can be noted from Figures 4.28 and A4.28 (Page 216) 
that whereas case-only facilitation was 15.01 msec (15.44 msec with 
additional subjects), when combined primes contained a congruent name 
component response latencies differed by 9.47 and 5.11 msec (6.56 and 
6.67 msec with additional subjects) from their respective case-only 
conditions. These differences in facilitation were greater than the 
differences in inhibition: whereas case-only inhibition was 10.63 msec 
(10.26 msec for additional subjects) the difference in latencies resulting 
from a name-incongruent component was 7.70 msec (13.23 msec for 
additional subjects). Albeit with caution, a possible interpretation of this 
is that, when inhibitory effects occurred, they were subject to less 
variation than facilitatory effects. On this basis inhibitory effects could be 
argued to be consistent with similar time costs involved with suppression 
of responses, regardless of how they were generated. This applies less 
easily to facilitation. This interpretation, however, discounts other 
sources of inhibition and further assumes response competition effects do 
not interact with other priming effects. 
From the above discussion different accounts of the combined priming 
effects remain viable. Although facilitation could arise from encoding, it 
could also arise from decision and response processes. While there are 
some difficulties in accounting for both facilitation and inhibition during 
encoding, response competition remains viable as an account for 
inhibitory effects. These results are further considered in the next 
chapter. Firstly, however, a remaining major priming possibility to be 
tested concerns the influence of case information upon name-decisions. 
This is of interest in relation to the earlier arguments concerning possible 
similarities in underlying mechanisms responsible for cross-attribute and 
within-attribute priming. 
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EXPERIMENT 5: Case-Priming of Name-decision 
In this experiment the last remaining major priming possibility where 
case information is used to prime a name-decision task is investigated. 
As with Experiment 1 case-priming is effected through the use of strings 
consisting entirely of upper-case letters, or, entirely of lower-case letters. 
Also, as with the first experiment, effectively neutral priming is 
considered to be achievable through the use of a row of dashes. A binary 
name-decision• task is possible if, as with Experiment 2, the words 
`upper' and 'lower' are used as targets. The arrangement of stimuli used 
according to the congruency of the prime case with the target name is 
shown in Table 4.7. The expected similarities in priming effects between 
the present and the earlier experiments are detailed in the next section. 



























PREDICTED PRIMING EFFECTS 
It may be observed from Table 4.7 that an unavoidable problem with the 
stimuli used concerns the fact that unwanted case information is 
contained within the target. Since it has been assumed that case 
information is encoded in less time than name information it is likely in 
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view of the processing models so far discussed that the unwanted case 
information will affect name-decision latencies if a relative-speed 
principle still holds. Although the effect of unwanted case information 
carried by the target may balance out across priming conditions there is 
the additional problem that it may mask any effects of the case 
information contained in the prime. In view of this predictions relating to 
likely trends in the magnitude of overall priming effects may be difficult 
to make. Additionally effects due to the case content of a prime may not 
be obtainable .or readily detectable from the results. If, however, any 
case-priming effects are detectable their time-course should not be 
affected by the target's case content. 
Encoding Effects 
In view of the argument presented in Experiment 4 that encoding effects 
are facilitatory-only in nature the predictions of case-priming effects 
upon name-decision will be made on this basis. If the overall structure of 
encoding processes is arranged according to the single- or dual-coding 
models so far discussed then a link between the processing of word-name 
and case information is possible. On this basis it may be predicted that 
name-decision will be facilitated by primes which are case-congruent 
with the target name. In terms of the priming conditions specified in 
Table 4.7 the `c+' latencies should be relatively shorter than the latencies 
for the 'N' condition. Encoding effects due to case-incongruent primes 
are not expected to occur if facilitatory-only encoding is assumed. 
Responding Effects 
If inhibition is due to response-competition then it is possible that case 
information carried by the prime which is incongruent with the target 
name will result in the initiation of a motor programme which will have 
to be suppressed if a correct response is to be effected. In accordance 
with the response-competition hypothesis it is thus expected that 
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response latencies for the `c-' condition will be relatively longer than 
those for the neutral condition. In this manner the inhibitory effects 
should be consistent with those obtained in the preceding experiments. 
Predicted Time-Course of Encoding and Responding Effects 
If facilitation is assumed to be due to encoding mechanisms and that 
priming effects may arise from completed or partially completed 
processing of previously presented case information then it may be 
assumed that such effects should be detectable for pre-exposed primes. 
Additionally, however, it may also be noted that the results of the 
previous experiments were taken to be indicative that case-encoding 
requires less time than name-encoding. In relation to the overall single-
and dual-coding structures it is thus conceivable that the more rapidly 
processed case information from a simultaneously presented prime, or, a 
prime that follows within a few tens of milliseconds after the onset of the 
target, will available in time to affect slower name-encoding. In this 
situation facilitatory effects for the `c+' condition may be expected at 
zero and, perhaps, at -40 msec SOA. However since the difference in 
response latencies for name-decisions and case-decisions was only in the 
order of 20 msec then it may be more reasonable to expect that while 
case-priming effects on name-decision may be detectable at SOAs of 
zero or greater they will not be detected for SOAs of -40 msec or below. 
The early availability of encoded case information in comparison to 
encoded name information may also have implications for the time-
course of inhibitory priming effects. If such effects are attributed to a 
single-channel responding system similar to that outlined in 
Experiment 4 then the early arrival of encoded case-priming information 
incongruent with that for a correct target response will trigger a motor 
program which will ultimately require suppression. On this basis if case 
information is encoded more rapidly than name information it is possible 
that inhibitory effects may also be obtained at zero SOA and, perhaps, at 
-40 msec SOA. 
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The effects of case information carried by the prime and target may be 
partly distinguishable from the time-course. In particular if facilitatory 
encoding effects decay with time then it is likely that with increasing 
SOA the masking effect of the target case will increase. Similarly it is 
possible that at very short positive SOA values the case-effects of the 
prime may dominate since a finite time would be required for the effects 
of the target case to become established. A difference in the time-course 
of inhibitory effects may not be so apparent in view of the finding from 
the previous experiments so far that inhibitory effects do not appear to 
diminish within the range of prime-target onset asynchronies used. 
Summary 
Apart from the confounding of prime and target case information, 
predictions of relative facilitatory and inhibitory effects may be made in 
accordance with encoding processes that are characterised by spreading-
activation and response processes which are subject to inhibitory effects. 
While facilitatory and inhibitory effects may be predictable according to 
the assigned congruency of the priming conditions exemplified in 
Table 4.7 (Page 232) for SOAs of zero and above, these effects may be 
less clearly delineated at the larger SOAs because of the masking effect 
of target case information. On the basis that case-encoding is faster than 
name-encoding the predicted time-course is distinct from those in the 
previous experiments where no priming effects were predicted or 
detected at zero SOA. The above predictions are now tested. 
METHOD 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and viewing conditions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. Stimuli were also of the same form and dimensions as 
Experiment 1. Random letter strings, a different string for each trial, 
were used for congruent and incongruent priming while a row of five 
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dashes was used for the neutral condition. Targets consisted of the words 
`upper' or 'lower'. Examples of the three experimental conditions used 
have been shown in Table 4.7 (Page 232). The conditions, as with the 
other experiments, were sequenced quasi-randomly so that there was no 
excessive clustering of any one experimental condition. Experimental 
trials were in blocks of 72 and similarly created practice trials were in 
blocks of 24. 
Procedure 
The procedure was largely identical to that adopted in Experiments 1 to 
4. Familiarity with the use of the words 'upper' and 'lower' to denote 
specific typographic case forms was initially checked by asking the 
subject to categorise verbally a list of letter strings similar to those to be 
used as primes in the experimental trials. The list comprised ten upper-
case and ten lower-case strings arranged randomly in terms of case and 
presented sequentially on the display monitor. The experiment was 
continued if at least eighteen of the twenty letter-strings were categorised 
correctly. 
The sequence comprising a single trial depended upon whether the 
primes were presented simultaneously or before and after the targets as 
shown in Figures 4.6a to 4.6c (Page 148). Subjects were asked to 
respond according to word-name of the target that was level with the 
markers and not to respond to the letter-strings below the target. The 
occurrence of the word 'upper' was registered by pressing a right-hand 
response key while a left-hand response key was used for the word 
`lower'. Reaction times were measured from the onset of the target and 
only those falling within a 200 to 1000 msec range were accepted for 
analysis. 
The session began with a block of 24 practice trials with the SOA set at 
the value to be used in the first experimental block. Practice trials were 
run until a suitable balance between speed and accuracy was reached. As 
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with the earlier Experiments the criterion was at least 80% accuracy for 
mean response times of 700 msec or less. SOAs of -480, -320, -240, 
-160, -80, -40, 0, 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, and 480 msec were used. The 
SOA was held constant within each block of trials but altered randomly 
between blocks, each SOA value being used for two blocks. A block of 
experimental trials took between five and ten minutes to complete and 
was separated by a rest period of approximately three minutes. An 
experimental session lasted approximately two hours. At the end of the 
session the subject was asked (in the form of a leading question) to say 
whether the horizontal bars which were occasionally visible were more 
similar to upper-case or lower-case letters and the response was noted. 
Experimental sessions were repeated so that a total of twelve sets of 
results were obtained. 
RESULTS 
Out of a total of 11,232 name-decision responses 7 fell beyond the 
allotted 200 to 1000 msec interval. Five out of the 7 outliers were shorter 
than 200 msec and were due to false starts while insufficient pressure on 
a response key or minor lapses in attention accounted for the remainder. 
The 7 outliers were not considered in any further analyses including the 
compilation of error scores. 
Response Latencies 
The effects of case-priming upon name-decision response time were 
significant; a 13 (SOA) by 3 (congruency) ANOVA yielded an 
F(2,10146) of 16.29, p<.001. The effect of prime-target onset asynchrony 
on response latencies was also significant, F(12,10146) = 71.56, p<.001. 
Significant interaction effects between SOA and congruency were not 
obtained; F(24,10146) = 1.50, p>.001. 
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The above data were examined in terms of prime-target order. 
Significant case-priming effects for pre-exposed and simultaneously 
presented primes were indicated by a further SOA by Congruency 
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FIGURE 4.35. RESPONSE TIMES: Mean response times for correct 
name-decisions as a function of case-priming condition and prime-target 
stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 5. Each mean is based on 288 
trials for one subject. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.35 below.) 
29.23, p<.001 while significant effects were not obtained for post-
exposed primes (SOA range -480 to -40 msec), F(2,4697) = 0.34, 
p>.001. Interaction effects between SOA and congruency were neither 
significant for pre-exposed and simultaneously presented primes, 
F(12,5449) = 0.52, p>.001, nor for post-exposed primes, F(10,4697) = 
0.67, p>.001. The main effect for SOA for both pre- and post-exposed 
and simultaneously presented primes was significant; F(6,5449) = 20.03, 
p<.001 and F(5,4697) = 46.90, p<.001 respectively. 
FIGURE A4.35. RESPONSE TIMES: As for 
Figure 4.35 mean correct name-decision 
response times for ten additional subjects over 
the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. Each mean 
is based on 288 trials. (See Appendix 3 for 
further details.) 
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Mean correct case-decision response times for each SOA-level for each 
priming condition are represented in Figure 4.35. Difference values, as 
before, were obtained by subtracting the means for the case-congruent 
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FIGURE 4.36. RESPONSE TIMES: The difference in mean name-
decision response times for case-congruent and case-incongruent 
priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-target stimulus 
onset asynchrony for Experiment 5. (Results for ten additional subjects 
obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are shown in 
Figure A4.36 below.) 
condition. These differences in response time are shown in Figure 4.36, 
again with the terms 'inhibition' and 'facilitation' respectively referring 
to positive and negative differences. The SOA for the prime and target 
was measured in relation to the onset of the target so that positive SOA 
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Inspection of Figures 4.35 and 4.36 suggests that response latencies for 
case-congruent primes are significantly longer for simultaneously 
presented and pre-exposed primes. This observation was confirmed by a 
series of one-way ANOVAs carried out across congruency conditions for 
each SOA and followed by the use of the Newman-Keuls method when a 
significant (p<.05) congruency-effect was obtained for a given SOA. 
These tests indicated that case-congruent-priming was established at zero 
SOA, Q,754=4.16, p<.05 and remained significant throughout the SOA 
range up to 480 msec, Q,786=3.35 p<.05. Although Figure 4.36 suggests 
a reliable trend for case-incongruent-priming effects it was found that 
these were non-significant at SOAs of zero, Q,754=2.31, p>.05, 80 msec, 
Q,765=2.41, p>.05 and 480 msec, Q,786=1.00, p>.05. For the remaining 
SOAs of 40, 160, 240 and 320 msec case-incongruent-priming effects 
were significant at the p<.05 level; Q,770=3.94, Q,784=4.44, 
Q,794=3.01, and Q,796=3.16 respectively. 
For SOAs of zero and above congruent case-decision response times 
were on average 11.4 msec more than those for the neutral condition. 
Latencies for incongruent name-primes averaged 8.4 msec more than the 
neutral condition. Congruent case-priming effects for SOAs of zero and 
above remained close to the average value of 11.4 msec throughout the 
SOA range. Although Figure 4.36 suggests that the time-course of 
incongruent priming relative to the neutral condition is subject to some 
variation over the positive SOA range it should be noted that this was not 
detected by the congruency-SOA interaction ANOVA quoted earlier. 
The mean name-decision response time across all priming conditions and 
SOAs was found to be 396.6 msec, SD=47.7. This value closely matched 
that for Experiment 2 (391.2 msec). The variation of response time with 
SOA also followed a similar pattern to that of Experiment 2; response 
latencies increased from 367.6 to 398.2 msec over the SOA range -480 to 
-240 msec and then decreased to 391.3 msec at zero SOA. This was 
followed by a sharp increase to 410.1 msec over the next 80 msec SOA 
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response latency at an SOA of -480 msec apparent from Figure 4.35 is 
also consistent with the previous experiments. Similarly it was observed 
that very few primes were visible at this SOA value on account of trial-
terminating responses being made before the occurrence of a prime. In 
the above respects, then, there is a stability across experiments. 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE 4.37. ERRORS: The variation in error rate for case-primed 
name-decisions according to priming condition and stimulus onset 
asynchrony for Experiment 5. Each mean is based on 288 trials for one 
subject. (Results for ten additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range 
-160 to +240 msec are shown in Figure A4.37 below.) 
Error Rates 
Figure 4.37 shows the error rates for the three priming conditions as a 
proportion of the total responses for each condition at each SOA-level 
and Figure 4.38 shows the same error rates for the congruent- and 
incongruent-case-priming conditions in comparison to the neutral 
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may be apparent: error rates decrease between from 0.12 at -480 msec 
SOA to 0.08 at -80 msec SOA before increasing slightly on average and 
levelling-out at about 0.09 for the remaining SOAs. For pre-exposed 
primes condition-dependent effects upon error rate occur; this 
observation being largely corroborated by the results of a series of Chi-
squared tests carried out for each SOA. These are now detailed. 
FIGURE 4.38. ERRORS: The difference in error rates for congruent and 
incongruent priming in relation to neutral priming as a function of prime-
target stimulus onset asynchrony for Experiment 5. (Results for ten 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec are 
shown in Figure A4.38 below.) 
The pattern of relative differences in error rates between the priming 
conditions has similarities to pattern of relative response latencies. An 
examination of Figure 4.38 suggests that error rates for the congruent and 
incongruent conditions were generally in excess of those for the neutral 
condition. However case-priming effects were significant only at 40 and 
80 msec SOA, x2 = 13.0, p<.05, and 7.7, p<.05 respectively. 











FIGURE 	 A4.38. 	 ERROR 	 RATES: 	 As 	 for 
Figure 4.38; the 	 difference 	 in 	 error 	 rates 	 in 
relation to neutral 	 priming for ten additional 
subjects 
	 over 	 the 	 SOA-range 	 -160 	 to 
+240 msec. 
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A point of interest with regard to the error rates is that both name-
congruent and name-incongruent priming produces a peak in the +40 to 
+80 msec SOA range. One difference with this peak and those of the 
earlier experiments is that it is delayed with respect to the onset of 
response-latency effects. A further difference with the present error 
findings is that for pre-exposed primes congruent-priming also results in 
an initial high increase in the occurrence of errors. 
Additional-Subject Data 
As with the preceding experiments results were obtained for ten 
additional subjects over the restricted SOA range -160 to 240 msec. 
Name-decision response latencies averaged 500.3 msec, that is 
approximately 104 msec longer than for the main subject. This increase 
in response time was again accompanied by a lower error rate for the 
additional-subjects in comparison to that for the main subject; an overall 
error rate of 0.069 compared with a figure of 0.102 for the main subject. 
Comparison of the pairs of Figures 4.35 and A4.35 (Page 238) through to 
Figures 4.38 and A4.38 suggests that relative priming effects obtained 
with the additional subjects were substantially similar to those obtained 
for the main subject. The trends apparent from Figure A4.36 (Page 239) 
were largely supported by Newman-Keuls tests. However it should be 
noted that incongruent case-priming was not significant at zero SOA 
(Q,657=1.85, p>.05) and at 240 msec SOA (Q,673=2.18, p>.05). 
Additionally, and unlike the main-subject data where significant case-
priming was obtained with congruent primes at zero SOA, the trend 
apparent in Figure A4.36 was not found to be significant (Q,657=1.74, 
p>.05). 
The effect of priming on the overall pattern of error data for the 
additional subjects was less evident than with the main subject. Although 
Figure A4.38 (Page 242) suggests a similar trend at 40 msec SOA this 
was not found to be significant (x2 = 3.82, p>.05). 
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In response to a leading question regarding which of the two typographic 
cases the horizontal bars more closely resembled the answer from each 
of the ten additional subjects was to the effect that it was neither one nor 
the other. Appendix 3 may be consulted for further details of additional-
subject data. 
DISCUSSION 
A comparison of the overall duration of name-response latencies for the 
main subject of 396.6 msec in the present experiment and 391.2 msec for 
Experiment 2 with the case-response latencies of 379.6, 376.6, and 379.8 
for Experiments 1, 3 and 4 is consistent with the assumption that the 
encoding of name-information requires more time than case information. 
As with the earlier experiments the presence of a prime appears to slow 
down target responses. Again this is evident from the increase of 
response latencies for pre-exposed primes in comparison to that for post-
exposed primes. In terms of general effects the time-course is similar to 
those already obtained and thus will not be further discussed. 
Case-priming condition-dependent effects appear to have been obtained 
in spite of the possibility of masking by the target case content. A notable 
feature, however, which emerges from the results is the relative increase 
in response latencies of both the congruent and incongruent priming 
conditions in comparison to the neutral condition for SOAs of zero and 
above. Rather than the expected facilitation for the congruent condition 
an inhibitory effect is apparent. This inhibitory effect is also matched by 
a relative increase in error rates for congruent in comparison to neutral 
priming. One possible explanation for this is that priming may result 
from a word-attribute other than typographic case. Since the letter-strings 
used in the congruent condition differ from the dashes used in the neutral 
condition in terms of such physical factors as area or brightness then 
these may have been responsible for any effects. However, if selective 
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priming is derived from the 'general' effects of double stimulation 
(Taylor, 1977) it is difficult to account for the relative differences in 
latencies between the congruent and incongruent conditions which 
appear with SOAs of 240 msec and above. Although these differences 
are small they appear from inspection of Figure 4.36 (Page 239) to be 
reliable and, furthermore, they correspond with the trend in relative 
differences in the error rates for the two conditions as shown in 
Figure 4.38 (Page 242). In sum, then, it may be argued that the obtained 
priming effects are linked to information pertaining to typographic case. 
The onset of a significant case-congruent priming effect upon name-
decision latency at zero SOA for the main subject is consistent with the 
prediction based on the relative speeds of encoding case- and name-
information. It was assumed here that with cross-attribute priming both 
single- and dual-coding structures would allow the products of case-
processing to be communicated to those mechanisms responsible for 
name-encoding. Although the relative magnitude of the effect for 
congruent primes does not accord with expectation the time-course is 
nevertheless consistent with the models so far discussed. The early 
availability of case information in relation to name information to 
response mechanisms may similarly accounts for the trend in the 
inhibitory effect detected at zero SOA for case-incongruent primes. 
The inhibitory and disruptive priming effects for congruent case-primes 
may have occurred for different reasons than those for the inhibitory and 
disruptive effects for incongruent primes. This may be inferred from the 
already noted diverging trends in the response latencies at the longer 
SOAs as well as from the time-course of error rates. In Figure 4.37 
(Page 241) the continued decrease in error rate with increasing SOA for 
incongruent case-priming contrasts with a relatively small change in 
error rate with SOA for congruent primes. 
If the inhibitory effect on name-decision latency with congruent primes 
is due to their case-content then an explanation for this is not obvious. If 
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an attempt is to be made to account the departure from the predicted 
effects then a question which initially arises concerns the locus. Two 
possible loci are, of course, represented by the broad groupings of 
mechanisms suggested by the distinction that has been made between 
encoding and responding processes. An encoding account of the 
inhibitory effect arising from congruent case-primes is difficult to 
formulate on the basis of existing spreading-activation and PDP models. 
This difficulty is also retained in view of the results of Experiment 4 
which have been taken to suggest that the inhibitory effects that may be 
allowable within the encoding stage according to some PDP models do 
not occur. 
So far inhibition at the responding stage has been accounted for by a 
response-competition mechanism where inhibitory effects should only be 
expected upon the occurrence of covert incongruent responses. If this 
explanation is to be pursued then a source of codes giving rise to 
incompatible responses must be determined. 
Generation of Incompatible Codes 
If incompatible case-codes are generated at the locus of analysis of case 
information then the relatively large facilitatory effect of case 
information on a case-decision task obtained in Experiment 1 would be 
difficult to explain. A more likely locus for the generation of an 
incompatible code may be that for semantic-encoding. One possibility is 
that an incompatible semantic representation of a case-code is generated 
in the way that antonyms are frequently generated as associates to verbal 
input (e.g., Kucera & Francis, 1967). The difficulty with this explanation, 
however, is that similar antonymous associates might also be expected 
with name-priming on case-decision since this may also involve a 
semantic link. However the inhibitory effects that might have arisen from 
this were not apparent from the name-priming effects obtained in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Although it is possible that the generation of 
antonymous associates within semantic-encoding mechanisms may vary 
247 
according to whether input is verbal or nonverbal this does raise a more 
difficult question as to why this may be so. Although a rule may be 
added to existing models to allow for such an asymmetry it is, perhaps, 
worthwhile avoiding a post hoc approach and instead more carefully re-
examining those structures that already exist. 
Another, and perhaps in some ways simpler, explanation arises if the 
range of possible outputs from the encoding of nonverbal visual 
information is. considered. Although on the presentation of a string of 
letters the code for a specific typographic case may be activated there 
remains the possibility that other codes may also be generated. These, for 
example, may vary from a code signifying the presence of an object, its 
colours, or, that it consists of a collection of letters. In comparison to 
these latter attributes the code for a particular typographic case-form 
such as 'upper' or 'lower' may be more specific and elaborate and 
demand a relatively extended analysis. In the same way that an encoded 
typographic case-form may output to a semantic system so also might the 
other encoded attributes. Furthermore the more general attributes of input 
such as its presence, or, that it consists of a string of letters may be 
encoded in less time than the more specific information such as that 
pertaining to a particular typographic case-form. In this event it is 
possible that more general letter-string information may be available 
relatively early to a semantic-encoding system. This more general letter-
string information might in turn lead to the activation of more specific 
concepts related to letters including typographic case. Such a process is 
represented diagrammatically in Figure 4.39. In this situation any one 
specific form of typographic case may not be invoked in preference to 
another. On this basis the early registration of the presence of letters in 
general may give rise to the activation of the semantic representations of 
both upper- and lower-case. In this way semantic-codes or their verbal 
counterparts that are incompatible to a case-prime may be outputted to 
responding mechanisms. As a result the response to the incompatible 
code may in turn have to be suppressed. As discussed earlier with both 











the inhibitory effect arising from response-competition may be greater 
than any cross-attribute facilitatory effect obtained through encoding. 
Thus the net effect for both compatible and incompatible case-primes 
upon name-decision may be inhibitory. 
NONVERBAL PROCESSING 	 SEMANTIC PROCESSING 








FIGURE 4.39. A diagrammatic representation showing how generalised 
case-information derived from letter-string input may lead indirectly to the 
generation of both upper-case and lower-case codes within a semantic 
system. (See text.) 
The consistency of the above account with the cross-attribute effect 
obtained in Experiments 3 and 4 where congruent name-priming 
facilitated case-decisions may now need to be explained. Here 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects were obtained with congruent and 
incongruent primes respectively. These results may have arisen because 
the verbal component of a stimulus may not be interpretable in the 
variety of ways pre-semantically that a nonverbal component may be. In 
other words there is no analogy between the early encoding of verbal 
material and the encoding of the nonverbal qualities of a letter string 
which may range from its colour to its specific case-form. It is 
reasonable to argue that a word has to be encoded either as a specific 
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verbal entity, or, as a number of specific verbal sub-entities. In this event 
if, for example, the word 'upper' is to trigger the semantic representation 
of a specific typographic case then the representation for upper-case is 















Word input upper 
FIGURE 4.40. A diagrammatic representation showing how the input of a 
case-denoting word-name may result in a congruent case-code being 
generated before an incongruent case-code. (See text.) 
This contrasting process is shown in Figure 4.40. The implication of this 
for response-competition is that an interfering code derived from the 
name-input congruent with target case will arrive at the responding stage 
after the code that is consistent with the target and thus suppressive 
mechanisms will not take effect. 
Although the above explanation of inhibitory effects with congruent 
case-priming of name-decision may be elaborate the explanation is based 
upon a reinterpretation of the existing basic mechanisms that have been 
postulated rather than relying on the introduction of new ones. The 
explanation, however, may only be regarded as partial in so far that it 
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does not explain the apparent difference in priming effects between 
congruent and incongruent priming for SOAs of 240 msec and above. 
From Figures 4.36 and 4.38 (Pages 239 and 242) it appears that this 
difference is reliable, and, that if incongruent codes are generated in the 
congruent case-priming condition then their effects are more enduring 
than those generated from incongruent primes. There appears to be no 
obvious explanation for this. 
CKAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The effects upon performance occurring in some cross-attribute Stroop-
like interference studies, and within-attribute priming studies involving 
letters or words such as those carried out by Posner and Snyder (1975), 
Neely (1977), and Taylor (1977) were examined in Chapter 3. It was 
noted that studies involving cross-attribute priming were frequently 
interpreted in terms of inhibitory effects arising from inconsistent 
information while within-attribute priming studies were frequently 
considered in terms of facilitatory effects where prime and target 
information were consistent. In view of the processing possibilities 
introduced in Chapter 1 it was suggested that some fundamentally similar 
mechanisms may be common to both within- and cross-attribute priming. 
It was argued that such similarities might be evident in the time-course 
and magnitude of effects obtainable. It was also argued that this was not 
always apparent from comparisons among existing studies because of the 
differing forms of stimuli, prime-target onset asynchronies, and task 
requirements used. Some uniformity in these respects was attempted with 
the present series of experiments. In this chapter the extent to which the 
present data suggest that there could be mechanisms in common to 
within- and cross-attribute priming effects is considered. The main 
empirical results are firstly summarised along with some initial 
assumptions and interpretations. The results are then discussed in relation 
to some possible processing mechanisms that could be involved in the 
tasks. The assumptions made in interpreting the results in relation to the 
processing mechanisms are stated within the context of those discussions 
where they apply. The extent to which the data constrain some of the 
processing options is considered along with some discussion of further 
empirical tests relating to the interpretations. 
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SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
General Observations 
The results of the series of typographic case experiments described in the 
previous chapter suggest that the presence of contextual information can 
affect the performance of speeded categorisation tasks. A prime that was 
visible before a response to a given target was made resulted in the 
slowing down of both case- and name-decision responses in comparison 
to primes which occurred after a response. This 'general effect' occurred 
regardless of prime-target congruency. Pre-exposed primes had a greater 
slowing effect than post-exposed primes. However, with all of the 
experiments, as the prime pre-exposure interval increased there was a 
slight trend towards shorter response latencies. 
Possible explanations for the faster responses with increasing SOA may 
be made in terms of both the increasing effect of arousal and the 
decreasing effect of psychological refractivity over the first 500 msec. 
With arousal, Posner and Boise's (1971) work suggests that the 
presentation of a prime results in a general lowering of response time 
with prime pre-exposures up to about half a second (see Appendix 2). If 
the effects of psychological refractivity are interpreted in terms of, either, 
recovery from the presentation of an initial stimulus, or, the organization 
of a response, then shorter response latencies would be expected at 
longer SOAs. Arousal and psychological refractivity are discussed in 
more detail in Appendices 1 and 2. The present findings are consistent 
with those on alertness reported by Posner & Boise (1971), and 
Drazin's (1961) work on refractivity. Further implications of alertness 
and refractivity are discussed below in relation to selective priming 
effects. 
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Comparison of Case- and Name-Response Latencies 
Although the experiments were not designed to allow direct comparison 
of name- and case-response latencies, overall it was noted that name-
decisions for both the main subject and additional subjects were 
consistently found to take more time than case-decisions; the differences 
ranging between about 10 and 30 msec. 
Selective Effects 
Selective priming effects were obtained according to the consistency of 
prime and target content. In all the experiments the onset of significant 
selective effects was marked by a relatively sharp transient both in 
relative response latencies and error rates located at, or shortly after, zero 
SOA. In comparison to relative response latencies, error rates fell rapidly 
away with increasing SOA from the sharp peak, or rose from a trough, 
established at the shorter SOAs. The selective effects are now 
summarised according to each experiment. 
Case Priming of Case-Decision 
The time taken to categorise a string of letters in terms of typographic 
case was affected by prior exposure of a similarly constructed letter 
string. Case primes consistent with their targets result in speeded 
responses and were subject to lower error rates in comparison to a prime 
consisting of a row of dashes. Similarly, case primes inconsistent with 
post-exposed targets increased response times and produced a higher rate 
of error in comparison to dashes. Priming effects were not apparent for 
primes which coincided with or followed their targets. 
It is assumed that the selective priming effect is due to the typographic 
case content of the primes. It has already been argued in Chapter 4 that 
other factors, such as stimulus area, that might have given rise to 
condition-dependent effects were either counteractive or minimal. 
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A further assumption that has been made in interpreting the relative 
priming effects is that since the dashes comprising the 'neutral' primes 
were not readily associated with either of the typographic cases by any of 
the subjects they may be regarded as providing a baseline against which 
any condition dependent effects can be compared. If this assumption is 
accepted then, for pre-exposed primes, case consistency results in a 
relative facilitatory effect and case inconsistency an inhibitory one. 
Although the neutral condition has been regarded as a baseline some 
further initial assumptions have been made when considering the 
magnitude of facilitation and inhibition in relation to the possible effects 
of alertness and psychological refractivity. With regard to alertness the 
greater frequency of presentation of identical stimuli with the neutral 
condition may result in a habituation effect so that response times could 
be comparatively long. If this relative effect increases as alertness builds 
up over the SOA range then facilitation could be overestimated and 
inhibition underestimated at longer SOAs. To some extent, however, it is 
also possible that the relatively small area occupied by neutral primes 
may, in comparison to the other priming conditions, contrast with the 
targets. This could result in a higher level of general arousal following 
neutral primes and lead to faster responses and thus an underestimate of 
facilitation. This may offset the effects of any habituation resulting from 
the more frequent repetition of neutral primes. With regard to 
refractivity, the more frequent and less complex dashes comprising the 
neutral priming condition may result in less initial processing and result 
in faster responses. If the effects of refractivity are greater at the shorter 
SOAs then inhibition could be overestimated and facilitation 
underestimated in this region. The combined effects of alertness and 
refractivity may be complex when it comes to interpreting the magnitude 
of facilitation and inhibition. However, the present assumption is that 
estimations of facilitatory and inhibitory priming are not excessively 
distorted as a result of any differential effects that might arise from 
neutral priming. This is in view of the possibility that the effects may to 
some extent be self-compensating, and, that in the congruent and 
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incongruent priming conditions the salient case-priming attribute is also 
extensively repeated, even though different letter strings are used. 
Name Priming of Name-Decision 
A similar pattern of relative priming effects to case priming was obtained 
when targets were primed and categorised in terms of the case-denoting 
words 'upper' and 'lower'. That is, name primes consistent with their 
targets resulted in speeded responses and were subject to a lower error 
rate in comparison to the prime word 'ether'. Similarly, in comparison to 
`ether' pre-exposed name-primes inconsistent with targets resulted in 
increased response times and a higher rate of error. Priming effects were 
not apparent for primes which coincided with or followed their targets. 
Although the priming conditions and categorisation task have been 
described in terms of word-name this does not necessarily exclude the 
possibility that other forms of information relating to a given word, such 
as semantic information, could be implicated. Since the primes were 
always in a different typographic case from their corresponding targets it 
has been assumed that the relative priming effects could be related to 
name content rather than the repetition of physically identical stimuli. 
Additionally, the relative priming effects of information derived from 
other word attributes such as typographic case were assumed to balance 
out across trials. Again, facilitation and inhibition in relation to a 
`neutral' condition were assumed on the basis of subjects not associating 
the word 'ether' with any one of the case denoting words. As with case 
priming any underestimation or overestimation of facilitation or 
inhibition is assumed to be minimal. This is because, in terms of 
alertness, although habituation may arise from the neutral condition the 
congruent and incongruent primes are also extensively repeated and any 
condition dependent effects are assumed to be small. Unlike the neutral 
condition in the case priming experiment, the stimuli in all name priming 
conditions occupied a similar area and it is assumed that any 
differentiation in levels of general arousal arising from this is unlikely to 
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give rise to significant effects. The complexity of the stimuli in all 
conditions is also assumed to be similar so that differences in priming 
effects resulting from refractivity can be regarded as minimal. 
Name Priming of Case-Decision 
The priming effects obtained with the case-denoting words 'upper' and 
`lower' also followed a similar pattern as in the first two experiments. 
Here case-decision times were shorter for consistent targets and longer 
for inconsistent targets in comparison to when 'ether' was used as a 
prime. Error rates were also affected according to prime consistency as 
before. Facilitation and inhibition were assumed on the basis that subjects 
were not biased in their association of 'ether' with any one typographic 
case. The effect of name priming on case-decision has been regarded as 
an example of cross-attribute priming. The cross-attribute effects differed 
from the above 'within-attribute' priming effects in that they were 
subject to a delay; namely facilitatory and inhibitory effects were not 
obtained unless the prime preceded the target by at least 80 msec. This 
compares with significant facilitatory and inhibitory effects obtained at 
40 msec SOA in the case of within-attribute priming. 
Case and Name Priming of Case-Decision 
Combined case and name priming of case-decisions also resulted in 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects when pre-exposed primes were used. 
When the prime and target cases matched, response times were shorter 
and error rates lower in comparison to a neutral condition consisting of 
dashes. Similarly, longer response times and higher rates of error were 
obtained for those conditions with a case mismatch. 
The relative effects of name information combined with case information 
on case categorisation of a target differed according to case consistency; 
in particular facilitation increased when there were both case and name 
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consistencies in comparison to case consistency alone whilst inhibition 
did not increase for case and name inconsistency in comparison to case 
inconsistency alone. However, in the latter instance a difference in error 
rates was apparent. In comparison to case consistency alone, the 
combined effect of case consistent and name inconsistent primes was 
inhibitory. With incongruent case primes a relative facilitation was found 
when primes were additionally name consistent, however, net inhibition 
was obtained in relation to the neutral condition. 
Differences in the time-course of case- and name-priming were also 
apparent from the results with combined case- and name-primes. 
Consistent with the results of the previous experiments it was found that 
case-priming effects were obtained earlier than name-priming effects. 
This pattern was found both with regard to response latencies and error 
rates. 
Case Priming of Name-Decision 
A final experiment which sought to examine the effect of case priming 
on name-decisions produced anomalous results; in comparison to the 
neutral condition, consisting of a row of dashes, inhibitory effects were 
obtained with both consistent and inconsistent primes. Here the relative 
effects on both response latency and error rates were found to be of a 
similar magnitude. The time-course of effects was marked by the onset of 
significant case-congruent priming at zero SOA. Although case-
incongruent priming was not significant until an SOA of 40 msec SOA 
was reached, a trend in inhibitory effects was nevertheless apparent at 
zero SOA. 
As with case priming of case-decision, refractivity could have 
contributed towards an overestimate of inhibition at shorter SOAs while 
alertness could have had both facilitatory and inhibitory consequences for 
neutral primes. Again it is assumed that these effects were likely to be 
marginal, or self-compensating. 
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PROCESSING MECHANISMS 
In this section the case and name priming results are considered in 
relation to some possible processing mechanisms that might account for 
performance in the decision tasks. A major assumption here is that task 
performance can be characterised in terms of processing following a 
series of stages responsible for encoding input, decision making, 
selecting and effecting a response. Initially the discussion focuses on the 
extent to which the obtained data may be consistent with mechanisms 
relating to these stages when considered independently. Further possible 
empirical work relevant to some of the interpretations is also outlined. 
Since performance may be related to more than one mechanism this 
section leads on to a consideration of how the above mechanisms may, 
collectively, account for the priming effects. To begin with, then, some 
possible processing mechanisms are outlined and discussed in relation to 
the data. 
Expectancy 
One way in which expectancy may operate in relation to the selective 
priming effects is for subjects generate a set of expected targets after a 
prime has been presented (Posner, 1978). Targets which fall within this 
set are recognised more quickly than those which do not. According to 
Posner and Snyder (1975b) it may take a relatively long period of time 
(i.e., a few hundred msec) to generate an expectancy set and so any 
priming effects obtained as a result of this will be slow acting. The effect 
is regarded as strategic and processing of expected targets is speeded 
regardless of their relationship to the prime. Similarly, processing of 
unexpected targets, again regardless of their relationship to the prime, is 
slowed. Expectancy, then, could give rise to facilitation and inhibition. 
If the present case priming effects are to be interpreted in terms of the 
strategic nature of expectancy as outlined above then it is necessary to 
identify possible means whereby target categories might be predicted 
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from priming information. The experiments were designed so that it was 
not possible to predict the task category on any given trial on account that 
the probability of occurrence of each category was equal, not predictable 
from the prime, and the order of presentations randomised and unknown 
to any subject. However, this alone may not rule out the possibility for 
strategic effects. For example there could have been an expectancy effect 
arising from subjects being aware of the existence of congruent priming 
conditions. If, for example, there should be a tendency for congruent 
prime-target pairs to attract attention and be remembered then an 
expected target set could result so that a bias towards faster responses for 
the congruent conditions could arise. The time scale over which this 
could occur would depend upon the time required to generate an 
expectancy set. Some guidance in this respect may be sought from work 
already introduced in Chapter 3, such as that on letter matching carried 
out by Posner and Snyder (1975), and in category priming carried out by 
Neely (1977). From these studies it is assumed that expectancy effects 
would be unlikely to occur early in the time-course such as at 40, 80, or 
160 msec. Relatively few stimulus categories were available in the 
present case priming experiments, and hence the expectancy set could be 
a small one. However, Posner and Snyder's (1975) figure of some 300 
msec for the onset of strategic effects, for example, may remain a valid 
guide in that the number of possibilities regarding an expectancy set in 
their work is assumed not to be dissimilar to those in the present work. 
If strategic priming effects did occur then it would be more likely that 
they would be detectable with increasing SOA. However increases in 
facilitation and inhibition which might have been indicative of 
expectancy as described above were not apparent within the longer SOA 
range covered by the main subject data. Although expectancy effects 
could remain a possibility the present results do not easily lend 
themselves to this interpretation. 
The role of expectancy could, of course, be further examined with the 
present case priming experiments if trials were re-run in blocks where the 
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probability of the prime being consistent with the target category was 
varied. In view of Posner and Snyder's (1975) work it might be 
anticipated that primes highly predictive of consistent targets could give 
rise to an increase in facilitation for consistent targets and inhibition for 
inconsistent targets with increasing SOA, assuming strategic factors are 
relatively slow acting. Further to this, and to some extent analogous to 
Neely's (1977) work, the time-course of effects could also be examined 
when primes were more likely to mismatch targets. With consistent 
targets, facilitation at shorter SOAs (presently assumed to be non-
strategic) would be expected to give way to inhibition at longer SOAs. 
With inconsistent targets, inhibition at shorter SOAs (again assumed to 
be non-strategic) could be followed by facilitation at longer SOAs. In 
addition to a possible transition from facilitation to inhibition, and vice-
versa, being attributable to a contrast between automatic and strategic 
effects the above empirical work may provide more direct support for 
priming mechanisms identified by Posner and Snyder being applicable to 
decision tasks of the type used in the present work. It would also be of 
interest under the new experimental conditions to see if, contrary to 
Posner and Snyder (1975), and Neely (1977), inhibitory effects which 
could be attributed to automatic processes continued to be obtainable. 
A further test that could be carried out in relation to expectancy as a 
possible priming mechanism would be to prevent conscious identification 
of prime information. This might be achieved using the pattern masking 
techniques outlined in Chapter 2. Apart from this modification the case 
stimuli used and the task requirements could remain essentially 
unaltered. If effects were obtained with masked primes then it could be 
argued that expectancy would be unlikely to be involved. However, there 
are difficulties in interpretation here since the mechanisms involved in 
subliminal priming could be different from those involved with 
supraliminal priming. Moreover, if subliminal priming was not obtained 
then, on this argument alone, besides expectancy remaining viable, 
mechanisms other than expectancy dependent upon supraliminal prime 
information may not become operative. Although reservations have 
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already been expressed regarding the difficulties in establishing criteria 
for sub-threshold priming and obtaining reliable effects the technique 
may nevertheless remain useable if finer quantitative measures are not 
required. Testing for expectancy effects may not be demanding in this 
respect. 
Spreading Activation 
A mechanism introduced in Chapter 1 that could account for priming 
effects during encoding is spreading activation. Unlike expectancy, 
spreading activation has been characterised as automatic and relatively 
fast acting (Posner & Snyder, 1975). Activation may spread among a 
number of interconnected processing units. These units have been 
referred to as 'nodes'. Each node can represent a concept or an entity of 
information such as a feature, a letter, or a word. Each node is also 
capable of assuming a level of activation. Activation may be derived 
from input to the processing system and spread from one node to another 
along links or connective pathways. Information from activated nodes is 
made available for further processing. It has been assumed that a change 
in the level of activation of nodes requires a finite period of time. On this 
basis it has also been assumed, for example, that information from nodes 
may be made available relatively quickly if the nodes are already partly 
activated. In this way one input may facilitate the processing of another. 
Although Posner and Snyder (1975) have argued that spreading 
activation can facilitate processing, other models based upon this 
mechanism may also allow for the possibility of inhibitory effects. For 
example, with Rumelhart and McClelland's (1981) interactive activation 
model, nodes acquire levels of activation which may vary from a 
minimum negative value through a resting level to a maximum positive 
value. Nodes with a positive activation level are deemed active while 
those with activation at or below zero are considered inactive. A 
distinction between activity relating to nodes and the nature of 
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connections between nodes was also made; active nodes may have both 
excitatory and inhibitory effects on other nodes according to the nature of 
the interconnections while inactive nodes have no effect. The combined 
effect on an individual node may be excitatory or inhibitory depending 
upon the relationship between it and the array of nodes or 'neighbours' to 
which it is directly connected. As a consequence the level of activation 
may be raised or lowered in accordance with an averaging effect of the 
connections. On this basis it is possible that priming information 
consistent with a given stimulus would raise the level of activation while 
inconsistent information would lower the level. Accordingly congruency-
dependent facilitatory and inhibitory effects are possible and, ignoring 
other mechanisms, the data from the first three experiments could be 
viewed as generally consistent with this interpretation. Difficulties arise, 
however, in accounting for the priming effects obtained with the two 
further experiments; when case information primed name-decisions 
(Experiment 5), and, when combined case and name information primed 
case-decisions (Experiment 4). 
In the discussion of Experiment 5 it was argued that the inhibition 
obtained when congruent case information primed name-decisions may 
have resulted from the early availability of activated nonverbal 
information that could be associated semantically with an opposite name-
response. A possible explanation for this was that in order for a given 
typographic case form to access a verbal referent it might first access 
codes representing typographic case in general. From this superordinate 
category multiple codes may be activated so that the verbal labels 
pertaining to both case subsets (i.e., 'upper' and 'lower') may be derived. 
As a result of this a net inhibiton could have arisen from the effects of the 
inconsistent verbal component. This process was summarised in 
Figure 4.39 (Page 248). 
With the results using combined primes in Experiment 4 it was found 
that facilitation of case-decisions increased with both case and name 
consistent information in comparison to case consistency alone. This has 
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already been accounted for by spreading activation on the assumption 
that with case and name consistency a greater number of nodes related to 
the target category become activated thereby reducing the time required 
for recognition. Although an increase in inhibition could similarly be 
predictable for case and name inconsistency in comparison to case 
inconsistency alone, this was not found. If it is assumed that spreading 
activation during encoding is at least partly responsible for priming then 
the above asymmetry could result from facilitation applying to case and 
name information and inhibition only to case information. Although this 
is a logical possibility it is not clear, however, from the encoding 
mechanisms described why this might occur. A further encoding 
possibility is that within-attribute effects could occur in the absence of 
cross-attribute effects but, again, given cross-attribute effects do occur, a 
question remains concerning the locus of association for representations 
in different modalities. A possibility which is consistent with spreading 
activation as characterised by those such as Posner and Snyder (1975) is 
that within- and cross-attribute facilitation could occur without inhibition. 
Here there are obvious difficulties with the similar and complementary 
facilitatory and inhibitory processes that might be predictable from 
Rumelhart and McClelland's (1981) interactive activation model. Other 
possibilities remain, of course, in that increased facilitation with 
combined case and name priming could be due to mechanisms other than 
spreading activation. These are discussed later. 
The rapid onset of priming as indicated by the early sharp transient from 
nonsignificant to significant relative effects in the time-course for each 
experiment may be regarded as consistent with Posner and 
Snyder's (1975) notion of spreading activation being fast acting. The 
time-course characteristic in all the experiments is of interest by virtue of 
its marking the onset of priming as well as the occurrence of an abrupt 
transient in effects. Again, these qualities can be discussed in relation to a 
model such as the interactive activation model suggested by Rumelhart 
and McClelland (1981). This model is characterised by the spread of 
activation between layers of nodes. In relation to models of this type 
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`bottom-up' processing has been used in reference to the rule that the 
activation of a 'lower' layer of nodes concerned with earlier analyses of 
input may only affect the state of activation of a 'higher' level of nodes 
concerned with later analyses. 'Top-down' processing may be similarly 
interpreted as activation at a higher-level only affecting a lower-level. An 
interactive model by definition is one characterised by both top-down 
and bottom-up processing (Rumelhart, Hinton & McClelland, 1986). The 
relevance of interactivity to the time-course of the present results is now 
considered. 
If encoding is interactive then a build-up of activity may be imagined 
where, as a result of input, some lower-level nodes reach a firing 
threshold relatively quickly and begin to activate higher-level nodes. 
These higher-level nodes may in turn activate or reactivate lower-level 
nodes. This process may continue so that the concurrent build-up in 
activation at different levels occurs over a period of time. In Rumelhart 
and McClelland's (1981) interactive activation model the speed at which 
this build-up occurs depends essentially upon the time it takes individual 
nodes to reach a firing threshold. Within such a framework it is assumed 
that recipient nodes will reach a firing threshold earlier if they are already 
partly activated. This state may arise through the prior presentation of 
compatible contextual information. This mechanism is consistent with 
the finding that within-attribute facilitatory encoding effects were 
obtained with pre-exposed congruent priming information. This is also in 
line with Taylor's (1977) notion of a secondary specific effect where the 
processing of one stimulus is influenced by the completed (or, at least, 
partly completed) processing of another stimulus. 
The above notion of interactivity also raises the possibility that the 
effects of pre-exposed primes could also have resulted from a top-down 
activating component. In this case early priming information encoded at a 
higher level could reactivate lower-level nodes so that they fire earlier 
with the subsequent presentation of compatible input. This process can 
also be extended to priming with simultaneously or post-exposed 
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contextual information. A parallel may also be drawn between this and a 
form of 'backward priming' that has been postulated by Koriat (1981). 
Here the suggestion was that information activated as a result of prior 
target input could reactivate input resulting from a subsequently 
presented prime. As a result of this both target and priming information 
may be processed together. It can be argued that this type of mechanism 
may accord with Taylor's (1977) notion of a primary specific effect 
where the processing of one input is influenced by the concurrent 
processing of another. In the present work, however, no within- or cross-
attribute facilitation was obtained with simultaneous or post-exposed 
primes. The same can be said for inhibitory effects if the relative speed of 
processing of case and name input (discussed below) is allowed for when 
case information primed name-decisions (Experiment 5). This is also of 
interest in relation to another related feature which typifies interactive 
nodal models; the speed with which a given node may reach a threshold 
for firing depends upon the number of activated nodes to which it has 
excitatory connections. With this in mind it may be argued that the effect 
of simultaneously presenting compatible context and target information 
may also be to increase the number of activatory interconnections for a 
given set of nodes so that speeded encoding would be expected. On this 
basis it would again be expected that the facilitatory priming effects 
exhibited at positive SOAs in the experiments carried out would also be 
obtainable at zero SOA and, perhaps, at shorter negative SOAs. The data 
were not consistent with this however. 
If it is assumed that spreading activation acts as a priming mechanism 
then one explanation for the lack of primary specific effects might be that 
the presentation of either priming information alone or target information 
alone was sufficient to produce a saturation. That is, for example, 
information carried by the target would be sufficient to activate all nodes 
relevant to a given input category to some point above the firing 
threshold so that no speeding of target-encoding would result on 
availability of simultaneously presented compatible contextual 
information. Such an explanation may, however, be questioned if it is 
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assumed that the increase in facilitation with consistent case and name 
primes in comparison to case consistency alone (Experiment 4) is 
attributable to encoding activation. This would suggest that saturation did 
not result from either case or name priming information alone. 
Another, and perhaps more direct, explanation for the lack of a primary 
specific effect is that encoding can proceed successfully on a bottom-up 
basis with minimal interactivity. Here the method relating to the priming 
experiments may be relevant. Firstly, target encoding at all levels could 
proceed successfully on the basis of minimal information because of the 
high familiarity due to the large number of experimental repetitions. 
Secondly, input was presented clearly (i.e., it was not visually degraded) 
so that processing gains from access to simultaneously available or post-
exposed contextual information would not be great. If the above account 
is tenable it suggests that while interactivity among nodal levels may 
occur, especially with unfamiliar input, encoding is nevertheless possible 
with minimal or even zero interactivity. 
The apparent lack of a primary specific effect stands in contrast to Glaser 
and Diingelhoff's (1984) work with cross-modality priming of picture 
naming and word categorisation. Here the existence of priming effects 
with simultaneously presented or post-exposed stimuli was taken to 
support a temporal proximity rather than a temporal precedence 
argument. In view of the above rationale it is possible that the effects 
obtained with simultaneous or post-exposed primes by Glaser and 
Diingelhoff could have occurred because subjects were relatively 
unfamiliar with the stimulus items used. Their findings are further 
discussed in relation to the present data in the next section. 
If it is assumed that with increased encoding interactivity, selective 
priming effects build up over a measurably longer period of time then 
two possible experimental manipulations may provide further tests of the 
above interpretations. Firstly, familiarity with the targets could be 
reduced by increasing the number of different items falling within a 
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given task category. This might result in a less abrupt transient with 
effects extending into the simultaneous or post-exposed priming region. 
Secondly, visual degradation of target stimuli could increase the time 
over which stimulus features become integrated. Here though, the form 
of stimulus degradation may be important. While pattern masking 
introduces spurious features which could weaken bottom-up input and so 
enhance contextual effects, the same may not hold with contrast 
reduction, or a light flash mask (Humphreys & Bruce, 1989). If either, or 
both of the above manipulations results in increased interactivity 
occurring over a relatively long period of time then it is possible that 
priming effects might be obtained from simultaneously presented, or, 
even post-exposed contextual information. It may be noted that possible 
variation of the effects of stimulus degradation according to context also 
has implications regarding the locus of facilitatory and inhibitory effects; 
this is further discussed below. 
Decision Making 
In relation to the tasks in the present experiments decision making can 
refer to a number of functions; for example, one job of a decision 
mechanism might be to decide upon the task-related category to which 
encoded target information belongs (e.g., 'upper case'), while another job 
might involve selecting and releasing an appropriate response 
programme (e.g., `right-hand keypress'). 
With regard to deciding upon the category of input in relation to an 
experimental task one possibility is that some form of comparison may 
occur with a given encoded target attribute against a stored set of 
representations (e.g., Seymour, 1979). In the present experiments one 
question which arises concerns whether such a 'task set' might only 
contain information identical with the task-related attribute of a stimulus, 
or, whether other attributes could be represented or available. For 
example, if decisions were based upon the task attribute alone then 
within- rather than cross-attribute effects would be expected to occur at 
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this stage. The further possibility remains, of course, that both case and 
name information could affect a comparison process so that cross-
attribute effects could be accountable in this way. This point is further 
discussed below where the data are considered in relation to other 
possible priming mechanisms. 
A decision making process such as the above may be subject to 
facilitatory effects if items within a task set were activated in accordance 
with priming information. Although inhibition may arise from 
inconsistent primes, as with encoding, it is difficult to account for the 
finding with combined primes in Experiment 4 that increased facilitatory 
effects were obtained from case and name consistencies while increased 
inhibitory effects from case and name inconsistencies were not. Again, as 
with encoding, this difficulty in accounting for the data might be 
resolvable if the above decision process was subject to facilitation alone. 
If inhibition did occur, however, it is also possible that the lack of 
increase in inhibitory effects could have resulted from decisions being 
based upon case information alone. If this was so, other mechanisms 
would be responsible for the increase in facilitation with case and name 
congruent primes. 
As a result of an initial decision process a response consistent with a 
prime could be pre-programmed and the threshold for effecting it 
lowered so that the occurrence of consistent oncoming target information 
could result in the earlier release of the program. This could lead to both 
within- and cross-attribute facilitation according to whether decisions 
were made on the basis of case or name information. However a response 
pre-programmed as a result of priming information could also be a source 
of inhibition. This possibility is discussed in the next section. 
The onset of the transient obtained in the time-course of the priming 
effects can also be considered in relation to decision-making processes. 
In the same way that encoding thresholds may be raised or lowered from 
pre-exposed stimuli so also might the threshold of activation of the 
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elements of a memory set involved in comparison. Similar threshold 
effects linked with the release of a response program might also be 
applicable. If it is assumed that priming results from prior activation of 
an item in a memory set, or responses consistent with the prime being 
pre-programmed then it would be expected that pre- rather than 
simultaneously or post-exposed primes would give rise to effects. This, 
again is consistent with the within-attribute data and, assuming case-
encoding requires less time than name-encoding, with the cross-attribute 
data. 
Relative Speed of Processing and Response Competition 
In Chapter 3 relative speed of processing and response competition were 
introduced as one possible account for the S troop effect. With this 
interpretation it is assumed that different stimulus attributes are encoded 
in parallel at different speeds up to a point where responses are 
generated. It is further assumed that there is a limited-capacity response 
channel, or buffer, to which the first available response is admitted (e.g., 
Morton, 1969; Treisman, 1969; and Neumann, 1980); a competition for 
final output. If stimulus attributes convey information leading to 
incompatible responses then a response to one attribute may be delayed if 
time is required to suppress a prior potential response to another attribute. 
If response compatible information is conveyed by different stimulus 
attributes then one possibility is that the same response programme could 
be activated. On this basis output based upon a target attribute may 
continue unimpeded. However, there are a number of other possibilities 
concerning sequences of compatible and incompatible responses. These 
are now considered in relation to the present results. Although the term 
response competition has been used in relation to interference or 
inhibition arising from incompatible responses to different stimulus 
attributes, it should be noted that the use of the term in the present 
discussion is taken to include responses to the same or different attributes 
in a sequence of stimuli. Furthermore, the possibility of facilitatory 
effects is also considered. 
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Although not a response competition effect as such, it is possible that an 
apparent facilitatory effect could arise with a target response if output 
proceeds on the basis of a consistent response which becomes available 
first. This might be regarded as a simple `headstart' effect. With the 
present within-attribute experiments, for example, the error peak at very 
short pre-exposures of inconsistent primes, and matched to some extent 
by a trough for consistent primes (e.g., Figures 4.9 and 4.13, Pages 154 
and 173), could suggest that output proceeds on the basis of prime 
information alone. However the possibility that a simple headstart effect 
might account for the data throughout the positive SOA range is 
considered unlikely. This is because, with consistent prime-target pairs, it 
would be expected that the magnitude of facilitation would be of a 
similar order to the prime-target onset asynchrony, and, increasing prime 
pre-exposures would result in similar increases in the magnitude of 
facilitation; this clearly was not the case. The error peak could have 
occurred as a result of problems of distinguishing the prime from the 
target in terms of case relevant information; this might have led to the 
generation of inappropriate responses. Alternatively, if responses were 
generated according to prime and target identity then response 
suppression could have been disrupted. If the latter explanation holds 
then, in the same way that response suppression may be liable to 
disruption at an early stage in time, it is also possible that once 
established it gains a 'momentum' which is difficult to reverse. This 
suggestion may be drawn from the observation for the main subject data 
at longer SOAs where the error rates for incongruent priming drop 
dramatically, and on some occasions (Experiments 1, 4, and 5) appear to 
fall below those for the neutral condition. In other words the act of 
suppressing a given (erroneous) response could make it more difficult to 
re-initiate the same response. There may be parallels between this 
process and the psychological refractory effect. 
If it is assumed that presentation of both prime and target stimuli results 
in the generation of potential responses which can interfere then the 
present data can be interpreted in terms of response competition. In the 
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case of within-attribute priming, for example, a conflict would be 
expected with the pre-exposure of a prime inconsistent with a target and 
the time-courses of within-attribute inhibitory effects obtained in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 4 are consistent with this. If an incongruent prime 
and target were presented simultaneously then there might also be a 
chance that a response consistent with prime information may gain initial 
control of the output channel and have to be suppressed with a resulting 
inhibitory effect. However, apart from a slight but non-significant trend 
with the main subject data from Experiment 1, inhibitory within-attribute 
effects were not obtained with incongruent conditions at zero SOA. One 
possibility, of course, is that competing responses were not produced; a 
distinction between prime and target information derived from the 
relative spatial arrangement of the stimuli within the visual field might 
have been instrumental here. However, if responses were generated to 
primes as well as targets then, again, a further mechanism would be 
necessary so that responses to targets rather than primes were outputted. 
If response suppression is to be initiated, prime information would have 
to be distinguished from target information. In addition to information 
from the spatial arrangement of the stimuli, other than for simultaneously 
presented primes and targets, temporal information could have been 
utilised since the trials were blocked in terms of onset asynchrony. The 
role of temporal information could be further investigated through 
mixing pre- and post-exposed primes within block of trials. The extent to 
which temporal information might be utilised in distinguishing prime 
from target information might be reflected in the error rates for choice 
decisions. 
With response competition considered in relation to cross-attribute 
priming the relative speed of processing of the different stimulus 
attributes has also to be taken into account. With the present experiments 
it is assumed that case categorisation responses are generated in less time 
than those for name categorisation. This assumption is consistent with the 
shorter case-decision latencies obtained in comparison to those for name-
decision across experiments. Further to this, the relative speed of 
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processing account is consistent with relative delays in the onset of 
within- and cross-attribute effects. For example, while significant 
inhibitory (and facilitatory) effects were obtained at 40 msec SOA when 
case information primed case-decisions (Experiment 1), similar effects 
were not obtained until at least 80 msec SOA with name-priming of case-
decisions (Experiment 3). This relative delay in the name-priming effect 
in comparison to case-priming was also apparent from the results 
obtained with the combined case- and name-primes used in the case-
congruent condition in Experiment 4. These latter combined priming 
results are, however, more complex and will be further discussed below. 
A similar interpretation may also be applied to the reliable trend in case-
priming on name-decision which was established from zero SOA 
(Experiment 5) in comparison to name-priming of name-decision which 
did not take effect until an SOA of 40 msec was reached (Experiment 2). 
The interference that may result from a sequence of responses has been 
considered in relation to the combined priming effects in the discussion 
of Experiment 4. In order to interpret the findings it was assumed that 
both primes and targets generate potential responses which are subject to 
interference. With combined primes there were further possibilities. 
Firstly, responses could have been generated for the task-relevant 
stimulus attributes only (i.e., case information with Experiment 4). In this 
case competition, or mutual facilitation, of responses in relation to an 
output buffer would not be expected with cross-attribute information. 
While this could account for the lack of relative inhibition with target-
incongruent case and name information combined, the same does not 
hold for the converse relative facilitation with combined target-congruent 
information. In this latter respect, however, other mechanisms such as 
those for encoding could have been responsible. Secondly, the possibility 
that responses could be generated for name as well as case information 
can also be considered. If a response to case information was produced in 
less time than that for name information then, given a sufficient pre-
exposure interval, a sequence consisting of a response to case 
information followed by a response to name information would be 
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available before that generated in accordance with the target's case. That 
target-inconsistent responses from the case and name content of a prime 
were treated as a singular response to be suppressed was considered 
possible in view that inhibition from combined case and name 
incongruent primes was similar in magnitude to that for incongruent case 
primes. Here the assumption was that more time would be required to 
suppress two responses if they were treated separately. The absence of a 
relatively greater combined inhibitory effect in response latency may be 
contrasted with the error results for the same priming conditions where a 
trend in relative effects was apparent. Here the probability of suppression 
of responses to priming information being disrupted could depend upon 
the number of potential responses resulting from information consistent 
with each priming attribute. Again, this may be distinct from the time 
costs involved should response suppression be successful. It has already 
been noted that combined congruent case and name information resulted 
in a relative increase in facilitation. Apart from other mechanisms, a 
possible account for this is that mutual priming between consecutive 
responses could have occurred, either on entry to or within a response 
buffer, or, with the subsequent execution of responses. However, in the 
absence of other sources of facilitation, a mutual priming account would 
not be consistent with the net facilitation from combined case-congruent 
and name-incongruent primes in view of the intervening inconsistent 
response from the name component. Although facilitation could be a 
response effect, other sources of facilitation are also likely. 
If consecutive potential responses resulting from a prime differ with one, 
therefore, being inconsistent with the target then response suppression 
could occur. This could account for the relative inhibition obtained with 
incongruent name information combined with case-congruent primes. 
Although a potential response to the congruent case component of the 
prime would be the first to be generated and control output this would 
also be followed by a potential incongruent response arising from the 
name component which might have to be suppressed before a response to 
the target could be outputted. With case-incongruent and name-congruent 
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information combined, inhibition could arise from the suppression of the 
initial inconsistent case response. It might be noted here that in the 
absence of inhibition from other sources, it would be difficult to account 
for the overall inhibition obtained with case incongruent combined with 
name congruent primes in comparison to the neutral condition if only 
those responses immediately prior to the target were suppressed. 
Relative speed of processing and response-competition can also be 
further considered in relation to the relative magnitude of case priming 
effects. In Chapter 4 it was argued that with a serial response buffer the 
degree of inhibition resulting from the suppression of an unwanted motor 
program may be the same regardless of its source. Here inhibition was 
seen to depend upon the nature of the unwanted motor program rather 
than how it was invoked. On this basis it would be expected that the 
degree of inhibition would be the same regardless of whether priming 
was within- or cross-attribute. If response suppression was solely 
responsible for inhibition then this expectation would be consistent with 
the general uniformity of the magnitude of the inhibitory effects obtained 
across the different experiments. However, here it should be noted that 
for the main-subject data in Experiment 2, where incongruent name 
information was used to prime name-decisions, inhibitory effects were 
found to be greater. It is possible that this latter departure from prediction 
may have arisen in view of the difficulties of cross-experimental 
comparisons of the magnitude of condition-dependent changes in 
response latency. The similarities otherwise obtained with the 
corresponding additional subject data may, to some extent, bear this out. 
These possibilities, however, are not discussed in detail since such 
comparisons of priming effects across experiments are made with caution 
and could be misleading. 
In sum, relative speed of processing and response competition could 
account for the inhibitory effects obtained. An apparent facilitation could 
arise from a headstart effect, however, it has been argued from the 
present data that this might only occur at very short SOAs. Although an 
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encoding account for facilitation has been suggested the possibility 
remains that facilitation could also result from response processes. 
Empirical tests which might further locate sources of facilitation and 
inhibition are discussed in the next section. 
Processing Mechanisms: A Collective Summary 
On considering the above mechanisms a number of accounts for the 
priming effects obtained remain possible. However, it has been argued 
that some mechanisms more easily accommodate the present data than 
others. There were difficulties with expectation as an account for priming 
at the relatively short prime-target onset asynchronies used. Similarly, 
there were problems in accounting for facilitation across the SOA range 
in terms of a simple headstart effect where output might have been 
produced on the basis of prime information when followed by a 
consistent target. From the mechanisms that have been considered, some 
appear more viable than others when considered independently in 
relation to the data. These mechanisms, however, have also to be 
considered in terms of their mutual compatibility with the results. This is 
now attempted in the form of an overall summary. Through this summary 
a view is suggested of processing as relevant to the experimental tasks 
used. 
From the series of processing stages posited earlier, input is assumed to 
be initially subject to encoding. Here automatic spreading activation 
could account for facilitatory effects obtained according to the 
consistency of priming information with the target. Assuming 
interconnections exist between case and name representations it is 
possible that an increase in the level of activation of a given 
representation in one modality could result in an increase in activation for 
consistent information in another modality. On this basis not only are 
cross-attribute effects possible but they could also be subject to relative 
increases according to the overall consistency of information within and 
across priming attributes. This has been argued to account for stronger 
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facilitatory effects with combined case and name congruent information 
on case-decisions compared with case congruent information alone. 
There is a possibility that inhibitory effects could occur with spreading 
activation. However, if the view is taken that these could be similar and 
complementary to facilitatory effects (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1981) 
then there are difficulties in accounting for no relative increase in 
inhibitory effects being obtained when inconsistent case and name 
information primed case-decisions. The possibility of only facilitation 
occurring during encoding is in keeping with accounts such as that by 
Posner and Snyder (1975). 
It has been assumed that the results of encoding are available to 
mechanisms where a decision concerning the category of information in 
relation to the task is made so that an appropriate response can be 
generated. With regard to the mechanisms considered, the possibility that 
decisions relate only to the task-relevant attribute of a prime (e.g., case 
information for a case-decision task) raises some difficulties. With a 
case-decision task, for example, if decisions and responses were based 
upon case information alone then name priming effects should be located 
prior to the decision stage. In terms of the mechanisms considered it 
would follow that facilitatory and inhibitory name priming would be 
attributable to spreading activation during encoding. However, inhibitory 
name priming would also imply a capacity for inhibitory case priming 
during encoding; the difficulties with this have already been noted. In 
view of this, decisions could be influenced by non-task- as well as task-
relevant attributes of a prime (e.g., case and name information for a case-
decision task). If decision making involves activation of representations, 
such as in a comparison process, then, as with encoding, difficulties 
occur when attempting to account for the asymmetry regarding the 
increase in facilitation and inhibition with combined congruent and 
combined incongruent primes respectively on case-decisions. Given this 
latter problem, sources of inhibition (and facilitation) beyond the 
encoding and decision stages may be considered. 
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If potential responses are generated in accordance with both a prime's 
case and name content then these may be subject to interference. One 
possibility is that responses may compete for entry to a limited capacity 
output buffer. On this basis inhibition could arise from early arriving 
target-inconsistent responses having to be suppressed. It has been argued 
that the degree of inhibition resulting from suppression of an inconsistent 
response could be the same, regardless of how the response was invoked. 
In this respect possible similarities in magnitude of within- and cross-
attribute inhibition were noted. The problem of accounting for combined 
case- and name-incongruent priming effects upon case-decision not being 
stronger than those for incongruent case priming alone, however, 
remains. One possible explanation in terms of response competition is 
that a rapid sequence of response programs generated for case and name 
information could be treated collectively as a single program. Again, the 
argument would be that once a response program has been generated the 
degree of inhibition involved in its suppression could be the same as that 
for programs from other sources. Although it is possible that a sequence 
of identical responses consistent with the target could be treated 
collectively with no relative increase in facilitation, mutual priming 
remains a possibility. That facilitation could solely arise from mutual 
priming of consistent responses, however, is considered unlikely in view 
of the net facilitation with congruent case combined with incongruent 
name information. 
The present results are consistent with facilitation and inhibition resulting 
from the prior availability of priming information, and, that responses to 
case information are generated in less time than those for name 
information. Further issues regarding the temporal relationship between 
prime and target information are discussed in the next section. 
Although it has been argued that some processing mechanisms can 
account for the present results, difficulties arise concerning the 
occurrence of inhibition with case priming of name decision regardless of 
congruency. This is returned to in the next section. Additionally, some 
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alternatives remain concerning the loci of facilitatory and inhibitory 
effects. Possible further work in this respect is now briefly considered. 
One way of investigating whether inhibition could occur in the process of 
encoding is to examine the effects of stimulus degradation on 
performance. In particular, it can be argued that early stages of visual 
processing are slowed if the level of illumination is low, or the contrast 
reduced (e.g., Wilson & Anstis, 1969). Additionally, Meyer et al. (1975) 
have found that the difference between lexical decision response times 
for targets primed by associated and unassociated words varied according 
to whether they were intact or degraded; responses for associated words 
were slowed less than those for unassociated words. This interaction was 
taken to suggest that semantic association and stimulus quality affect a 
common processing stage, the assumption being that processing is 
carried out through a series of independent stages (Sternberg, 1969). 
Meyer et al. (1975) also argued from their further data involving 
phonemic transformations that the effects of visual degradation (and, 
hence, semantic association) were likely to influence encoding, with 
stimulus quality not substantially affecting further processing. 
If an analogous approach to the above association effects with word 
stimuli is applied to the current case priming experiments then it may be 
possible to obtain data which may further constrain the location of 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects. Here, for example, the slowing of 
responses resulting from stimulus degradation should be lessened with 
congruent priming in comparison to that for a neutral condition on the 
assumption that facilitation occurs at the encoding stage. If inhibition 
also occurs during encoding then an interaction effect might also be 
obtainable with incongruent primes. With spreading activation as a 
mechanism, for example, information from degraded target features 
might take relatively longer to activate an appropriate representation if its 
threshold had been raised as a result of prior inconsistent information. 
Conversely, the absence of an interaction effect with incongruent primes 
would be consistent with inhibition not occurring during encoding. Here 
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the validity of results, of course, would depend upon providing neutral 
priming. Although some difficulties in this latter respect have already 
been expressed it might nevertheless be fruitful to pursue this line of 
enquiry in future work. Again, interpretation of such results would 
assume a sequence of processes to which Sternberg's (1969) additive 
factor method is applicable. An absence of interaction with inhibitory 
priming would be informative to the extent that it could, by default, 
support the argument that decision or responding processes could account 
for inhibitory priming. In view of the possibility that facilitation may 
result from the spread of activation during encoding, it would be 
expected that an interaction effect with stimulus degradation would be 
obtained with facilitatory priming. However, the possibility that 
facilitation could also be a decision or response effect would still remain. 
One way that response facilitation might be distinguished from encoding 
facilitation would be to compare the effects of priming using conditions 
which are response compatible but encoding incompatible. This, for 
example, could be arranged by using pairs of word and picture stimuli. 
To illustrate this, the word 'tree' and a picture denoting a tree, and the 
word 'boat' and a picture of a boat could be used either as primes or as 
targets. In order to allow the above priming possibilities the occurrence 
of 'tree' (word) or 'boat' (picture) could be registered by a right-hand 
keypress and 'boat' (word) and 'tree' (picture) by the left-hand. Encoding 
incompatibility and response compatibility (e-, r+) would be obtained if, 
for example, 'tree' (word) was used to prime 'boat' (picture). Similarly, 
an example of encoding compatibility and response incompatibility 
(e+, r-) would be when 'boat' (word) was used to prime 'boat' (picture). 
If facilitation occurs during response processing then this could be 
detectable through the (e-, r+) condition. If inhibition due to encoding 
was weak or did not occur, this possibility having been considered above, 
then detection of response facilitation would depend upon comparison 
against a neutral baseline. Here, again, the assumption would be that 
neutral priming could be obtainable, given the reservations already 
discussed. In the event of inhibitory effects occurring during encoding 
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these might similarly be detectable if (e-, r+) latencies were compared 
with those for neutral primes. Again, and subject to the same assumptions 
regarding neutral primes, a net inhibitory effect could be attributable to 
encoding. The above method could, of course, present difficulties 
regarding task demands. However, it may be noted that useable data have 
been acquired by those such as Neely (1977) and Seymour (1977) where 
the demands resulting from some of the experimental manipulations used 
may be regarded as not altogether dissimilar. 
WITHIN- AND CROSS-ATTRIBUTE PRIMING SIMILARITIES: 
THE PRESENT RESULTS AND OTHER WORK 
Some questions which lay behind the present series of experiments 
concerned the extent to which the effects of within- and cross-attribute 
priming could be similar and the extent to which the same processing 
mechanisms might be involved. It was argued that some similarities 
between within and cross attribute priming effects that might have been 
drawn from the results of other experimental work could be obscured by 
differences in the stimuli and procedures used. As already noted, the 
present work has sought to compare within- and cross-attribute priming 
effects where experimental differences have been minimised. Although 
the viability of some mechanisms which may underlie within- and cross-
attribute priming has been argued, further discussion is merited 
concerning the extent to which within- and cross-attribute priming could 
be similar, and, how the present results relate to other work; in particular 
the priming and interference studies introduced in Chapter 3. 
The present within-attribute priming results can provide a reference 
against which other priming results can be compared. Here both 
facilitation and inhibition were quickly established for pre-exposed 
primes. With regard to facilitation and inhibition a comparison can be 
made between these results and those for letter matching reported by 
Posner and Snyder (1975). While it has been argued that automatic 
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inhibition as well as facilitation was obtained in the case priming 
experiments, automatic inhibition was not detected by Posner and 
Snyder. It was argued in Chapter 3 that this might have arisen in view of 
the difficulties regarding a neutral prime with the letter matching task 
used, and, that letter matching might have been confounded with prime-
target matching. In view of the present results a further observation on 
Posner and Snyder's work can be made. Namely, assuming response 
competition could account for inhibition, it can be argued that for Posner 
and Snyder to have obtained automatic inhibition response competition 
might also have to be applicable to their results. However, while in the 
present experiments information carried by an incongruent prime was in 
itself linked to a response with a particular hand, in Posner and Snyder's 
letter matching task priming information alone would not have implied a 
particular handed response. In view of this responses to primes might not 
have been generated in the way that they could have been with the 
present case-decisions. In this respect inhibition arising from response 
competition would not apply. 
Response competition, however, could apply to Taylor's (1977) results 
with letter decisions. From the description of this work in Chapter 3 it is 
apparent that prime as well as target information corresponded to a given 
handed response. With regard to inhibition and facilitation, then, the 
within-attribute findings are consistent with Taylor's (1977) in that 
relative response latencies were obtained. However, an important 
difference in relation to the present results is that Taylor (1977, 
Experiment 1) obtained effects with simultaneous primes and targets. 
Although neither a case nor name-decision task, Taylor's use of keypress 
responses according to particular letter identities has similarities with the 
present work. Also, as with the present experiments, the stimuli were 
highly familiar to the subjects. This latter point, as argued earlier, could 
suggest that a strong primary specific effect resulting from an interaction 
between bottom-up and top-down processing would not be likely. On this 
basis it is difficult to explain the disparity in the onset of effects. 
However, one difference which could have been crucial concerns the 
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spatial arrangement of the stimuli. A feature of Taylor's experiment was 
the use of an asterisk which was not only presented immediately prior to 
the target but was also in the same spatial position (see Figure 3.4, 
Page 91). Here it is possible that masking could have arisen, resulting in 
a short term disruption, so that initial processing of the target was 
delayed in relation to the priming letters (which were not spatially 
coincident with the asterisk). An obvious test of this interpretation would 
be to re-run Taylor's experiment either with the asterisk spatially offset, 
or, removed altogether. Further to this, it may be noted that significant 
priming effects were not obtained with letter matching at the shortest 
SOA of 10 msec in the time-course results reported by Posner and 
Snyder (1975). 
Although similarities in facilitation and inhibition have been noted 
between within-attribute case and name priming, a difference remains in 
that more time was required for name responses. If it is assumed that the 
typographic case-attribute of a word can be treated as a non-verbal, or 
pictorial, attribute as distinct from its name, or verbal, attribute then one 
way of accounting for the difference in latencies is in terms of modality 
specific recognition systems. The single- and dual-coding models 
introduced in Chapter 1 are illustrative of this. With single-encoding it is 
held that both verbal and nonverbal information can be represented in a 
common semantic system; one example of this being the sensory-
semantic model of picture and word encoding (Nelson et al., 1977). 
Alternatively, dual-coding models assume that qualitatively different 
semantic representations exist for verbal and nonverbal input. An 
example of this second type of model that was referred to is Paivio and 
Begg's (1981) dual-coding model of meaning. With either model more 
time could be required to activate name codes than case codes. 
While an encoding account of the difference in case- and name-decision 
latencies is plausible there is also a possibility that task-related decisions 
could be modality dependent in this respect. If decisions were based upon 
semantic representations of input then, with dual-coding, output from 
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each system could be treated differentially. Although this may not arise 
with single-encoding there is also the possibility that decisions could be 
based upon output directly from any featural systems involved. This 
possibility is further discussed below. 
Although encoding may initially be modality specific, the mechanisms 
underlying within- and cross-attribute priming can nevertheless be 
regarded as similar insofar that representations exist which can become 
activated, and this in turn has consequences for performance. With either 
single- or dual-coding, activation of representations in one modality 
could result in activation of related representations in another modality. 
With single-encoding, processing converges on a common semantic stage 
while dual-coding allows links to be made between representations 
pertaining to each modality. While name priming of case-decision 
appears consistent with the above within-attribute results in that both 
facilitation and inhibition occurred, there was a notable departure from 
this pattern when, regardless of congruency, case information had an 
inhibitory effect upon name-decisions. That the inhibitory effects might 
not have resulted from case content is difficult to account for. The 
possibility that responses in the neutral condition could have been 
speeded as a result of the reduced complexity or reduced area of the 
dashes used in comparison to the other stimuli would not be consistent 
with the results obtained when dashes were used as a baseline in case 
priming of case-decision. Although the inhibitory effects might be 
accountable in terms of modified processing mechanisms, or, processing 
mechanisms other than those already introduced, none were found to be 
readily applicable. Earlier, this apparently anomalous finding was 
explained in terms of already introduced mechanisms whereby the 
presence of priming letters in general might result in the activation of a 
superordinate semantic code which in turn could activate word names 
relating to both case forms. From this, it was argued, a net inhibitory 
effect from response suppression could have arisen. This result 
nevertheless remains problematic and it is not clear how it can be 
accounted for in terms of established models. If the inhibitory effects 
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relative to neutral priming are not valid then it could follow that case 
primes do not differentially affect name-decisions. This could arise if 
cross-attribute effects did not occur during encoding, or, name-decisions 
were based on name information only. The possibility that the 
phenomenon is peculiar to typographic case could be further tested with 
analogous experiments using other forms of stimuli. However, an 
analogy might also be drawn with Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) 
investigation of the effects of pictures on word categorization. This is 
discussed below. 
Although facilitation and inhibition were obtained with both within-
attribute priming and cross-attribute name priming of case-decision there 
are possible differences in the strength of within- and cross-attribute 
effects. Initial inspection of Figure 4.27 (Page 215) may suggest that case 
effects on case-decision were stronger than name effects. Here, though, it 
should be noted that Experiment 4 did not allow the effect of the name 
priming component on case-decision to be directly isolated from the case 
component. Any facilitation or inhibition due to name information could 
have been larger than that suggested by the relative increase in effects of 
case and name information in comparison to case information alone. 
Indicative of a stronger case effect is the finding that combined congruent 
case and incongruent name information resulted in a net facilitation. 
While this observation alone could be accounted for merely by 
facilitatory effects being stronger than inhibitory effects the same 
reasoning would also suggest that the congruent name effect could 
dominate when combined with an incongruent case effect. This was not 
found; net inhibition was apparent. Although there could be complexities 
resulting from interaction of case and name effects during encoding it has 
also been argued that inhibition could have resulted from a separate 
mechanism such as response competition. In this case the above 
differences in facilitation and inhibition could be indicative of the 
magnitude of the name effect. On this basis, then again, it is possible that 
within-attribute effects on case-decisions could be stronger than cross-
attribute effects. If the latter is assumed, then this is also consistent with 
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the earlier single- and dual-coding structures. The means by which cross-
attribute priming could occur have already been noted with regard to 
these models. With single-encoding, for example, if it is assumed that 
verbal and nonverbal featural systems exist which can both support 
priming then within-attribute effects would be expected to be stronger 
than cross-attribute effects on account of prime and target compatibility 
within each system. Priming, however, could also result from the 
semantic representation of name or case input being accessed. In this 
latter situation those such as Carr et al. (1982) and Snodgrass (1984) have 
noted the possibility of an extreme interpretation where priming effects 
could be equivalent regardless of input modality. If differences in the 
strength of priming effects are attributable to encoding then this latter 
position does not appear to be consistent with the present results. A dual-
coding structure could similarly account for the differences insofar that 
verbal and nonverbal input are encoded in separate systems; within-
modality information having a greater influence than information from 
another modality. The dominance of a case effect can be accounted for in 
terms of single-encoding if it is assumed that encoding can be selectively 
directed so that particular stimulus attributes are activated with 
consequent effects upon performance. This possibility is central to 
Nelson's (1979) notion of a 'focal code'. Here it is held that encoding 
can be directed according to the type of task. That the name component 
should nevertheless have an effect is allowable in view of specific 
encoding operations having a degree of independence (Nelson, 1979). 
The means by which encoding can be selectively directed in Nelson's 
sensory-semantic model, however, have not been made explicit. With 
featural systems where activation spreads automatically it is not clear 
how task-selectivity could operate. However, the effects obtained could 
occur if direct access of information from the featural systems to decision 
and response mechanisms is allowed. For example, with reference to the 
sensory semantic model, Bajo (1988) has suggested that naming a word 
may not require semantic access. Here the possibility is that a response 
could be based directly upon the output of the phonemic featural system 
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(see Figure 1.5, Page 51). If output directly from a phonemic featural 
system is possible then this principle may be extended to provide a model 
where decisions could be based directly upon the output of the verbal and 
nonverbal visual featural systems. Comment relevant to this possibility is 
found in Nelson et al.'s (1977) discussion concerning the significance of 
the sensory semantic model in relation to memory. For example, it is 
stated that encoding 'cannot be accurately characterized as consisting of 
a series of immutable and automatic activations that are specifically and 
only directed to some pinnacle of semantic-encoding' (Page 494). In the 
sensory semantic model the codes existing within the visual featural 
systems are elaborated and effective as 'mnemonics'. For example the 
recognition of pictures may largely depend upon the nature of their visual 
rather than their semantic codes. In view of this one possible inference is 
that a response to a given object (or an attribute such as typographic case 
used in the present experiments) could involve direct access to the output 
of a pictorial visual feature system rather than necessarily being entirely 
semantically mediated. In this sense decision mechanisms could also be 
implicated in any differences in the strength of case and name effects. 
The extent to which semantic information might be involved could also 
be relevant to the S troop asymmetry typically found between the effects 
of colours on reading and words on colour naming. Here the two tasks 
are, in a sense, entirely different. With reading, or word naming, a direct 
link between grapheme to phoneme conversion could exist and provide 
little opportunity for irrelevant colour information to have an effect. With 
colour naming, semantic mediation is necessitated before phonemic 
information is accessed. This order of operations is explicit in Nelson et 
al.'s (1977) sensory semantic model (Figure 1.5, Page 51). 
Similarities in within- and cross-attribute effects may be apparent from 
the time-course of effects; a striking feature in the present results being 
the sharp transient marking the onset of selective priming. Allowing for 
possible differences in the time required for accessing case and name 
codes, the results suggest that priming is determined by the order of 
processing of prime and target information. Although this could be 
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consistent with the encoding, decision and responding mechanisms as 
described, further consideration of this is warranted in view of the 
discussion of Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) work in Chapter 3. Here a 
strong form of relative speed hypothesis predicted that the temporal 
relationship between target and distractor information is both necessary 
and sufficient for interference effects, while with a weak form of the 
hypothesis the temporal relationship was only regarded as necessary. 
From their results with picture and word interference experiments Glaser 
and Diingelhoff (1984) rejected the strongest form of the hypothesis 
while retaining the weak form only insofar that temporal contiguity of 
target and distractor is required if any interference is to occur. This 
conclusion was consistent with mechanisms which predicted backward 
priming effects. For example the semantic encoding explanation of 
Stroop interference (Seymour, 1974, 1977) was cited; this was 
interpreted in terms of the accumulation of competing internal evidence 
for target and distracting contextual information which is independent of 
temporal precedence. However, in Chapter 3, Glaser and Diingelhoff's 
(1984) conclusion that interference was a function of encoding rather 
than responding mechanisms was challenged on the grounds that in their 
experiments, in particular where words were used to distract picture 
categorization, the range of prime pre-exposures was insufficient to 
obtain effects with the tasks that they used. 
If it is assumed that typographic case can be regarded as a nonverbal, or 
pictorial, attribute then, in one way, name priming of case-decision can 
be regarded as analogous to Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) word 
priming of picture categorization. On this assumption the present finding 
that name information primed case-decisions supports the argument that 
Glaser and Diingelhoff might have obtained greater increases in word 
priming of picture categorization with longer prime pre-exposures. If 
Glaser and Diingelhoff's picture priming of word categorization is also 
regarded as analogous to case priming of name-decision then two aspects 
of these results may be noted. Firstly, both sets of results may be 
accountable in terms of a relative speed of processing argument. That 
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Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984, Experiment 2) picture priming effects on 
word categorization began at the shorter prime post-exposures and 
extended throughout the pre-exposure range can be seen as having a 
similarity with the onset of case priming of name-decision at zero SOA. 
In the present work, though, the variation in the onset of effects 
according to relative speeds is smaller and more sharply delineated than 
the corresponding effects of pictures on word categorization. In addition 
to the wider variety of stimuli used by Glaser and Dtingelhoff a possible 
factor here is that categorization was registered by a vocal response 
rather than a keypress. That these variants could account for latter 
quantitative differences in results could, of course, be followed up 
empirically, either by using keypress responses to picture categories, or, 
vocal responses to case-decisions. The second aspect of the results 
concerns the magnitude of facilitation and inhibition. With case priming 
of name-decision it was notable that inhibition was obtained regardless of 
congruency. Glaser and Diingelhoff obtained a strong inhibitory effect 
with incongruent picture primes on word categorization. However, 
facilitatory effects were obtained with congruent pictures, albeit weak. 
The earlier account for inhibitory case priming effects on name-decision 
in terms of a letter string leading to activation of a superordinate category 
representing typographic case in general could also apply to Glaser and 
Dtingelhoff's findings. That a more general, or superordinate category 
could be activated for pictures might account for the facilitation obtained 
by Glaser and Diingelhoff since, rather than using a keypress to indicate 
specific items, the task was to name a category. Although the latter 
effects are difficult to explain an important point which nevertheless 
emerges from comparisons of the present data and those of Glaser and 
Diingelhoff is that a relative speed of processing and response 
competition account of verbal to nonverbal, and nonverbal to verbal 
interference effects could remain viable. This interpretation may be 
contrasted with Glaser and Diingelhoff's (1984) conclusion in favour of a 
functional internal processing asymmetry underlying reading and picture 
categorization, and, picture naming and word categorization. 
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Some Concluding Remarks 
There are potentially many different mechanisms which can account for 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects obtained in even a small subset of 
primed choice reaction time tasks. Additionally, more than one 
mechanism may contribute to any one pattern of effects and complexities 
arise from many possible competing accounts. One theme in this work 
has been to examine the extent to which some established mechanisms 
could account for contextual effects concerning information in verbal and 
nonverbal form. This account differs from others in that it has been 
argued that the same mechanisms could remain viable in accounting for 
priming within and across stimulus modalities. This may apply to the 
effect of verbal information on decisions regarding nonverbal items as 
well as nonverbal information affecting decisions concerning verbal 
information. However, it should be noted that, apart from their possible 
existence, the applicability of mechanisms may vary according to task 
requirements and other features of experimental design. There is a sense 
in which the account is parsimonious in that some existing mechanisms 
have been reinterpreted to accommodate both previous and present data. 
However the present results also throw up instances which do not sit 
easily within existing models; that consistent contextual information can 
lead to an inhibitory effect on performance is a case in point. Similarly, 
while the asymmetry between effects resulting from combined congruent 
and incongruent primes may on the one hand constrain some processing 
possibilities on the other hand it also leads to further questions 
concerning the details of underlying mechanisms. In this way these 
findings could be relevant to how existing models might be developed, 
or, novel explanations sought. 
APPENDIX 1 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REFRACTORY EFFECT 
Experiments investigating the response of single nerve cells to 
successive stimuli indicate that a cell takes time to recover after 'firing'. 
This interval of time, typically in the order of 0.5 msec (e.g., 
Telford, 1931; Craik, 1948), is known as the 'refractory period'. The 
term 'psychological refractory period' is used in reference to the delay, 
typically up to 50 msec, that has been found in analogous psychological 
experiments when subjects respond to the second in a sequence of two 
successive stimuli (e.g., Drazin, 1961). Although the similarity of the 
terms suggests analogous underlying processes it is dangerous to make 
such a comparison. For example the longer interval found in the 
psychological experiments may be accounted for by the organization of a 
response to a particular stimulus rather than merely by recovery. Since 
the examination of responses to successive discrete stimuli is an integral 
part of many priming studies it is important to consider the nature of any 
likely 'refractory' effects when interpreting the results. 
Many simple reaction studies (e.g., Klemmer, 1956; Drazin, 1961; Bevan 
et al., 1965) have shown that if a warning signal is given before a target 
signal then the reaction time to the target varies with onset asynchrony of 
the two signals in fashion similar to that shown in Figure A1.1. Reaction 
time approaches a minimum with SOAs of about 1000 msec and may 
increase as they become longer. If different SOA values are used in 
random order the results form a similar pattern except that overall the 
reaction times are longer. Furthermore it has also been well established 
(e.g., Davis, 1957; Creamer, 1963) that the RT to the second signal 
varies in a similar manner if a response is required to the warning signal 
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FIGURE A1.1 Variation of reaction time to a target stimulus as a function 
of onset asynchrony or 'foreperiod' between warning signal and target. 
(From Drazin,1961.) 
feature, then, which is common to the results of the above studies is the 
lengthening of target RT with shorter SOAs. Another feature of the 
refractory effect is that it that it persists after extensive practice 
(Hick, 1948; Davis, 1956; Slater-Hammel, 1958; Gottsdanker & 
Stelmach, 1971). 
One particularly dominant account for the 'refractory' delay was put 
forward by Craik (1948) and is known as the 'single channel hypothesis'. 
The idea is that somewhere in the processing sequence there is a time-lag 
caused by the "building up of some single 'computing' process which 
then discharges down the motor nerves, ....new sensory impulses entering 
the brain while this central computing process was going on would either 
disturb it or be hindered from disturbing it by some 'switching' system." 
(Craik, 1948, p. 147). Another explanation of the cause of refractory 
effects may be drawn from Keele's (1973) idea of limited space in 
information processing capacity. In this context the word 'attention' has 
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been used to describe the total processing capacity available; while some 
activities require almost total 'attention' and interfere with other 
activities there is also the situation, particularly with skilled performance, 
where attention may be divided with minimal interference. 
Although the notions of limited space and the single channel hypothesis 
suggest general principles that may be applicable to refractory 
phenomena there is, of course, no specific mention of exactly where such 
`limited space' or a 'single channel' may be located. If it is assumed that 
an overall performance involves a number of broad components such as 
peripheral sensory or motor mechanisms, the identification or 
categorization of input, then the decisions relating to a plan of action and 
a repertoire of motor commands which have to be organised 
appropriately for muscle control (see for example Marteniuk, 1976) so 
that the carrying out of an action by means of the respective effector 
mechanisms is allowed. With this context in mind some of the main 
observations and experimental findings will be outlined. 
Where 'limited space' is concerned Keele (1973) argues that information 
in memory pertaining to familiar situations and appropriate responses 
may be obtained with very little demand on processing capacity and it is 
what follows this information retrieval process that demands attention. In 
other words it is in such things as the initiation and control of movement 
that refractory effects may occur rather than in a decision mechanism as 
such. Thus in a situation, such as a reaction time experiment which is 
highly practised, where the identification of input and selection of a 
suitable plan of action are assumed to occupy a minimal amount of time, 
performance should still be limited by the initiation of movement. This 
was supported by the observation that, even with practice, a 
psychological refractory period remained (Keele, 1973). However a 
concern with this explanation rests with the effect of practice upon the 
processing capacity required for initiation and control of motor 
movement. It is perhaps also worth noting Keele's points concerning 
novel situations and responses: the limitation of processing space and 
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also of information processing time in principle applies to all information 
processes and in an unfamiliar situation verbal labelling of events and 
selection or construction of suitable responses require relatively large 
amounts of time and processing capacity. With Keele's model, however, 
this does not explain the persistence of a refractory effect in experimental 
situations where a response is required only for the second of two 
successive stimuli rather than to both. 
Davis (1956, 1957, 1959) and Creamer (1963) have found that delays in 
response to the second of two stimuli still occur even if the first stimulus 
is presented in a different sensory modality from the second and also if 
responses are made with opposite hands. These findings may be taken to 
suggest that the locus of the delay lies within the more extremely 
peripheral sensory and motor mechanisms. Although responding with 
opposite hands may invoke separate motor mechanisms of a more 
peripheral nature this does not necessarily mean totally independent 
peripheral processes are being deployed; very similar types of motor 
instructions common to both hands (which may be regarded as relatively 
peripheral) may be involved and interfere with each other. This has been 
illustrated by McLeod's (1978) experiment where two letters were 
presented briefly in succession, with an onset asynchrony of one second, 
and the subject's task was to press one key if the letters were the same 
and another key (using a different finger of the same hand) if they were 
different. This task was probed; an auditory tone to which subjects had to 
respond was presented at varying points within each trial. One group of 
subjects responded to the tone (which sounded like `bip') by saying `bip' 
while another group responded by pressing a key with the opposite hand 
to the one used for indicating letter similarity. In all cases subjects 
responded as quickly and as accurately as possible. If a probe was 
presented at or just before the occurrence of the second letter then letter 
matching responses took longer while a probe presented at other points 
in a trial had no significant effect. If responding with opposite hands to 
different tasks is believed to involve separate peripheral mechanisms 
then one is justified in concluding (as was done at the time) that central 
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processes are responsible for refractory effects. Importantly however, 
McLeod found that auditory responses to the probe were not significantly 
affected by a probe's temporal position within a trial. This suggests that 
more than one categorisation and decision regarding action can take 
place at one time centrally because when response systems are separated 
no refractory effects are obtained. 
If the results of the above studies are taken together then a possible locus 
which remains for the refractory effect lies within the organization of 
some of the motor commands required for certain actions; in particular 
those that may be common within response modalities such as the limbs. 
The mechanisms responsible for these functions may be thought of as 
acting as an interface between any decision mechanisms that may exist 
and muscle action at the extremities. The requirements of the motor co-
ordination necessary in the pursuit of many everyday activities involving 
the arms and legs suggests closely associated mechanisms in certain 
areas. The findings from studies concerned with simultaneous actions 
such as those by Gunkel (1962), and Schmidt, Zelaznik, Hawkins, Frank, 
and Quinn (1979) are also consistent with this view. 
APPENDIX 2 
ALERTNESS EFFECTS 
The terms 'alertness' or 'arousal' have been used in reference to an 
overall level of activation in the central nervous system; the level of 
activation having consequences for the readiness with which stimuli may 
be processed. Apart from the more dramatic contrasts between such 
states as sleep and wakefulness two categories of alertness are 
identifiable; 'tonic' and 'phasic'. Tonic alertness refers to variations in 
alertness that are detectable over relatively long periods of time such as 
several hours or a day, or, even in terms of a lifetime. The effects of this 
have been demonstrated by a number of experiments which show marked 
changes over the course of a day in performance on such tasks as 
speeded letter cancelling to the number of digits that can be accurately 
memorised (Blake, 1971). By way of contrast phasic changes occur over 
very short intervals of time such as a few hundred msec. Such changes 
may be controlled voluntarily and may, for example, result from the 
occurrence of a warning stimulus within an experimental trial. Since the 
timing of the onset and cessation of experimental stimuli may determine 
changes in phasic alertness which affect performance the nature of the 
condition is examined in more detail. 
Phasic Alertness 
The presentation of a cueing stimulus typically alerts an organism so that 
subsequent stimuli may be processed more rapidly. Such an 'orienting 
response' has been investigated by studying the electrical responses of 
the brain with the aid of an electroencephalograph. Generally electrical 
responses are detectable from about 10 msec after the onset of a stimulus 
and last for about half a second (see, for example, Hassett, 1978). A 
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more detailed examination of such 'evoked potentials' which have been 
averaged over a number of repeated presentations reveals some distinct 
components; an early component occurs on all occasions and is even 
detectable during sleep while later components depend on more 
voluntary attentional processes. A later component that is of particular 
relevance to reaction time studies is a gradual increase in negative 
potential, termed the 'contingent negative variation' (CNV). This is 
obtained in response to a stimulus (to which no response is required) 
which is used to prepare a subject for the arrival of a second stimulus 
(when a response is required). Such a CNV may be obtained 200 msec 
after the onset of a warning stimulus and reach a maximum at about 
500 msec, after which it may gradually diminish over a further period of 
some 500 msec (Posner, 1975). The onset and magnitude of the CNV 
depends on the SOA between the alerting and imperative stimuli. 
There is an established relationship between CNV and alertness in a 
variety of experiments where one stimulus is used to signal the arrival of 
a second imperative stimulus and this is further mirrored in time-course 
changes in reaction time (Posner, 1978). For example with a letter 
matching task reaction times may fall from very short SOAs by about 
50 msec to reach a minimum at SOAs of about 500 msec and then 
increase slowly with further increases of SOA (e.g., Posner & 
Boies, 1971). This U-shaped relationship between response time and 
SOA indicates that alertness builds-up over about half a second and is 
maintained only for a relatively short time. 
Of particular importance to the interpretation of results from some 
reaction time experiments is whether phasic alerting is general or 
selective in relation to input content. Posner (1978) cites evidence from 
letter-matching experiments by Posner and Boies (1971) that suggest 
phasic alerting results in a general improvement in reaction time rather 
that having an effect on 'automatic pathways' responsible for encoding 
more specific information carried by a stimulus. The occurrence of 
automatic effects was indicated by the increase in relative facilitation in 
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responses in same-letter matches in comparison to different-letter 
matches that was obtained when the second of each letter-pair (to which 
a response was required) followed the first with increasing intervals of 
time from 0 to 500 msec. In addition to the relative effect there was an 
improvement in reaction time for both matching and mismatching 
SOA (msec) 
FIGURE A2.1 Response times for a physical letter match task as a 
function of the warning signal onset asynchrony (represented for each 
point by the number preceding the oblique) and letter-pair onset 
asynchrony (numbers following the obliques). (Adapted from Posner and 
Boies, 1971.) 
conditions due to the alerting effects arising from the first letter of each 
pair also acting as a warning signal. The distinction between the 
activation and alerting effects was deduced from further experiments 
where a warning signal other than one of the letter pairs was used. In this 
case it was found that when the letters comprising each pair were 
presented simultaneously then response times fell with increase of 
interval following the warning signal in the manner indicated by the 
`preparation' curve in figure A2.1. In a further 'encoding' condition 
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Posner and Boies also found that if one of the letters of a pair was 
presented 500 msec after a warning signal, and that this letter was then 
followed by the second letter to which a matching response was required 
then, over a range of time separations from 0 to 500 msec between the 
two letters, response times were some 100 msec less than the preparation 
condition. This is also shown in Figure A2.1. In this condition it was also 
found that the warning signal had an equal effect on response times to 
matching and mismatching conditions. The point 500/0 in the preparation 
condition is equivalent to the 500/0 point in the encoding condition when 
there is zero time separation between the letters, this equivalence is 
reflected in the response times obtained and also indicates that the 
warning signal used in the encoding condition has an alerting effect. The 
continuing relatively low response times obtained for the 500/150 and 
500/500 points in the encoding condition may be accounted for by the 
additional effects of pathway activation. A further condition where the 
first of each letter pair acted both as a warning signal and as a selective 
cue indicated that activating and alerting effects working together 
produce a lowering in response time equal to the sum of the two effects 
separately produced. The results for this 'both' condition are again 
shown in Figure A2.1. This work suggests that alerting and activation 
effects are independent; a warning signal thus may not affect encoding 
processes but instead have consequences regarding the response to the 
results of input processes. Posner and Boies (1971) also obtained similar 




EXPERIMENT 1: Case-Priming of Case-Decision 
Subjects: Three undergraduates and seven postgraduates served as 
unpaid volunteers. 
Total number of responses: 5760 
Number of responses falling below 200 msec limit: 9 
Number of responses falling above 1000 msec limit: 8 
Number of errors: 390 
For SOA range -160 to +240 msec: 
Main effect for SOA: F(7,5329)=5.05, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,5329)=12.60, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(14,5329)=1.63, p>.001 
For SOA range -160 to -40 msec (post-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(2,1988)=1.47, p>.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,1988)=0.14, p>.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(4,1988)=0.16, p>.001 
For SOA range +40 to +240 msec (pre-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(3,2672)=1.15, p>.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2672)=24.88, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(6,2672)=0.34, p>.001 
Congruency effects for individual SOAs (*p<.05): 
Q(c+/N) Q(c-/N) Q(c+/c-) X2(errors) 
-160 F(2,668)=0.08 1.94 
-80 F(2,659)=0.33 1.05 
-40 F(2,661)=0.06 5.73 
0 F(2,669)=0.15 0.73 
+40 F(2,665)=3.52* 2.17 1.56 3.73* 4.02 
+80 F(2,664)=9.88* 3.67* 2.59 6.27* 16.92* 
+160 F(2,673)=4.78* 1.93 2.45 4.38* 0.92 
+240 F(2,670)=8.08* 3.56* 2.06 5.63* 0.37 
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FIGURE A4.7. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 1): Mean correct case-
decision response times for ten additional subjects over the SOA-range 
-160 to +240 msec. Each mean is based on 288 trials. 
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FIGURE A4.8. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 1): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
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FIGURE A4.9. ERRORS (Experiment 1): The variation in error rate for ten 
additional subjects obtained over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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FIGURE A4.10. ERRORS (Experiment 1): The difference in error rates in 
relation to neutral priming for ten additional subjects obtained over the 















EXPERIMENT 2: Name-Priming of Name-Decision 
Subjects: Three undergraduates and seven postgraduates served as 
unpaid volunteers. 
Total number of responses: 5760 
Number of responses falling below 200 msec limit: 6 
Number of responses falling above 1000 msec limit: 39 
Number of errors: 332 
For SOA range -160 to +240 msec: 
Main effect for SOA: F(7,5359)=16.19, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,5359)=24.70, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(14,5359)=4.83, p>.001 
For SOA range -160 to -40 msec (post-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(2,2029)=9.47, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2029)=0.90, p>.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(4,2029)=0.42, p>.001 
For SOA range +40 to +240 msec (pre-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(3,2643)=7.92, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2643)=51.00, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(6,2643)=0.91, p>.001 
Congruency effects for individual SOAs (*p<.05): 
Q(n+/N) Q(n-/N) Q(n+/n-) x2(errors) 
-160 F(2,684)=0.70 1.51 
-80 F(2,677)=0.66 7.60* 
-40 F(2,668)=0.43 1.27 
0 F(2,687)=0.17 2.50 
+40 F(2,655)=13.51* 3.33* 4.10* 7.43* 44.71* 
+80 F(2,652)=13.49* 4.29* 3.09* 7.37* 58.26* 
+160 F(2,658)=18.81* 5.41* 3.15* 8.56* 14.63* 
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FIGURE A4.11. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 2): Mean correct name-
decision response times for ten additional subjects over the SOA-range 




FIGURE A4.12. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 2): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
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FIGURE A4.13. ERRORS (Experiment 2): The variation of error rate for 
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FIGURE A4.14. ERROR RATES (Experiment 2): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for ten additional subjects over the 
SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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EXPERIMENT 3: Name-Priming of Case-Decision 
Subjects: Two undergraduates and eight postgraduates served as unpaid 
volunteers. 
Total number of responses: 5760 
Number of responses falling below 200 msec limit: 1 
Number of responses falling above 1000 msec limit: 14 
Number of errors: 514 
For SOA range -160 to +240 msec: 
Main effect for SOA: F(7,5207)=10.79, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,5207)=7.99, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(14,5207)=1.60, p>.001 
For SOA range -160 to -40 msec (post-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(2,1999)=0.37, p>.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,1999)=0.32, p>.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(4,1999)=0.24, p>.001 
For SOA range +40 to +240 msec (pre-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(3,2553)=7.37, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2553)=10.78, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(6,2553)=1.65, p>.001 
Congruency effects for individual SOAs (*p<.05): 
Q(n+/N) Q(n-/N) Q(n+/n-) x2(errors) 
-160 F(2,668)=0.34 0.57 
-80 F(2,670)=0.37 0.88 
-40 F(2,661)=0.10 2.83 
0 F(2,655)=0.01 2.25 
+40 F(2,618)=0.11 36.88* 
+80 F(2,634)=1.59 20.45* 
+160 F(2,646)=9.14* 2.61 3.39* 5.99* 6.78* 
+240 F(2,678)=6.51* 3.38* 3.10* 6.48* 6.18* 
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FIGURE A4.16. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 3): Mean correct case-
decision response times for ten additional subjects over the SOA-range 
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FIGURE A4.17. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 3): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
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FIGURE A4.18. ERRORS (Experiment 3): The variation of error rate for 
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FIGURE A4.19. ERROR RATES (Experiment 3): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for ten additional subjects over the 
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EXPERIMENT 4: Case- and Name-Priming of Case-Decision 
Subjects: Two undergraduates and twelve postgraduates served as unpaid 
volunteers. 
Total number of responses: 15680 
Number of responses falling below 200 msec limit: 19 
Number of responses falling above 1000 msec limit: 39 
Number of errors: 1160 
For SOA range -160 to +240 msec: 
Main effect for SOA: F(7,14406)=16.17, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(6,14406)=12.59, p<001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(42,14406)=1.85, p>.001 
For SOA range -160 to -40 msec (post-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(2,5467)=4.61, p>.001 
Congruency effect: F(6,5467)=0.98, p>.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(12,5467)=1.33, p>.001 
For SOA range +40 to +240 msec (pre-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(3,7154)=22.19, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(6,7154)=26.66, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(18,7154)=0.81, p>.001 
For c+/N Q(7175)=5.48 p<.05 
For c-/N Q(7175)=3.50 p<.05 
For c+/c- Q(7175)=8.98 p<.05 
For c+n+/c+ Q(7175)=2.36 p>.05 
For c+n-/c+ Q(7175)=4.07 p<.05 
For c+n+/c+n- Q(7175)=6.43 p<.05 
For c-n+/c- Q(7175)=1.63 p>.05 
For c-n-/c- Q(7175)= n/a (p>.05) 
For c-n+/c-n- Q(7175)=2.05 p>.05 
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Q(c+/N) Q(c-/N) 	 Q(c+/c-) 
+40 F(6,1760)=6.45* 2.71 1.35 	 4.06* 
+80 F(6,1763)=8.49* 3.12 3.42* 	 6.54* 
+160 F(6,1804)=4.55* 3.02 1.77 	 4.79* 
+240 F(6,1827)=2.87* 2.05 0.49 	 2.54 





+40 1.15 1.07 2.22 
+80 1.23 2.16 3.39* 
+160 0.92 2.31 3.22 
+240 1.42 2.62 4.04* 





+40 0.58 1.58 1.00 47.33* 
+80 2.33 0.46 1.87 56.73* 
+160 1.37 0.67 0.69 13.02* 
+240 0.06 0.56 0.50 21.41* 
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FIGURE A4.26. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 4): Mean correct case-
decision response times for fourteen additional subjects over the SOA-
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FIGURE A4.27. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 4): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to neutral priming for fourteen additional 
subjects over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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FIGURE A4.29. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 4): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to case-congruent priming for fourteen 
additional subjects over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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FIGURE A4.30. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 4): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to case-incongruent priming for fourteen 
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FIGURE A4.31. ERRORS (Experiment 4): The variation of error rate for 
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FIGURE A4.32. ERROR RATES (Experiment 4): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for fourteen additional subjects over the 
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FIGURE A4.33. ERROR RATES (Experiment 4): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for fourteen additional subjects over the 
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FIGURE A4.34. ERROR RATES (Experiment 4): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for fourteen additional subjects over the 
SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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EXPERIMENT 5: Case-Priming of Name-Decision 
Subjects: Three undergraduates and seven postgraduates served as 
unpaid volunteers. 
Total number of responses: 5760 
Number of responses falling below 200 msec limit: 2 
Number of responses falling above 1000 msec limit: 4 
Number of errors: 372 
For SOA range -160 to +240 msec: 
Main effect for SOA: F(7,5358)=6.78, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,5358)=11.90, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(14,5358)=1.17, p>.001 
For SOA range -160 to -40 msec (post-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(2,2019)=21.56, p<.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2019)=0.08, p>.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(4,2019)=0.51, p>.001 
For SOA range +40 to +240 msec (pre-exposed primes): 
Main effect for SOA: F(3,2682)=2.55, p>.001 
Congruency effect: F(2,2682)=16.34, p<.001 
SOA/Congruency Interaction: F(6,2682)=0.45, p>.001 
Congruency effects for individual SOAs (*p<.05): 
Q(c+/N) Q(c-/N) Q(c+/c-) x2(errors) 
-160 F(2,675)=0.54 0.15 
-80 F(2,671)=0.04 2.42 
-40 F(2,673)=0.64 4.70 
0 F(2,657)=1.07 0.72 
+40 F(2,673)=3.30* 3.03* 3.22* 0.19 3.82 
+80 F(2,667)=4.16* 3.07* 3.86* 0.79 1.20 
+160 F(2,669)=5.87* 4.47* 3.87* 0.60 0.13 
+240 F(2,673)=4.48* 4.24* 2.18 2.07 1.52 
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FIGURE A4.35. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 5): Mean correct name-
decision response times for ten additional subjects over the SOA-range 
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FIGURE A4.36. RESPONSE TIMES (Experiment 5): The difference in 
mean response times in relation to neutral priming for ten additional 
subjects over the SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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FIGURE A4.37. ERRORS (Experiment 5): The variation of error rate for 
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FIGURE A4.38. ERROR RATES (Experiment 5): The difference in error 
rates in relation to neutral priming for ten additional subjects over the 
SOA-range -160 to +240 msec. 
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